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Drilling "dry" meant drilling ahead while pumping
water down the drill pipe without actual
circulation. It was felt that this would be safe as
the production zone (probably meaning the oil zone)
was expected some 30 ft. deeper.
They decided to go
ahead on this basis. Jack Pettinger: "1 do remember
that Lloyd Stafford was 'dead against it'. I
remember him saying 'the least that can happen is a
blow-out'."11
Upon the decision of March 6, to
drill "dry", a water line was rigged up to the
standpipe so that water could be pumped directly
down the drill string. Daylight tour on March 7 made
19 ft. and the afternoon tour 22 ft. of new hole
with no returns. The graveyard tour of March 8 had
drilled 17 ft. to 5,331 ft., still 23 ft. short of
the projected total depth for running the production
casing when the well blew out completely at 4:15
a.m., flowing large amounts of oil and gas from both
D-3 and Viking.
Bill Kinghorn, now retired at the
Pacific Coast, had been brought up from the Valley
as mentioned before and was one of the Conservation
Board's "bottom hole" men taking pressure surveys.
He said he had pleaded with Red Goodall to not let
them drill "dry".
Jack Pettinger,9 now retired
from Halliburton, set down in a letter of May 1981
his recollections of March 6 discussions:
On the Atlantic 3 job, total frustration eventually set
in...I remember sitting in on a conversation with
Cody Spencer, Clarence Matthews and Lloyd
Stafford... - Clarence was of the opinion according
to geological information...that there was
still...30 ft. of the 'Lost Circulation Formation'
to penetrate and it was suggested that they drill
ahead 'dry' and then try to control circulation over
the area in one operation.10
(This may help resolve the Spi Langston account
which follows.)
There is another item which is
difficult to explain although there was a motley
assemblage of mixed grades of casing on the Atlantic
racks. Spi Langston had a special casing shoe which
had been flown in from the U.S., ready to run on the
long string. This was a Larkin, which had a set of
petals opening up below the ports when the shearing
ball was pumped down. This would partially shield
from the D-3 the scouring and lost circulation
effect of the cementing. Spi said he was ready to
run casing with this special shoe, Because of a
possible mix-up in drill pipe measurement (an extra
single picked up?) 30 ft. of hole were inadvertently
drilled, according to Spi, This could have happened
during the struggle to get cement plugs set and
regain circulation from March 2 to March 8.
Information gathered shortly after the D-3 blow-out
from those parties having responsibility, is
summarized:
- Dave Gray had suggested drilling be
continued. He had seen "dry" completions in the
Middle East through a limestone in which it was
particularly difficult to maintain circulation. The
technique was to drill ahead with water, reach the
required total depth and cement the drill pipe in
place as production casing.
- Lloyd Stafford and Nate Goodman telephoned Gene Denton and Cody Spencer
to discuss the proposal. Nate also contacted the
Board's Deputy Chairman, Red Goodall and further
discussions were held in Calgary between Denton and
the Deputy Chairman, as to the advisability of
drilling "dry".
- Red Goodall confirmed that Nate
Goodman was in constant attendance during the time
circulation was lost and did not object to the
procedure outlined, having in mind the drilling
experience up to that time.
- Goodall mentioned that
the annulus should be kept full 'in order to
counteract a possible blow-out'. (This was
impossible to achieve.)
- Clarence Matthews had contacted Atlantic Oil
Co. and made his recommendation to them to drill
"dry". He was then reported to have received their
approval by telephone. Clarence then conveyed the
word to Lloyd as to how he was to carry on: if
cement did not hold at 5,265 ft...."dry" drilling
was to be proceeded with.
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