A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam

VOLUME VII
THE SOLDIER

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9 March 1981

SUBJECT: Declassification of the BDM Study, "The Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam"

Defense Technical Information Center
ATTN: Ms. Betty Weatherholtz
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314

1. Your organization was on the distribution list for the BDM study, "The Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam." The study was assigned AD numbers B048632L through 641L.

2. In December 1980, the Army War College Security Office notified all recipients of the study by telephone that it contained classified information and should be secured.

3. BDM now has revised the appropriate pages of the study to delete all classified information and has conformed to all other requirements required by the clearance review.

4. A revised copy of the study which is unclassified and approved for public release is inclosed. DTIC Form 50's are inclosed for assignment of new AD numbers.

ANDREW C. REMSON, JR.
Colonel, CE
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
A STUDY OF STRATEGIC LESSONS LEARNED IN VIETNAM

VOLUME VII

THE SOLDIER

This draft report is submitted to DAMO-SSP.
FOREWORD

This Study is a final draft submitted to DAMO-SSP in accordance with the provisions of Contract No. DAAG 39-78-C-0120.

The task is to identify and analyze lessons that should be learned from three decades of US involvement in Vietnam. This is Volume VII of the Study.

Volume I The Enemy
Volume II South Vietnam
Volume III US Foreign Policy and Vietnam 1945-1975
Volume IV US Domestic Factors Influencing Vietnam War Policy Making
Volume V Planning the War
Volume VI Conduct of the War
Volume VII The Soldier
Volume VIII The Results of the War

"The views of the authors do not purport to reflect the positions of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense."
A. PERSPECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This volume, The Soldier, is the seventh of an eight-volume study entitled A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam undertaken by the BDM Corporation under contract to the US Army. This comprehensive research effort is aimed at identifying lessons which US military leaders and US civilian policy makers should have learned or should now be learning from the US experience in Vietnam.

Volume I of this study, an examination of the enemy, includes discussions of the DRV leadership and party organization, Communist Vietnamese goals and strategies, and internal and external channels of support established to aid the North's war effort. Volume II focuses on the Republic of Vietnam, the country's societal characteristics and problems, its government, and its armed forces. Volume III discusses the global conflict in which the US involvement occurred, the major historical precedents influencing US involvement, and the US national-level policy process which shaped this involvement. Volume IV explores the US domestic scene, including its political and economic components, the role of the media during the Vietnam conflict, and the extent of domestic support for the war. Volume V concentrates on the actual planning of the US war effort, examining various aspects of this effort, including contingency planning, the Pacification and Vietnamization programs, and the negotiation process. Volume VI, Conduct of the War, includes discussions of US intelligence, logistics, and advisory efforts; US counterinsurgency programs; and ground, air, naval, and unconventional operations. Finally, Volume VIII discusses, in broad terms, the results of the war for the United States in terms of domestic, foreign, and military policies.

This eight-volume study effort is analytical, not historical in nature. Its focus is primarily military in orientation. The purpose of the entire eight volumes is not a retelling of the Vietnam conflict, but a
drawing of lessons and insights of value to present and future US policy
makers, both civilian and military.

B. METHODOLOGY AND PURPOSE OF VOLUME VII "THE SOLDIER"

The purpose of this volume on The Soldier is to describe in what way
US strategy during the Vietnam period was shaped or affected by the charac-
ter of the American soldier and the characteristics of the American mili-
tary system, and to determine whether the average American soldier changed

This volume examines the socio-economic background of the soldier and
the personnel policies at the national level that impacted on the conduct
of the war; the most notable of these were the selective service system,
the presidential refusal to mobilize the Reserve Component, and Project
100,000.

Training and indoctrination are analyzed and found to be generally
good but unable in themselves to resolve the serious "people problems" that
haunted the military during the four years of gradual US withdrawal from
the Republic of Vietnam. Service personnel policies that impacted on
training are evaluated.

Very real problems in the area of leadership and ethics surfaced
during the Vietnam War. Shortcomings in these vital areas had an impact on
the morale and discipline of the troops, although other factors beyond the
control of the military services also had an important influence. This
volume shows, however, that the services were far too slow in recognizing
and adjusting to outside influences. The danger lies in the possibility
that some senior personnel will refuse now to recognize what real changes
have occurred and may still be occurring.

Racial tensions surfaced in the ranks of US forces in Vietnam and
elsewhere during the period 1960-1973. Their comparatively minor impact on
combat operations is discussed, as is the impact on non-combat functions
deriving from the otherwise pervasive influence of real and perceived
inequities in treatment accorded racial minorities during the period, in
Vietnam, the United States, and elsewhere.
Drug abuse, including alcohol abuse, which was and is the more widespread and serious problem within this category, is examined, using various research data accumulated by social scientists, congressional investigations, and the US Armed Forces.

Soldiers in any war are subjected to stress and a variety of psychological effects. This volume examines the impact of war on the soldier's mental health, drawing comparisons between psychological problems which surfaced in past conflict with those encountered by the US soldier during the Vietnam war.

C. HISTORICAL - CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF VOLUME VII

Figure VII-1 is a timeline showing selected events that are particularly relevant to this volume. It focuses on those significant historical events which had an impact on the US soldier during the period 1960-1973.
Figure VII-1. Significant Events Affecting The United States and Southeast Asia

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The chapters of Volume VII, The Soldier, develop a number of key insights and lessons concerning the US soldier during the years 1960-1973. These insights highlight a broad and diverse array of soldier-related problems and policies that developed in the years of the United States' combat role in Indochina. The insights are specific, focusing on the major themes discussed in the chapters of volume, including personnel policies and problems, racial discrimination, drug abuse, leadership quality, and careerism. The accompanying lessons, in contrast, while derived from the US soldier's experiences in Vietnam, are more general in tone, with wider application and greater interest to US military leaders and planners.
During the Vietnam War, successive administrations were reluctant to publicize "bad news" of any sort and attempted to minimize the domestic demands of the Vietnam policy. Thus the public, increasingly attached to its burgeoning comfort, was poorly prepared and often not very willing to make the necessary sacrifices for even a "limited" war effort. Personnel policies reflected this situation, and the poorer, poorly educated combat soldier whom these policies tended to generate bore the brunt of the fighting.

The Selective Service System demonstrated serious and inequitable flaws in its application to the Vietnam War. For example, failure to mobilize the National Guard and Reserves made the Reserves a haven for legal draft avoidance. The Reserve component's authorized strength swelled during the Vietnam War, but since abolition of the draft and reliance on the "All-Volunteer Service," the Reserve component has been depleted seriously, resulting, in 1979, in approximately a 50 percent shortfall in the minimal recruitment requirement at a time when regular enlistments are falling off sharply, particularly in ground combat forces.

Project 100,000 and other social programs placed an inordinate burden on the military services, particularly the Army and Marine Corps which had to field combat soldiers. The burden was felt in the basic and advanced training centers, but its greatest impact was in the area of military discipline and courts-martial. Earlier studies had indicated the unsuitability of men such as those recruited under Project 100,000.

De facto personnel policies allowed massive draft avoidance which tended to favor the already more privileged members of society and caused resentment among many of those who did serve, causing morale, leadership, and disciplinary problems.
LESSONS

Major and long-term changes occurred in public attitudes during the Vietnam War, most of which initially were not directly related to the hostilities but which were accelerated or amplified because of the war. Military authorities must keep apprised of and understand societal changes if they expect to achieve optimum efficiency in commanding new personnel and in personnel policy management.

The political parameters constraining military policy decisions must be fully understood if either of them is to be controlled to any extent. If political parameters prove inflexible, military means and/or ends must be adjusted accordingly. Together political and military limits define the "realm of the possible" for future policies.
**INSIGHTS**

**Training and Indoctrination**

- Despite many obvious shortcomings, the Army's training effort during the Vietnam War was a remarkable and comprehensive effort, accomplished without mobilizing the Reserve assets.
- The BCT, AIT, basic officer, and the scores of specialist schools in the Army training system were generally responsive to requirements worldwide and particularly to requirements in Vietnam. Lessons learned in combat were fed into the system, with varying degrees of success in lesson assimilation.
- Units that trained and deployed as units generally performed far better than those in which personnel were assigned as individuals. The "train and retain" concept, while more expensive than one in which individuals are assigned separately, pays off in results, and in the long run may prove to be cheaper owing to the higher calibre of trained soldiers.
- Unit schools are essential, particularly in a combat zone, and brigade and division levels are the best equipped to conduct professional unit schools.
- The key trainers are company and battalion commanders because of their experience, proximity to the troops, and the nature of their tactical responsibilities. However, these commanders require the interest, support, and guidance of their seniors if they are to ensure the best possible training and indoctrination of the US soldier.
- The one-year combat tour and the six-month command tour, in vogue during the Vietnam conflict, operated to the detriment of training. Some commanders seemed to believe their short tours absolved them from the responsibility of resolving underlying training and leadership deficiencies in their units. Problems could be left unsolved for the next commander. This is not an indictment of the many excellent commanders who served in Vietnam, but the record does show that there was a substantial number of opportunists in command positions in Vietnam.
- The combat efficiency and unit cohesion that was evident in the early days of the war, at least until the post-Tet drawdown began, suggests that indoctrination was not a serious problem within the Army at that time. Most divisions conducted
indoctrination for newly arrived troops which enhanced their orientation, acclimatization, and knowledge of the rules of engagement.

Indoctrination programs conducted during 1970-1972 appear to have been ineffective. This was due in large measure to the changing society and its impact on the young recruit coupled with antiwar sentiments expressed by the media and Congress during the US drawdown. The services were slow to acknowledge or recognize the changed situation and to initiate remedial action. Training and indoctrination alone could not be expected to produce the desired results in combat; however, since personnel policies often destroyed unit cohesion through transfers designed to balance individual rotation dates.

LESSONS

Training, supervision of training, and teaching subordinate commanders how to train is a command responsibility which, if exercised properly, will produce combat effective units. To carry out this responsibility, field grade and general officers must know their business and they must discharge their training responsibilities aggressively and enthusiastically.

Changes in formal school curricula tend to be slow in coming and, therefore, are not always responsive to the changing needs of commanders in the field. Unit schools, or in-country training, therefore, constitutes the commander's best tool for influencing the quality and readiness of his unit. The quality of these schools is in direct proportion to the experience and ability of the personnel assigned to run the schools.
Leadership and Ethics

- Many factors external to the military created an environment that made leadership and adherence to the highest ethical standards difficult for even the best officers. There were also factors internal to the military, but very difficult to change, which created an institutional bias towards ticket punching, careerism, and other aspects of what has been labelled the "new ethic."
- The leadership task confronted by Army officers became overwhelming when their subordinates equated them with the war effort, which, as time went on, became more-and-more manifestly futile.
- The lack of unit cohesion caused by the six-month command tour, inter-unit transfers to achieve rotation-date balances, and the individual rather than unit replacement, militated not only against primary-group identification and ties, but against the creation and maintenance of a healthy relationship between commanders and their troops.
- The problem of decreasing officer and NCO quality was a serious and possibly insoluble problem. Recruitment efforts can be upgraded and training procedures improved, but public support is essential to the availability of a willing manpower pool and the development of high quality, ethical leaders.

LESSONS

Some accommodation must be reached between the inevitably bureaucratic nature of the armed forces and the imperatives that have developed for success within these bureaucracies. In particular, phenomena such as the "can-do" ethic and the "zero-defect" syndrome must be recognized as prevalent in the US military but somehow they must be kept from becoming career-related obsessions that undermine professional ethics.

The relationship between the existence of high standards of leadership and ethics and the political environment in which military operations are conducted must always be remembered. There are limits to the survivability of even the healthiest institutions in a non-supportive environment.
INSIGHTS

Morale and Discipline

There is a great variety of evidence available to indicate the existence of morale and discipline problems among US forces in Vietnam, problems that varied significantly depending on location, position in the Armed Forces, specific duties, leadership, and time.

The most important factors adversely affecting morale and discipline--some old, some new with Vietnam--include factors implicit in the nature of the Vietnam conflict (such as limited direct-enemy contact and the psychological stress associated with the sporadic, unpredictable mine and booby trap threat, limited indications of progress and even purpose, antipathy towards the South Vietnamese, idleness and boredom, increased contact with visible privilege and other inequities); flaws or side effects of various personnel policies; the hypocrisy and frustrations associated with careerism; problems originating in society; the perceived inadequacy of civilian support; the intensification of problems brought about by the drawdown; and, connected with many of these, the gulf or cultural gap separating leaders from followers--usually draftees and other non-career personnel from career officers and NCOs--which made good leadership particularly difficult and poor leadership particularly disastrous.

LESSONS

The goals for achieving high levels of morale and discipline are clearer than the methods for achieving them, but problems such as the adverse effects of "opportunistic careerism" or service personnel policies that impact unfavorably on morale and discipline can and must be addressed and corrected.

Good training and indoctrination, but more important, good professional leadership, will usually sustain morale and discipline even in adversity; poor leadership of itself will hurt or destroy them.
INSIGHTS

Race Relations
- Race problems remain in the military today. The interaction of factors causing or aggravating racial tensions is so complex that it is next-to-impossible to determine with any certainty the impact of racial tensions alone on the conduct of the war and the implications of that impact for the post-Vietnam military.
- Racial tensions were rarely overt on combat missions and thus had only a limited impact on combat effectiveness overall.
- In rear areas, where troop concentrations and boredom sometimes coincided, problems erupted in which racial tensions sometimes played a role, even if not always a dominant one. The military, which was usually not responsible for generating the racist feelings, did not always handle the problem well, though there were significant exceptions to this generalization. Good leadership when present, minimized this and other problems.
- American troop feelings about the interaction with the Vietnamese people left room for improvement. Race seemed to be one factor—the defining factor if nothing else—in the general resentment that developed. The problem was no different in any significant way from that experienced by other armies in other foreign countries, except in RVN many US soldiers perceived that the RVNAF were not fighting their own war and, therefore, they often were antagonistic in their attitudes and relations with the RVNAF.

LESSON

Though the military cannot control racism in society, it has various avenues of recourse within its jurisdiction. Effective programs must be, and must be perceived as being, fair, consistent, and as having sufficient "teeth" to achieve their objectives. The development of good leadership should be the sine qua non of such programs.
Psychological Effects

Psychiatric casualties, common to most wars, were also present in Vietnam but at lower rates than were experienced in World War II and Korea.

A variety of factors affected the incidence of these casualties. Some of the factors were not new to Vietnam—indeed some are very old. The most important of these is exposure to combat, which includes: the workings and cohesiveness of the primary group, the quality of leadership, the age and background of the combatants, including their pre-existing psychological problems, the nature of society, and the quality of training. Other factors affecting mental health which were unique to or especially significant in Vietnam include: the operation and effects of the one-year tour of duty and six-month command tours and related policies, the nature of the combat (the tactics, the confusion of enemy and allied personnel and civilians, the rules of engagement, the nature of the support system, and so on), the quality of the medical and psychiatric support systems, and the ready availability of drugs, to name some of the more important.

Contrary to the beliefs of many, the impact of the antiwar movement, while not negligible, seems to have played only a minor stress-provoking role.

A variety of coping mechanisms were observed in Vietnam as in other wars. These included religious faith, rituals, superstitions, various forms of escapism, excessive sleep, spending sprees, identification with an authority figure, fusion with the group, escape into work, drug or alcohol abuse, humor, reading, and overeating, to name only a few. Those who failed to develop effective coping mechanisms or whose mechanisms were unacceptable were those most likely to need psychiatric assistance.

LESSON

Proper management of psychological stress in wartime necessitates a close understanding of both individual and group psychology and the operation of factors effecting mental health in general, and more specifically in wartime.
Drug Abuse

- The pattern and incidence of drug abuse in Vietnam was not markedly different than that encountered by American soldiers worldwide during that same period.
- Changing mores and societal attitudes made drug use generally acceptable among the younger generation at a time that coincided with increased force commitments to Vietnam where high-quality drugs were readily available at very low cost. This combination largely accounts for the incidence of drug abuse in Vietnam; the drug problem should have been foreseeable.
- Fear of battle or of becoming a casualty was not the major reason for drug use, as had been assumed by many; boredom, routine tedium, the desire to "kill time," peer pressure, and coping with an unfamiliar physical and military environment are cited as major reasons for drug use in Vietnam.
- Generally, members of units with lower drug usage reflected higher esteem for their unit leaders; these non-users felt their leaders to be interested in their personal welfare and helpful to them in fulfilling their duty assignments.
- There is at least circumstantial evidence that very few soldiers who were actively engaged in combat were under the influence of drugs; rather, they showed "drug sense" and avoided its use when exposed to combat situations. There is, however, very little evidence of the effects of drugs on combat readiness and performance of combat troops in the field or in exposed fire bases.
- There is substantial evidence of dangerous levels of drug use in rear areas and base camps, particularly after 1970, to a degree that would seriously have impaired combat efficiency had those locales been subjected to strong enemy attacks. In part, the composite organizational structure and generally relaxed discipline of major installations in rear areas, contributed to the incidence of disciplinary problems, including drug abuse.
- US officials did not anticipate the nature and extent of the drug abuse problem, especially its increasing rate after 1968. Initiatives at drug education/orientation programs had little effect because of failure to understand the basic causes for drug usage in Vietnam.
- The amnesty program and related treatment and rehabilitation programs did succeed in ridding the services of unrehabilitatives and undesirables. As a consequence of its failure to anticipate the drug abuse problem, the Army initially had no effective activity/work programs to divert potential users from drugs, and the subsequent response to the drug epidemic in many cases was "too little, too late."
LESSONS

To cope with drug abuse problems, leaders of all ages and grades need to understand the causal nature of the drug problem. Leaders should not have to learn these skills by on-the-job training but rather should be schooled in the fundamentals of drug abuse and the means for preventing, detecting, and handling drug problems.

The principal inducement for drug use is boredom, and boredom can be prevented by intelligent, professional leaders who know and understand the problem and who provide meaningful and satisfying work/activities, opportunities, and recognition to their troops.

A variety of drug abuse detection measures have been developed, but they have generally been subject to manipulation by clever drug users. Surprise inspection and testing has proven to be the best way to uncover users, but preventing drug use in the first place is the best tactic, which requires knowledge about the problem and leadership in dealing with it.

Beating the drug problem cannot be accomplished solely by the military services; extensive cooperation between many government agencies is needed at the top level, and that cooperation must extend down to the lower operating levels.
CHAPTER 1
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, PERSONNEL POLICIES,
AND THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

And who are the young men we are asking to go into action against such solid odds? You've met them. You know. They are the best we have. But they are not McNamara's sons, or Bundy's. I doubt they're yours. And they know they're at the end of the pipeline. That no one cares. They know.

-an anonymous general to correspondent Arthur Hadley

A. INTRODUCTION

"Greetings."

To the individual draftee receiving his impersonal call-up letter for service in Vietnam, the Selective Service System may well have appeared to be an arbitrary, inconsistent and ponderous induction machine. Ponderous--perhaps at times. Inconsistent--certainly. But the process was far from arbitrary, if by arbitrary it is meant that all young men of draft age had an equal chance of going to, or seeing combat in Vietnam.

Completely blind, arbitrary selection is not necessarily desirable. Enlistment provides a mechanism for those who are particularly willing to serve. Physical and mental competency tests screen out the unsuitable. Special talents and skills may legitimately place certain individuals in special categories. But within these parameters--parameters which must be set with the utmost caution--fair and equal treatment under the law behooves a democracy. As General Westmoreland reflected, looking back over the Vietnam period:

If we go to war, the hardship should be shared by a cross section of our society. There should be no favored group.1/

That the Selective Service System as operated during the Vietnam years was not arbitrary was, and is, abundantly clear. What has become equally

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clear is that this less-than-complete randomness was not solely or even largely based on military imperatives. Indeed, certain personnel policies were made despite their obvious detriment to military objectives. The reasons were clearly political, or more broadly conceived, social. Accommodation of military and political objectives becomes necessary. As Samuel Huntington has observed:

Every society develops policies for achieving its foreign and domestic goals. Because implementing these separate policies requires economic and political resources, tradeoffs are inevitable. A major focus of these tradeoffs is military policy, which attempts to meet the demands made on its strategic component by foreign policy with material and political resources supplied its structural component by domestic policy. American military policy has tended to be warped by overemphasis on one goal or the other.2/

It was Clausewitz who first drew attention to this major dimension of strategy. Without the peoples' willingness to support a war, sometimes at great personal expense, logistical skill and technical competence would not be enough to achieve victory. As Professor Michael Howard notes:

Military thinkers in the West, extrapolating from their experience of warfare between industrial states naturally tended to seek a solution to what was essentially a conflict on the social plane either by developing operational techniques of "counterinsurgency," or in the technological advantages provided by such developments as helicopters, sensors or "smart" bombs. When these techniques failed to produce victory, military leaders, both French and American, complained, as had German military leaders in 1918, that the war had been "won" militarily but "lost" politically--as if these dimensions were not totally interdependent. 3/ (emphasis added.)

Thus, as Steven Canby observes, "Military manpower procurement alternatives have to satisfy both military requirements and domestic goals."4/ Seen in context then, the "Selective Service is only a case of an administrative system's reaction to political culture."5/ The problem, of course, is to determine the proper balance.
B. PERSONNEL POLICIES (MANPOWER PROCUREMENT)

This section deals with those personnel policies most directly related to manpower procurement. The effects of these policies on the soldier and the overall war effort, and discussion of other policies not as closely related to manpower procurement are discussed in later chapters of this volume. Here the question is principally limited to who was selected, how, and why.

1. Background

Military manpower procurement methods had been actively analyzed and debated for many years before the Vietnam requirements actually tested the system. America's long-standing antipathy towards conscription was reinforced by her faith in the militia system but was challenged by problems faced in the Civil War. The unpopularity of federal recruiters led to the establishment of local draft boards during the Civil War. Serious discussion of draft policies followed in 1866. The 1917 Selective Service System was patterned directly on these recommendations. The system as constructed was extremely successful and its structure and processes were partially responsible for its winning of acceptance for conscription.

Since 1917 the system underwent amazingly few substantial changes until the introduction of the all-volunteer Army in 1973. The basic principle that all young men had an equal obligation to serve unless certain exemption qualifications were met became fairly well established.

The existence of any exemption categories, however, opened up the possibility of active avoidance in addition to more legitimate disqualification.

In World War II the most common way to avoid military service was to fail the necessary physical examination. Nationwide, nearly a third of all registrants failed this preinduction exam; the failure rate went as high as 50 percent in some parts of the South. Student deferments were also given, though they were tightened up as the war progressed until they exempted only those in the most critical fields such as engineering and medicine. By 1944 male college enrollments had dropped by two thirds from prewar levels.
The experience of the United States and other countries during the twentieth century led to some new (or the revival of some existent) concerns. England's lost generation of World War I, it was felt, must not be repeated. Those who had lived through the second World War had witnessed the sharp decline in the number of male college students and young scientists. There was a growing concern that future potential had been mortgaged for current needs.

These concerns were embodied in the 1948 Selective Service Act. The G-I Bill helped insure the repopulation of college campuses. But the G-I Bill would not have as far-reaching consequences as another policy resulting from this concern. The policy was called "channeling" by the director (from 1947 to 1969) (and one of the most outspoken advocates) of the new system, General Lewis B. Hershey. Hershey observed, "we are [not] so rich in human resources that we can afford deliberately to ignore opportunities we have to channel people into training and the application of training." The decline in postwar military enrollments hurt the case of those who argued for a system of universal military training. Hershey's argument for limited conscription prevailed.

How, then, was a system to be constructed that allowed for the development of talent—and indeed hopefully encouraged it—while still applying as equally as possible to all young men? General Hershey envisioned a system that channeled able young people into study or "critical occupations" when they were not absolutely necessary for immediate military needs. This he called "pressurized guidance." It was this philosophy that helped shape the Selective Service System as embodied in the 1948 conscription law during most of the Vietnam era. Categories of persons to be deferred were to be determined by the president. Eighteen year olds could serve a one-year enlistment, or induction could be avoided altogether by the service of six years in the reserves. Starting in 1950 college students in the top half of their class could be deferred and were given four months after graduation to find a job that entitled them to further deferment. These qualifications changed over time.
The philosophy had its merits, though in retrospect it has become relatively easy to observe its flaws. Numerous writers have emphasized the caution necessary before straying from a truly equal democratic policy. Canby has observed that the limited conscription of the Selective Service "sacrificed for presumed necessity ... the fundamental principle of equal treatment for individuals and for social classes; substituted for this democratic principle was the elitist principle of differential value to the state. Such a discriminatory policy can be legitimized in a democracy only by the doctrine of necessity and social survival." (Emphasis added)

The plan was, in addition, structurally weak.

Deferments justified by "national wealth, safety, and interest" assumed actual and potential shortage of skilled manpower. If the nation's resources are under-utilized or will never be fully mobilized for national security, then resources can always be released from civilian to military purposes. This criterion, therefore, asserts that market forces cannot assure an adequate supply of skills for either full mobilization or prolonged periods of high military requirements. Ergo, men (i.e., students) must now be channeled into skills determined to be in the national interest. The weaknesses of the argument are in its assumptions. Channeling was devised for a full mobilization strategy under the special conditions that were perceived in 1950, namely: (1) a temporary shortage of skilled personnel caused by World War II's temporary curtailment of new scientific talent and rapidly shifting technological demands, and (2) large military manpower demands for the indefinite future. A second critical assumption was the alleged inadequacy of the market system to meet scientific manpower demands. Its fallacy is in extending a valid short-run argument into the long run, where market forces do adjust to shifting demands.

In short, the criterion of "national wealth, safety, and interest" which has been an underpinning of the American draft system, is analytically invalid except during full mobilization or under very special circumstances. (Emphasis added)

The execution of the plan was flawed as well. Insufficient incentives and regulations meant that lawful avoidance was not necessarily
channeled into critical occupations. The Selective Service System was never able to locate and plug the myriad of misused legal and illegal loopholes used by many people to escape the demands of the system. As one observer noted:

...the draft did little to 'channel' a generation of draft-age men in directions that served the national interest. Instead, it created distortion, dislocation, and above all, class discrimination. This cannot be blamed on General Hershey alone; he was merely the most vocal advocate of a manpower policy deeply rooted in American history.15/

As the Marshall commission stated, "without the justification of being in the national interest, the justification originally intended, student deferments have become the occasion of serious inequity."16/ And Harvard study group concluded, "The economic benefits of discrimination among young men are modest, and largely confined to the young men who benefit."17/

Deferment categories became established, however. Enough enlistments and reserve call-ups were available during the Korean War to allow this system to continue in its essential format. Lobbies of sorts protected their deferment categories. As General Hershey recalled, "Business was all over my back, agriculture wanted this that and the other thing, and education wanted their PhD's."18/ Despite deferment options, college student participation in Korea was roughly proportional to their number. The main criticism of the Selective Service Systems seemed to be that physical examination standards were unrealistically high and excluded too many potential servicemen.

After the Korean War the most significant challenge to the Selective Service System seemed to be the need to find enough categories to defer in order to control the size of the rapidly expanding 1-A pool, as the baby boom babies reached draft age. A June 30, 1966 study on the draft by the Department of Defense observed:
A principal problem affecting the operation of the draft system in the past has been the growing supply of draft-age men in relation to military requirements. A decade ago, only 1,150,000 men were reaching age 18. In 1965, the number of 18-year olds had increased by 50% to more than 1,700,000. This trend will continue into the coming decade; by 1974 the number of men reaching draft age will total more than 2,100,000--over 80% above the 1955 level.19/

Policy demanded that virtually all those qualified for immediate induction ought to serve or be channeled, or the idea of universal national obligation would suffer. Deferments were extended to include fathers. When even this did not entirely alleviate the problem, General Hershey persuaded President Kennedy to put all married men in a special low-priority 1-A category. By 1966 hardship, fatherhood, and marital deferments outnumbered student deferments by nearly two to one.

The escalation of the Vietnam War meant retrenchment would be necessary from this liberal exemption and deferment policy. (See Figure 1-1).20/ The occupational deferment loophole was tightened. Married and graduate deferments were rarely issued, though old deferments in these categories were honored. Fatherhood deferments were limited to those who had not already been given student deferments. Emphasis on good grades was restored as a qualification for student deferments. Ultimate decision on deferments was left to the individual draft boards, of which there were about 4,000, so that standards were far from uniform.21/ Thus, as one draftboard member observed, the system was "sort of like an accordion. Sometimes you stretch it out and get generous with deferments and then other times you squeeze it up tight."22/

2. Political Parameters

This then is a general description of the system available to the president for generating servicemen for Vietnam. In certain ways it suited the demands made on it, but President Johnson, in particular, faced a peculiar situation that would require him to make some new demands on the system.

For Americans the Vietnam War was a limited war. Despite the expenditure of a colossal amount of money and the eventual commitment of
Figure 1-1. Enlisted Personnel Entries by Major Source FY 1948-1966
over half a million troops, mobilization remained far from total. Only two million of the 27 million American males eligible for draft registration during the Vietnam War years ever served in Vietnam. The small percentage that served is illustrative of the limited impact of the war, but it was in the president's interest to make the war appear even more limited than it actually was.

Unfortunately for the president, the war coincided with a period of significant domestic expenditure. As he told his cabinet in mid-July 1965, it had been "the most productive and most historic week in Washington during this century." As one longtime observer noted:

He was exaggerating, but less than he often did. He was thinking of the Medicare and voting-rights bills, both near final passage in Congress, and more generally of the major pieces of legislation he had either already succeeded in persuading Congress to pass or else knew from his long experience would pass soon: the tax cut, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Economic Opportunity Act, the pioneer Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and the rest. It was, Tom Wicker commented a few weeks later in the New York Times, a more substantial record of reform legislation than most presidents put behind them in two full terms, and it had been done in a bare eighteen months. 23/

In these successes the president had much cause for rejoicing, but he also had a few reasons to worry. As an attuned alumnus of Congress he was well aware of the signs of flagging interest in this ambitious and expensive domestic program, and as Commander in Chief he was aware of what he called "the lowering cloud of Vietnam." Appropriation requests for the war had skyrocketed from $100 million for the 1964 fiscal year to over $14 billion in the combined August-January requests of fiscal year 1965. As Johnson himself put it later, "two streams in our national life converged--the dream of a Great Society at home and the inescapable demands of our obligations halfway around the world." But, as he observed on January 12, 1966, "I believe that we can continue the Great Society while we fight in Vietnam."
To convince the public and himself of this possibility the president had to minimize both the cost and the impact of the war. As his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara testified before a Congressional hearing:

...there are many things, many prices we pay for the war in Vietnam, some heavy prices indeed, but in my opinion one of them is not a strain on our economy.24/

In one sense McNamara was right. There was enough money for both guns and butter, but the money was in the private sector; there was not enough money in the federal budget, unless taxes were raised. And taxes were cut. Indeed taxes had been cut twice, first by Kennedy with the investment credit of 1962--allowing corporate profits to double between 1961 and 1966--and then by the tax cut proposed under Kennedy and passed under Johnson. By 1966 the percentage of GNP taken by taxation had fallen by over 28 percent from that taken during the Eisenhower years. Had taxation simply been continued at the rates of the Eisenhower years it would have yielded an additional 25 billion dollars during the Vietnam period (through 1969). In 1968 Johnson was finally able to get through Congress a ten percent tax surcharge to help finance increased military expenditures, but only after agreeing to cut six billion dollars from the domestic budget.

Congress' reluctance to endorse the fiscal policies necessary for sustaining both the war and the Great Society reflected the growing restlessness of the people, and particularly blue-collar workers, with the economic situation in general and the administration's anti-poverty programs in particular. To Congress, the expense of Johnson's domestic programs coupled with the cost of US commitments abroad had become politically untenable. Kennedy's stirring, popular words, "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship..." were less popular when translated into their functional equivalents: taxes, military commitment and casualties. The American public did not want to make these sacrifices, neither did they want to give up the prosperity that seemed so effortless during the postwar boom. Yet they wanted as well the expensive interventionist foreign policy developed after the war. As Leslie Gelb observed,
the rhetoric of succeeding presidents downplaying the problem in Vietnam set in the public's mind:

the belief that the president would ensure that the threatened nation did not fall into Communist hands—although without the anticipation of sacrificing American lives. 

Many Americans had grown used to having their cake and eating it too. This unusual time was passing.

3. The System in Operation

How were procurement policies to be squared with this mood? One direct consequence was Johnson's decision, at least during the early years of the war, not to call up the National Guard or reservists. To do so would have been tacitly to admit that the conflict in Vietnam was not the limited war it was being pictured as and that it would be difficult to administer the important domestic programs in the face of such a war. When compared with the regular forces, guardsmen and reservists were better educated, better connected, and better off, and their mobilization would have been more likely to create a fuss and increase opposition to the war.

Here was a clear case of political and military needs clashing.

As Kinnard observed:

Whatever the legacy of Berlin, JCS and service South-east Asia contingency plans definitely were based on the call-up of the Reserves. For example, the Army's active force structure was uniquely oriented toward combat units; hence many logistic units existed principally in the Reserves. Again, the plans called for mobilizing Reserve training divisions to train new recruits for the Army, this freeing the Active Army Training Center cadres for reassignment. Many other examples could be cited, but the point is that contingency planning viewed the Army Active and Reserves as one force, and war plans were drawn accordingly. (Emphasis added.)

Poor communication of intentions by the administration to the military aggravated the problem. General Donald V. Bennett, as Director of
Strategic Plans, Joint Staff on Mobilization, proposed to the Secretary of Defense on July 15, 1965, that a number of divisions and other support were needed in Vietnam. As he recalls,

We had about a week to work on it. We indicated the kind of mobilization support required. The Secretary of Defense picked up on it... We made quite a strong point on the requirement of early, partial mobilization in order to insure an effective force as soon as possible. All were positive that no one could make a decision to reinforce Vietnam without a concurrent decision to mobilize. The President made a TV appearance on 28 July at noon. I was on leave at Hilton Head. The President went through the first part of his speech. I agreed. The second part was about reinforcement. I knew about that. Then he came to the mobilization part and he said, "... and we are going to do this without mobilizing." I was probably the most shocked man in the world.27/

Secretary of Defense McNamara did recommend to the President in July 1965 that 235,000 reservists be called up, but his recommendation was rejected.28/

Unless Johnson would have been content with an executive declaration of national emergency allowing for only a one-year call-up, a joint congressional resolution would be necessary for such a mobilization. As a declared national emergency would constitute a direct challenge to the administration's low-key approach to the war, the latter alternative was the only possible choice. It, too, proved to have too many drawbacks in the president's estimation. In particular Johnson did not relish a congressional debate on the war or the institution of any new congressional controls. As Doris Kearns observed, "By refusing to call up the reserves or ask Congress for an acknowledgement or acceptance of the war, Johnson believed he could keep the levers of control in his hands."29/
Even had congress readily approved the request, the attention drawn to the mobilization could only highlight the war effort. As Kinnard observed,

The decision not to call up the Reserves, as McNamara had recommended, was obviously a political one....the announcement caught much of the Armed Services leadership by surprise. In Fort Lewis, Washington, for example, the post was already readying barracks for the arrival of the Reserves.

Military pressure to call up the reserves did not end with the Johnson decision of July 28 to rely on increased draft quotas. Westmoreland felt that mobilization would convey a political-military message to the enemy, calling it

an important factor in the reading of the North Vietnamese and the Chinese with respect to our determination to see the war through.

The withdrawal of equipment from some reserve units to support regular forces lessened their activation potential. Still the JCS fought for full mobilization. But domestic political constraints prevailed.

Only after the Pueblo incident, the beginning of the Tet offensive, and the assassination attempt on the life of the President of South Korea were the JCS successful in winning a limited call-up of 37,000 guardsmen and reservists. Less than half were sent to Vietnam, and no other reserves were called up during the war. The call-up had its problems. Due to equipment shortages, personnel problems, and little or no warning, mobilized units required longer-than-expected training times. Some of Johnson's political fears were realized: numerous complaints were sent by guardsmen to their congressmen, and some units even challenged the legality of the call-up.
It should not be surprising, given this limited call-up, that a 1966 Pentagon study found that 71 percent of all reservists were draft-motivated—\textsuperscript{34}--the reserves had become an acceptable means of avoidance. By 1970, it was estimated that maybe nine out of ten reservists had joined to avoid the draft. Reserve enlistments fell when draft calls declined.

Another manpower program consonant with the Johnson administration's predicament was Project 100,000.\textsuperscript{35} This program has been called the Defense Department's contribution to the Johnson Great Society. In theory the program was designed to extend the umbrella of military training and education over one segment of America's underprivileged youth--those in intelligence Categories IV and V who would normally have been eliminated by the preenlistment aptitude test. This meshed with the already existing practice of many judges to sentence social misfits and petty criminals to military service as a means of rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{36} Another merit of the program, perhaps its prime merit to its sponsors, was that by filling part of the draft quotas with young men of limited ability from lower socio-economic backgrounds, some of the pressure from the more vocal and privileged members of society was eased.\textsuperscript{37} This allowed student deferments to be maintained at their current level.

Recruiting campaigns for Project 100,000 and other similar programs were consciously aimed at disadvantaged teenagers. This was a distinct shift in policy from earlier programs. A post-World War II study by Eli Ginzburg stressed the connection between low intelligence and poor performance in the military.\textsuperscript{38} High school dropouts were found to be five times as likely to perform badly as those with at least some college. Armed Forces Qualification Tests were developed to screen out potential problems. Five intelligence categories were established, all those scoring in Category V were eliminated from consideration. Men in this category became targets of Project 100,000.\textsuperscript{39} See Table 1-1.\textsuperscript{40}
TABLE 1-1. ACCESSIONS BY MENTAL GROUP, ENTRY MODE, AND SERVICE BRANCH, 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFQT (Mental group, score, and expected percent)</th>
<th>Total Enlistees</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draftees</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I (93-100) 7%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (65-92) 28%</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (31-64) 34%</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (10-30) 21%</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Acceptees: (9-0) 10%</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other programs in addition to Project 100,000 concentrated on those from Categories IV and V. At one Oakland, California office 120 of the 125 recruits were from lower class neighborhoods, 90 percent were from Category IV or lower, many had police records and most were black or Hispanic. Peter Barnes in his book *Pawns* quotes one white Marine recruiter as saying "We use their language...we say 'man'...we even call cops 'pigs'." Between 1966 and 1968 Project 100,000 brought in 240,000 recruits. Of the Category IV troops, 75 percent came from low income backgrounds, over 80 percent were high school dropouts and half had IQs of less than 85. Over 40 percent received combat-related assignments. This assignment practice was reinforced by the view of some officers that low IQ troops made good fighting men. As one officer commented, he would "prefer a company of riflemen with fifth-grade educations over a company of college men anytime." However, as will be detailed in Chapter 4, troops from Project 100,000 and similar programs caused serious disciplinary problems as well, and such programs were phased out. Fewer were recruited and more discharged. As Baskir and Strauss detail:

the notion of using the armed forces as a part of the Great Society passed with the coming of the Nixon Administration. Project 100,000 quotas fell to 75,000
that year, and 50,000 the following year. The proportion of Category IV troops recruited outside Project 100,000 fell at the same rate. The military became more exacting about the performance of marginal recruits. In 1968, for example, the Marine Corps dropped less than 7 percent of Category IV soldiers during basic training; by 1971, they were discharging almost half. In 1972, Project 100,000 was officially terminated, and replaced by "New Standards," an equivalent program geared to the upcoming All-Volunteer Force.45/

By 1975 only six percent of the Armed Forces were in Category IV; this fell to four percent in 1977.46/

During this time, moreover, appeals courts had been overturning rulings that sentenced young men to the military. The idea that the military was an institution for rehabilitation was declining. The institution of the all-volunteer army would bring this practice to a close.

In addition to these official policies, other de facto mechanisms emerged--amounting to unofficial policies--that affected manpower procurement.

Recruits, and new officers of above-average ability, tended to see combat less often than those with lesser talents. As rear-echelon staffs grew over the course of the 20th century, and as more specialized skills were needed for troop support, able recruits were selected to fill these assignments. Conversely, when there was a shortage of combat troops, replacements would often be selected from the least-productive non-combat units--for managerial, not punitive reasons--and these units tended to have a high percentage of low-IQ men from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

Medical exemptions provided a means of avoidance, an out used primarily by those from higher socio-economic backgrounds. These exemptions became so popular they were semi-institutionalized in the form of clinics specializing in pre-draft physicals. They tended to remain the preserve of the middle classes. As Baskir and Strauss observe:

Many doctors, dentists, and psychiatrists who specialized in draft avoidance now feel a sense of disquiet about their role during the war. The people they most
wanted to help--blacks, low-income youths, and con-
scientious war resisters who had been denied CO
status--were rarely the ones who came to see them: The
people we saw were all middle class. It wasn't that
the others didn't have the money. They just never
thought of going for professional help.47/

The political-military leadership, while aware of this avoidance
mechanism, did not act to end it.48/ This was probably due in part to the
same cautiousness that prevented the Johnson administration from calling up
the reserves. Its effects on the war effort, and particularly on morale,
which can well be imagined, will be detailed in Chapters 3 and 4.49/

Non-registration was the draft avoidance mechanism of the poor.
A risky practice for middle class youths who were more easily traced,
non-registration suited the needs of those who led relatively untraceable
lives, such as migrant workers and some ghetto residents. According to a
Notre Dame survey (for details, see following section) nearly 50 percent of
non-registrants were black, and most had very limited educations. Some
were non-registrants, no doubt, because they did not know of the registra-
tion requirements. But others were not so innocent, for the survey
discovered that nearly all of black non-registration occurred during the
later phases of the war. The stories of returning black veterans no doubt
alerted many to the hardships of war.

Another official personnel policy, while not manpower procurement
policy per se, directly affected the procurement process. This was the
establishment of the one-year tour of duty and the six-month command tour.
While not a wholly political decision, the policy dovetailed well with
political requirements.

The length of a tour of duty in the US Armed Forces in the twen-
tieth century has varied over time and between the different branches of
the service. During the early stages of US involvement in Vietnam the
length of tour was not as standardized as it became later; general officers
served 18 months or more, field-grade Army officers might serve a 14-month
tour while their counterparts in the Marines served for 13 months
(shortened from 15 in about 1960, and later shortened to 12). By the time
General Westmoreland arrived in Vietnam the one-year tour of duty policy
was fairly well established as was a six-month command tour for officers. General officers tended to serve similarly short tenures, though their tour of duty was officially 18 months or more. As Maureen Mylander observed in her respected book *The Generals*,

In II Field Force, the most prestigious headquarters with over one hundred maneuverable battalions at the peak of the buildup, generals' tenure averaged 7.6 months.50/

And Douglas Kinnard notes that of the 183 generals who held command positions in Vietnam, over half served there as generals for less than a year, and a quarter for less than eight months,51/ this situation being aggravated by promotions, new job requirements and, toward the end, a reduced force structure.

Many reasons were advanced in support of the one-year tour. The climatic conditions in Vietnam made the already numerous burdens of the combat situation even more wearing. The one-year tour helped boost morale by giving each man a reasonable goal, an individual light at the end of the tunnel. Shorter tours meant that more men could be rotated into and out of Vietnam, thus spreading the burden of combat and perhaps easing political pressures on the administration. This in turn might increase the staying power of the US in a war that was not receiving total public support.

Additional reasons were advanced for the six-month command tour. Rapid turnover allowed more men to obtain combat experience which, it was argued, helped produce better staff officers and create a better military-wide understanding of counterinsurgency warfare. Unfortunately the six-month tour also happened to extend the possibilities for ticket punching. Worse, competitive young officers from platoon through brigade level were replaced after six months by equally competitive young officers, most seeking to enhance their military careers through courageous combat leadership. The tired enlisted personnel were left to complete their 12-month
tours under two or more "gung ho" officers. As Westmoreland observed,

... there was no conscious policy of trying to provide as many regular officers as possible an opportunity to get command experience on their records. It was instead a result of a natural desire of efficient young officers to hold positions of responsibility, to meet the challenges of command, and a similarly natural desire of higher commanders to want officers on their staffs who had had local command experience.52/

Political and military leaders generally agreed that the price paid—a lack of continuity of experience, limited officer-troops contact, etc.—for the advantages noted above was significant, but affordable. Many disagreed. As LTC David R. Holmes observed:

Extended practical experience and rapport with indigenous counterparts is required to develop an understanding of the political/psychological character of paramilitary operations, to maintain the quality of leadership required to uphold appropriate ethical/moral standards and to acquire the particular small-unit tactical skills involved in counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency operations cannot, therefore, be conducted effectively using peacetime "business as usual" personnel policies.

Advisers, key noncommissioned officers and commanders—particularly at company and battalion level—should not be subject to the premature rotation caused by the short-tour concept. Frequent rest and recuperation—to include respites in the Continental United States—should be used to provide the required breaks from battle. The short-tour policy, which often produced command tours as brief as six months, undoubtedly contributed to the instances of mutiny, corruption, drug abuse and "fragging." It also probably reinforced the "ticket-punching," careerist syndrome still visible in today's officer corps. (In fairness, it should be said that the Army was following or imitating the "guns and butter" policies of the national leadership.)53/ (emphasis added)
Looking back, General Westmoreland speculated on the alternatives:

It may be that I erred in Vietnam in insisting on a one-year tour of duty for other than general officers as well as enlisted men. . . . the officers were so few in number that many had to go back for second, third, and even fourth tours, so that the disruption of family life or the threat of it was omnipresent. Two-years for all officers, including general officers, with a short home leave at the end of the first year would have reduced the disruption, but such apparent discrimination against officers might have added to the difficulty of procuring junior officers through officer candidate school and the ROTC. Perhaps an eighteen-month tour for all officers, as was always the case for general officers, might have been a workable compromise.54/

Some of the effects of the one-year tour and the six-month command tour will be examined in Chapters 3 and 4 along with other personnel policies which did not directly affect manpower procurement.

4. Voluntarism

Thus far the discussion of manpower procurement policies has centered largely on the draft and draft avoidance. The Selective Service, however, was not the sole avenue of manpower procurement; indeed, during the Vietnam War period nearly four times as many persons enlisted as were drafted. Of course some of the enlistees were obviously draft-motivated, but many were not, and thus the mechanism allowing voluntary enlistment must be considered a very important personnel procurement policy.

The system for procurement by voluntary recruitment consists of separate, decentralized, and relatively autonomous organizations. Despite their independence, however, they have many comparable features.

The great size of the total recruiting effort is indicated by the fact that, in 1962, 3,368 recruiting stations were staffed by approximately 12,000 military personnel. Moreover, there are other agencies performing voluntary recruitment functions that further expand this number. The military academies attract potential officers. ROTC units act as a locus for military enlistees on college campuses, and are implicitly part of the
system. So are the numerous "in-service" recruiters who are primarily concerned with re-enlisting already active service personnel. Finally, there are the Reserve components whose recruitment activities, although not related to those of the active services, absorb a large proportion of the potential enlistees.

Local recruiting personnel share certain characteristics. They must build up a relationship with the community in which they operate. Establishing contacts with local public officials and service clubs is almost a necessity for effective recruitment. Above all, they must be easily accessible. National media carry their advertising as a public service, thus reinforcing their message and focusing attention on their presence. Promotional material is provided routinely to high school guidance counselors. The recruiter reinforces these techniques by maintaining a competent self-image.55/

TABLE 1-2. MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO RECRUITING AND ADMINISTRATION OF RECRUITMENT, 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>3,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>3,233</td>
<td>3,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>1,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>2,734</td>
<td>3,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>10,161</td>
<td>11,224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1-3. RECRUITING STATIONS, BY TYPE AND SERVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>MAIN</th>
<th>BRANCH</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>1,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3,218</td>
<td>3,368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These recruiting efforts helped produce over eight-and-a-half million enlistees during the Vietnam war. A comparison of enlistees to
draftees appears in the following section of this chapter and in later chapters of this volume.

5. Evaluation

How well did this blend of systems, this meld of voluntary and compulsory service, of political and military requirements, of legal and illegal--official and unofficial--policies work? The answer, of course, depends on what criteria are used to judge. As noted earlier, military manpower procurement alternatives have to satisfy both military requirements and domestic goals. As Canby notes:

The military goals that Selective Service focused on are straightforward and stated in the preambles of the various Universal Military Training and Service acts and Selective Service acts, to wit:

Sec. 1(b)...an adequate armed strength must be achieved and maintained to ensure the security of this nation.
Sec. 1(c)...adequate provision for national security requires maximum effort in the fields of scientific research and development, and the fullest possible utilization of the nation's technological, scientific, and other critical manpower resources. (Emphasis added.)

The domestic criteria by which procurement policies may be judged are harder to agree upon. The generally acceptable list provided by the Harvard Study Group on the draft suggests the following:

1) fairness with respect to who serves;
2) fairness with respect to conditions of service;
3) efficiency in the use of the nation's manpower;
4) efficiency in the use of military manpower within the services;
5) the satisfaction or resentment of those rejected and those selected;
6) the impacts of alternative systems on politics and on policy making;
7) the impact on race relations, education, and poverty;
8) the technical workability of alternative systems;
9) the uncertainty of disruption in the lives of young men;
(10) the career opportunities in the military service; and
(11) matters of conscience, tradition, and law.58/

Even if these criteria are accepted, one is no closer to an
evaluation of a particular system unless some agreement is reached as to
which criteria have priority over others and what constitutes fulfillment
of each criterion. Naturally opinions, as well as circumstances, vary
greatly. In one instance, one alternative may become more attractive than
others. Voluntarism may look good in peacetime but fare poorly at other
times. A lottery system may be attractive during peace or limited wars but
not during full mobilization. There is no rule that only one system may be
used; a sequential or a concomitant use of more than one system might prove
ideal.

There is not space here for a detailed analysis of all the vari-
ables. Instead just a few of the benefits of, and difficulties with, the
Selective Service and recruitment systems as practiced during the Vietnam
period will be briefly noted with the dual aim of understanding the system
better and providing some basis for future decisions. Allowance must be
made for simplification. Even were a full understanding possible, however,
the lessons provided for the future must be kept in proper perspective,
for, as Roger Little has cautioned, "Historical experience is not always an
accurate guide for dealing with present realities, and indeed is often used
to defend an obsolete system against the necessity for change."59/

The voluntary nature of the enlistment and recruiting programs
operating during the Vietnam period tended to help keep them free of some
of the problems that plagued the draft. There was, however, some room for
improvement. The decentralized, little-coordinated nature of the many
recruitment mechanisms fostered strong competition. This had some positive
effects but it also prevented the coordinating of information, or the
emphasis on common elements among the various branches of the service.
Potential enlistees were forced to 'shop around' for information. Neither
was there as much coordination between the recruiting stations and the
Selective Service System as there could have been. Further, the quota system placed an emphasis on quantity of recruits rather than quality. There was little incentive for recruiters to stray from their most lucrative source of recruits--high school youth--to seek those with special skills. Similar skill shortages would also appear in the All-Volunteer Army.

Despite these difficulties the various enlistment mechanisms functioned relatively well during the Vietnam period. Those who had forecast a poor showing of volunteers were gainsayed.

The Selective Service was not so trouble free. Some of the inequities of the system have already been noted, particularly those mechanisms which made draft avoidance or access to the more preferred aspects of military service more available to the more affluent. Certain other details deserve mention.

As noted earlier, the concept of the local draft board was of long standing and received continued support from General Hershey. The virtue of the local-board system, it is argued, was that it was more likely than a centralized system to be able to mesh local needs with national demands through its understanding of the local situation. However, the system did not always operate in this ideal fashion.

Since the member's appointment was to a specific board and his tenure was usually indefinite, composition of the board usually lagged behind the demographic characteristics of a changing community. Thus, in Chicago, many board members who were originally appointed when they were South Shore residents had since moved to North Shore suburbs but still commuted to their original boards. Meanwhile, the population of these board areas had been markedly changed by the out-migration of whites to the suburbs and the in-migration of Negroes from the rural South. Under these conditions the local board was more likely to be perceived as identified with the Selective Service System than with the local community...

The validity of the board's decisions on occupational deferments rested on the assumption that at least one member had adequate knowledge of the occupational structure of the community. However, the complexity of the industrial structure
of a metropolitan area was such as to minimize the chance that a board member would have adequate knowledge of a specific occupation and its relationship to an industry. Without such knowledge, decisions were more likely to be made on the basis of such spurious considerations as the prestige of the employer or industry in the community, or the ability to sense the issues to which the board would be responsive.60/

The Selective Service was successful in its primary aim—it filled the manpower quotas. This was obviously its most important function. However, its ability to produce men when voluntary avenues proved inadequate meant that there was little pressure and no incentive to pursue reform or introduce innovations in personnel practices. One possible reform might have been the development of a more effective program for dealing with marginal personnel—marginal as measured on a variety of scales.

Further, the existence of the assured system of supply meant that there was a perhaps undue emphasis placed on entrance qualifications at the expense of longer-range plans, causing some neglect of the most effective means of utilizing personnel throughout their period of military service. The ending of the draft and the introduction of the All-Volunteer Army for example, has seen increasing emphasis on such things as job mobility, career flexibility and rehabilitation programs. Of course, programs such as these may have less place in a non-volunteer or partially volunteer military force, but their correct place and value must at least be carefully studied.

These, then, are some of the conditions and factors that must be considered in an evaluation of the manpower procurement system that functioned during the Vietnam period. An important overall trend in procurement and its possible importance for the future will be noted in the conclusion. First, however, we must turn to the product of this system—this collection of policies and non-policies—the soldier.
C. THE SOLDIER

1. Draftees and Enlistees

Who was the soldier that this Selective Service machine produced? Was he a member of the affluent, increasingly college-oriented, trouble-free but socially aware postwar baby boom that is so often remembered as the Vietnam generation? Chances are he was not. Many of this generation did not care to associate themselves with a war. A Rhodes scholar observed that "... there are certain people who can do more good in a lifetime in politics or academics or medicine than by getting killed in a trench."61/ "I got a good steady job," a Delaware defense worker said. "I'm making good money and having a ball every weekend. Why the hell should I want to go?"62/ A University of Michigan student commented that "... If I lost a couple of years, it would mean $16,000 to me. I know I sound selfish, but, by God, I paid $10,000 to get this education."63/

The war did not require that this entire generation be associated with it. Only two million of the 27 million male members of this generation served in Vietnam (see Figure 1-2).64/ Many of the remaining 25 million men took active steps to ensure that they were not among those two million. As noted above, the draft laws and military assignment policies made this avoidance relatively easy.

The young man who did serve in Vietnam was most likely to be a draftee from a low socio-economic family background. Typically, he was from a rural community, or an inner-city or older neighborhood. He was less educated than his non-serving contemporaries. He was the same American soldier who had participated in all of the major American wars.65/

The earliest study performed concerning the enlisted soldier in Vietnam was conducted by Davis and Dolbeare in 1965-6.66/ They found that only two percent of draftees were college graduates. Many college graduates did volunteer for military service, some inspired by a desire to beat the draft. College graduates comprised 90 percent of the officer corps—one of the reasons for the student deferment program—but as Davis and Dolbeare illustrate, college graduates seldom served as combat troops.
Figure 1-2. The Vietnam Generation in Service
Another study, an informal survey by the Harvard University Crimson of 1,200 graduates of the class of 1970, showed that only 56 had served in the military. This was contrasted with the several hundred members of the class of 1941 who performed combat duty during World War II, and the 35 who died in that war. While data were not provided concerning the enlistment status (draftee, volunteer or officer) of these Harvard graduates, the numbers do indicate a decline in military participation by this particular segment of society.

Another study was prompted by the University of Notre Dame. It sought to determine the likelihood of military service as affected by different variables. It found that education level affected the probability of military service (Table 1-4). These data are no more conclusive than the informal Harvard Crimson survey, but they do demonstrate that college graduates were less likely to perform military service than non-college graduates.

The most comprehensive examination of Vietnam service was performed by Badillo and Curry in an investigation of the casualties incurred by 101 Cook County, Illinois, communities (greater Chicago). They discovered that casualties were not related to the military participation rate of the community, but rather to its socio-economic status. One of the status indicators examined was the educational level of the community, shown in Figure 1-3. They found that an inverse relationship existed between education and casualties: more highly educated individuals suffered considerably fewer casualties than did less-educated individuals. They concluded that socio-economic status had little influence on military participation rates, but that it did affect participation in combat. To them, the question was not "who shall serve," but "who shall serve how?" This dilemma was also demonstrated in the Notre Dame data presented in Table 1-4.

A second trait of the combat soldier in Vietnam was his low income background. Congressman Alvin O'Konski surveyed 100 draftees from his Wisconsin district. He found that all of them were from families with an annual income of less than $5,000. The Notre Dame study also examined the family-income levels of Vietnam-era servicemen. It concluded that
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILITARY SERVICE</th>
<th>VIETNAM SERVICE</th>
<th>COMBAT SERVICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH SCHOOL DROP OUTS</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLEGE GRADUATES</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW-INCOME</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE-INCOME</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH-INCOME</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1-3. Casualty Incidence and Personal Educational Level
low-family-income soldiers were twice as likely to serve in combat as middle- or high-family-income soldiers. This relationship is shown in Table 1-4.

In their study of the socio-economic indicators of casualties, Badillo and Curry found the same relationship developed by Notre Dame. They examined both family income level and father’s occupation for each of the 101 communities. Their data, presented in Figures 1-4 and 1-5, demonstrate a similar inverse relationship between income, occupation and Vietnam casualties as that demonstrated for educational level.

These two traits, less education and low family income, characterized the majority of Vietnam combat troops. These traits, according to many observers, became more prevalent over the course of the war. In addition, a third trait was frequently ascribed to them:

In the average rifle company, the strength was 50% composed of Negroes, Southwestern Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Guamanians, Nisei and so on.

Minorities made up a disproportionate number of draftees. In 1965 blacks suffered 24 percent of the Vietnam casualties. Through a concerted program designed to equalize this disproportionate casualty rate the military decreased the black casualty percentage to nine percent by 1970 (see Figure 1-6). As a result of this policy, blacks suffered 13 percent of the overall casualties incurred in the Vietnam conflict, roughly in proportion to their percentage of the American population.

Badillo and Curry found no correlation between black casualties and black communities (Figure 1-7). They concluded that black soldiers tended to possess low education and family-income levels and it was these socio-economic factors that determined Vietnam participation. Since blacks and other minorities were over-represented in the lower socio-economic classes, they tended to be over-represented in the military.

Certain differences between enlistees and draftees can be observed with sufficient regularity to be generalized.
Figure 1-4. Casualty Incidence and Family Income Level
Figure 1-5. Casualty Incidence and Father’s Occupation
Figure 1-6. Black Casualties in Vietnam
Figure 1-7. Casualty Incidence and Black Communities
Enlistees are younger than draftees. Relatively more of them are in Armed Forces Qualifications Test mental groups I and II (as measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test, "AFQT"), while draftees score more frequently in mental groups III and IV. At entry only 41 percent of the Army enlistees, as compared to 53 percent of the draftees, are high school graduates. However, an additional 20 percent of the enlistees are awarded high school equivalency credits on the basis of the General Educational Development (GED) test, as compared to only 3 percent of the draftees. Finally, enlistees are more likely to re-enlist than draftees, and consequently are the principal source in all services of permanent cadre personnel with long-range commitments.82/

2. Officers

Officers were on the whole from somewhat different backgrounds. As Moskos observed, "Enlisted men are typically single, high school-trained, in their early twenties, and from working class backgrounds." Officers, on the other hand, "are characteristically college-educated, married men in their early thirties coming from middle class backgrounds."83/

When the Vietnam conflict commenced, nearly all officers were graduates of West Point or an ROTC program. As American involvement increased, officer strength rose from 110,000 in 1964 to 172,000 in 1969.84/ Some of this 56 percent increase was made up of warrant officer aviator acquisitions; most of the new officers were made second lieutenants. West Point did expand its output to help fill some of this void. ROTC output actually declined during this period. The remaining demand was filled by direct commissions and OCS. Officer demography began to change.

Social influence determined the probability of becoming an officer in the first place. Once commissioned, however, all officers were in theory equal. They were to be promoted and assigned because of merit and qualification. It was only near the top of the rank structure—with general officers—that social influence again assumed a more acknowledged role.

World War II began the destruction of this American military tradition. Prior to that war, nearly all officers were West Point
graduates, but the high influx of ROTC and OCS officers commissioned during the war lowered the West Point percentage dramatically. In 1973 only 48 percent of the Army's general officers were West Point graduates (see Table 1-5). 85/

Throughout the Vietnam period, West Point remained a haven for military traditionalists.

According to information available in 1972, members of the student bodies of the academies tended to be from families whose income fell into the $10,000 to $20,000 a year range. Twenty percent of the students came from families with incomes over $20,000 and another 20 percent represented incomes of less than $10,000. In contrast, about 48 percent of civilian four-year college men (ROTC) indicated that their families' income ranged from $10,000 and down. Racially, the academies average about 96 percent white, a greater percentage of whites than is typical of most civilian colleges. 86/

While the percentage of West Point officers in the Army during recent years has declined because of the influx of ROTC and OCS graduates, their influence has remained. Figure 1-8 87/ indicates that during the war years 75 percent of the West Pointers remained on active duty beyond their legal commitment; the figure is 50 percent for OCS and 40 percent for ROTC. The ROTC influence is declining within the Army. Not only are a smaller percentage of ROTC graduates remaining on active duty, but fewer are being commissioned (see Figure 1-9). 88/

Direct commissions are generally reserved for career non-commissioned officers or aviation warrant officers with demonstrated leadership ability. OCS attracts junior enlisted soldiers. Generally speaking, the upper middle class is represented by West Point, the middle class by ROTC, and the working class by OCS and direct commissions. With the declining ROTC participation rate, the officer corps is beginning to parallel the social background of the enlisted ranks. West Pointers will continue to exert an influence greater than their relatively small numbers would indicate, but the social background of the average officer will probably approach that of the average soldier.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE OF COMMISSION</th>
<th>GENERAL</th>
<th>LIEUTENANT GENERAL</th>
<th>MAJOR GENERAL</th>
<th>BRIGADIER GENERAL</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USMA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>123</td>
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<tr>
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<td>41</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DATA AS OF JUNE 30, 1973
Figure 1-8. Officer Retention Rates by Source of Commission
Figure 1-9. ROTC Enrollment
The Vietnam conflict accelerated this conversion. It became extremely unpopular to be an ROTC student on campus during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many cadets bowed to this social pressure and dropped out of the program. Student activists damaged or forced the discontinuation of ROTC at some prestigious institutions throughout the country. As Cortright documents:

Total college ROTC enrollement dropped from 218,000 in the 1968 academic year, to 87,807 in 1971-72 and 72,500 in 1972-73. ... From 1969 to 1972, thirty-eight ROTC units were expelled from college campuses, largely because of pressure from radical student activists. The latter years of the war thus produced an immense increase in student resistance to the military.89/

The Army did establish new programs to replace those closed down. Generally, these were at smaller, poorer colleges where the students tended to have a lower socio-economic background than at the closed campuses.

Many students had enrolled in ROTC to escape the draft. The prevailing attitude was "If I have to go, it might as well be as an officer." With the introduction of the draft lottery, most of these students hurriedly dropped out of the program. It is to the Army's credit that students who desired to enroll in ROTC as a result of a low lottery number were usually denied that opportunity. Thus by the early 1970s, ROTC was producing officers who wanted to be officers. This probably accounts for the increase in ROTC retention rates.

Somewhat similar phenomena occurred with West Point and OCS. Thus, while the Army is now comprised of officers with a lower socio-economic background than at any time in its history (except for massive wartime buildups), these officers tend to be more highly motivated that those generated by draft-avoidance.

3. Relevance of Socio-Economic Background

It has been shown that certain general background characteristics can be described for the average officer, enlisted man, or draftee serving in Vietnam. If these socio-economic similarities are to be of any interest
to military and political planners it must be shown that they affect in some way the structure or functioning, or both, of the American armed services. There is considerable debate on this point. Morris Janowitz has suggested than an analysis of social origins of the military can provide a powerful key to the understanding of its political logic, although he notes that no elite behaves simply on the basis of social origin.90/ John Johnson, citing evidence from military organizations in Latin America, agrees:

Although the situation is changing, a uniform still does not always make an individual, first of all, a soldier, and at least until that stage is reached the officer's social background will remain one of the keys to his behavior.91/

Others, such as C. W. Mills, argue that social background is less important to the character of a professional soldier than it is to any other social elite.92/ In later works, Janowitz has been more equivocal about the importance of social origin, noting that while socio-economic background may be important in the military elites of developing countries, it is less important in Western industrial societies where the military has become more bureaucratized and professionalized.93/

In a carefully detailed, thorough investigation of the role played by social origin in the structure and functioning of an officer corps, Kourvetaris and Dobratz note that while there is evidence that there has been "a steady and continuous change in officer recruitment from a narrow, relatively high social base to one more representative of the population," there is little evidence to indicate that this change has had any significant impact.94/ As they observe,

Social origins as explanatory variables of political orientations in the military elites become less important when individual armies are attached to supranational political and military alliances.

Thus social recruitment and political orientations of the officer corps are not sufficient indices for explaining the nature and character of the political and social military structure. The social origins approach as a research
strategy of political behavior of social elites (including the military) has been criticized by a number of writers. Putting it in a slightly different way, it is not sufficient to determine the "Who's Who" of officer corps; one should also investigate what Lasswell referred to as "the what, how and why?" of differential distribution of scarce resources of class, status, and power within and across national societies.95/

This conclusion is supported by a more limited, personal study done by Sanford M. Dornbusch after a ten-month period spent at the US Coast Guard Academy.96/ Dornbusch observes that there are powerful forces at work that minimize the importance of social background. Swabs are not permitted to discuss family background. A two-month isolation helps reinforce a break with the past. No money may be sent from home. Practices, official and otherwise, emphasize the low status of the swab and thus encourage a desire and respect for high status as defined by the service. Hazing tends to cause a cadet to identify first and foremost with his class. As Dornbusch recalls, "As a consequence of undergoing this very unpleasant experience together the swab class develops remarkable unity. For example, if a cadet cannot answer an oral question addressed to him by his teacher, the other members of his class will not answer."97/ Even socializing gives no key to background:

The next week end finds the swab compelled to invite an acceptable girl to a formal reception. He must necessarily choose from the only girls in the area whom he knows, those he met during the recent hours of [controlled] social intercourse.98/

In short, "There are few clues left which reveal social status in the outside world."99/

Peter Karsten concurs on the relative importance of socio-economic background in a study on Service Academy and ROTC officer candidates. He writes:

Differences in social origins are not relevant to the differences we found in the attitudes of members of our three groups—that is, there was no difference in the
response of representatives of one level of social origin from those of any other level. 100/

Another example of the relative importance of the social background of the military officer in Western societies is provided by a study at the British Military Academy at Sandhurst. Maurice A. Garnier summarizes the question and his answer:

Many studies of military organizations have relied heavily on the concept of social origins as an explanatory variable. This paper analyzes the changes in recruitment which have taken place in a British military academy and hypothesizes that, if social origins is a useful variable, changes in social composition of the cadets entering the academy ought to lead to changes in the ideology dominant in the organization. No such change is found to have taken place for the period 1947-1967. It is then argued that a more meaningful characterization of socialization experiences be attempted because in a highly industrialized society, social origins no longer constitute a meaningful summary of an individual's socialization experiences. 101/

But for space limitations, other studies could be cited with similar conclusions. 102/ While these studies do not, on the whole, deny the importance of social origin to an understanding of military performance, they do serve to put it in its seemingly rather limited place. This does not leave a vacuum of variables; numerous other factors have been advanced as being important to the understanding of the performance of the soldier. Moskos summarized some of the more commonly mentioned reasons for combat motivation as one example: presumed national character, the operation of the military organization, national patriotism, and primary group cohesion. 103/ Some of these will be discussed in the following chapters as they bear on the American experience in Vietnam.

A series of studies, then, document that the socio-economic background of military personnel has had limited impact on the military's structure and function in many Westernized industrial nations. However, some of the conclusions may be too narrow. In the case of the US experience in the Vietnam War, the obvious inequity of the draft that favored the more affluent was recognized by many of those who were drafted
and caused resentment. This is, in a way, a separate question from that addressed by the above studies, but it too involves social class. Further, officer-troop tensions can be aggravated by perceived class differences—though if current predictions hold, these class differences will diminish.

However, there is a larger, and in the end perhaps, a more important implication of the changing social origins of military personnel. If officers' socio-economic origins approach those of enlisted men, and if the latter remains as low as it was during the Vietnam period, a very serious alteration in the relationship between the military and society may result.

In the recent past, military-civilian connections have been very strong. As recently as 1958, 70 percent of all 26-year-old men had been, or were in military service. There was general support for a system that was considered to have worked fairly well in the past, and general support for a continuation of the draft. With the drawdown of the Vietnam War and the decrease in both the number of military personnel required and in the social classes from which they tended to come, the strong military-civilian tie is in danger of serious erosion. The military's image appears tarnished to many Americans, whether or not deservedly. Now only a limited segment of society has any real personal stake in military activities, and it is a segment of society located fairly low in the class structure where its influence with community leaders is unlikely to be effective. Increasingly, a large proportion of society is being excused from a personal concern with national military policy. The effects of this trend can hardly be underestimated. Roger Little summarizes the situation:

The developing problem confronting military manpower agencies is whether military service can be retained as a component of the civic ethic when it is meaningful only to a dwindling fraction of American men. Through more flexible training and assignment policies and adjustment of the term of service to the available manpower, the participation would be increased and the significance of these institutions in American society would be revitalized. The solutions that we have proposed are intended to avoid the crisis that present policies portend: that membership in American
D. SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS

Of the 27 million men who came of draft age between 1964 and 1973 nearly 16 million, or over 60 percent, avoided induction by a variety of legal or illegal means. Over half a million left the military with less-than-honorable discharges. Over half a million committed apparent draft offenses. Approximately two million served in Vietnam. A quarter of a million were wounded. Over 50,000 died.

The men within each of these categories did not necessarily represent an average cross section of America's youth. The average American soldier who saw combat in Vietnam was from a poorer-than-average socio-economic group and had a limited education. There was a disproportionately high chance that he would be from a racial minority.

This was not a new phenomenon in the history of war; the lower echelons of society have often borne the brunt of combat responsibilities. The American Civil War with its "20-Nigger Rule" and substitute-purchase system, and the sailors of the famous navy of the British Empire provide relatively recent examples. What is surprising in the Vietnam context is the degree that this remained the case in a modern prosperous democracy. This chapter has attempted to provide a brief answer to the question of how this came about.

Having recently emerged from a heady period of almost-effortless world dominance, a period initiated by spectacular and relatively rapid success in World War II, the US was not prepared, in more ways than one, for the new demands of emerging situations. Many Americans were not aware of the changing economic situation at home, and thus were unable to analyze its impact on foreign policy. Economic opportunities narrowed in many ways while economic expectations rose.

The high price of an active foreign policy began to be felt. The clash of demands from President Johnson's Great Society program and the War
in Vietnam provide the classic example of this confrontation. The president, both a beneficiary and a victim of the inflated expectations of the period, walked a political tightrope.

Military manpower procurement policies felt the effects of this changing political situation, as is reflected in both their de facto and de jure operations. The basic framework of the Selective Service System survived through much of the war. There were a few significant alterations, and these tended to mirror political rather than military demands. The decision not to call up the Reserves until late in the war, and then in only a limited capacity, was one such policy. So was Project 100,000. The policy decision regarding tours of duty was not wholly political, though it suited political needs. The institution of the lottery and then the All-Volunteer Army were directly tied to the political and military events of the Vietnam period. The de facto policy that failed to narrow the education, medical, Reserve, and other loopholes that tended to be used by the more privileged groups of society clearly had a political as well as some military basis.

The effects of the socio-economic makeup of the military have been actively debated. While there is still disagreement, it would seem that the social class background of the soldier has had less of an impact on his performance and on the structure and functioning of the military during the Vietnam period than have other factors. However, if the decline in personal civilian-military ties continues, a decline at least partially tied to the socio-economic origins of military personnel, the long-term impact on the military may be far from insignificant.

The unparalleled political-military-economic situation the United States found itself in after World War II accommodated both an expensive foreign policy and increasing domestic wealth, accompanied by rising expectations. The gradual relative decline in this position of unchallenged world dominance coincided with increasing political unrest at home (e.g., the civil rights movement, fueled in part by the optimism created by these rising expectations) and the increase in the economic demands of American Vietnam policy. Successive administrations, reluctant to publicize "bad
news' of any sort, attempted to minimize the domestic demands of the Vietnam policy. Thus the public, increasingly attached to its burgeoning comfort, was poorly prepared and often not very willing to make the necessary sacrifices for even a 'limited' war effort. Personnel policies reflected this situation, and the poorer, poorly educated combat soldier whom these policies tended to generate bore the brunt of the fighting.

The Selective Service mechanism worked exceptionally well and was remarkably fair during World War II--an all-out war. The draft, also functioned reasonably well and fairly during the Korean War, with help from the call-up of the Reserves. In contrast, the Selective Service System demonstrated serious and inequitable flaws in its application to the Vietnam War. For example, failure to mobilize the National Guard and Reserves made the Reserves a haven for legal draft avoidance. The Reserve component's authorized strength swelled during the Vietnam War, but since abolition of the draft and reliance on the All-Volunteer Service, the Reserve component has been depleted seriously (a subject beyond the purview of this effort but deserving further serious study), resulting, in 1979, in approximately a 50 percent shortfall in the minimal recruitment requirement.

The unsatisfactory results of the protracted war in Vietnam and pressure from vocal subgroups of the population caused American legislators to abolish the draft and substitute the All-Volunteer Force, which, despite disclaimers, seems not to be working well.

(It should be noted that in August 1979 none of the US military services met its accession quotas and charges were levied that the Army had deliberately reduced its accession goals from the number it required to what it expected to recruit--about one half of the number others said was needed.) Concomitantly, one or more of the services lowered its enlistment standards.

Project 100,000 and other social programs placed an inordinate burden on the military services, particularly the Army and Marine Corps which had to field combat soldiers. The burden was felt in the basic and advanced training centers, to be sure, but its greatest impact was in the area of
military discipline and courts martial. Earlier studies had indicated the unsuitability of men such as those recruited under Project 100,000, and the lessons of these studies were quickly relearned.

De facto personnel policies allowed massive draft avoidance which tended to favor the already more privileged members of society and caused resentment amongst many of those who did serve. The effects of these policies on morale, leadership, etc. will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

E. LESSONS

The political parameters constraining military policy decisions must be fully understood if either of them is to be controlled to any extent. If political parameters prove inflexible, military means and/or ends must be adjusted accordingly. Together political and military limits define the 'realm of the possible' for future policies.

Lessons regarding personnel policies and their effects on the soldier relate directly to the other subjects of this volume, such as leadership and ethics, morale and discipline, combat effectiveness, etc., and will be examined in the context of those chapters.
CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES


   ___: Senate Armed Services: Military Deserters; May 21 and 22, 1968.


   ___: House Armed Services Committee: Hearings and Special Reports on Subjects Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 1970.


9. It must be remembered, for example, that the military departments looked to civilian colleges for 90 percent of their new officers. See the Statment of Thomas D. Morris, US Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) Before the House Committee on Armed Services, Report on DOD Study of the Draft, June 30, 1966.


11. One of the main problems with the philosophy of universal conscription was how to determine who should be selected when not all were needed, without violating the policy of equal treatment under the law. For a discussion of this problem see the Report of the National Advisory Commission of Selective Service, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?, February, 1967.

12. For example, these were the educational deferment policies of the 1967 Military Selective Service Act:

Deferment Categories - The National Security Council is designated as the Agency to make recommendations on what education and occupation categories should be deferred.

Undergraduate Students - Deferments are provided for all college undergraduates whose academic work is satisfactory to their schools, eliminating the old system of class standings and test scores as a guide for local draft boards. Students requesting a student deferment will be granted deferment until they (1) receive a baccalaureate degree, (2) drop out of school, or (3) reach their 24th birthday, whichever comes first.

a. Upon termination of a student deferment, the man is liable for induction as a registrant within the prime age group irrespective of his actual age. "Prime age group" means the age group which has been designated by the President as the age group from which selections for induction are first to be made after delinquents and volunteers.

b. A man who has been deferred to attend undergraduate school will not be deferred again unless he can prove extreme hardship or that he is employed in an industry or engaged in graduate study considered vital to the national interest.

Occupational Deferments - The President's authority to defer those working in agriculture, industry, certain public agencies, and other fields found necessary for the maintenance of the national interest remains in effect. Youth engaged in apprentice or vocational training will be eligible for a deferment if it is considered the skill being learned is critical to the national interest.
Graduate Students - The President retains discretionary authority to defer graduate students who are studying in a field found to be necessary to the preservation of national health, safety, or interest. The President has announced he plans to limit deferments to those studying in the fields of medicine and dentistry.

a. It is understood that the President will continue to defer any man eligible for induction who is entering his second or subsequent year of post-baccalaureate study without interruption on 1 October 1967, if his school certifies that he is satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction leading to his degree, but he will not be deferred for a course of study leading to a master's degree or the equivalent for a total of more than two years, or for a course of study leading to a doctoral or professional degree or the equivalent (or combination of master's and doctoral degrees) for a total of more than four years.

b. Men deferred for graduate study will remain liable for training and service in the Armed Forces until the anniversary of their 35th birthday, except in cases of extreme hardship.

13. Steven Canby, Manpower Procurement, p. 3.
18. These lobbies tended to be very effective. One academic, Leslie Fiedler, commenting on the insulation of the academic community from military service observed that he "had never known a single family that had lost a son in Vietnam, or indeed, one with a son wounded, missing in action, or held prisoner of war. And this despite the fact that American casualties in Vietnam are already almost equal to those of World War I. Nor am I alone in my strange plight; . . ." Saturday Review, November 18, 1972.
20. Ibid., p. 5.
21. General Hershey elaborated on the advantages of such a system: "No system of compulsory service could long endure without the support of the people . . . The Selective Service System is, therefore, founded upon the grass roots principle, in which boards made up of citizens in each community determine when registrants should be made available for military service." Ibid., p. 6. General Hershey further commented upon this and other aspects of the Selective Service system in a series of interviews in 1975 made as part of the US Army Military History Research Collection Senior Officers Debriefing Program. On the necessity of flexibility at the local level, Hershey observed that this was so essential that he doubted that a computerized system could successfully be substituted for it. See transcripts for further comments.


23. Hodgson, America in Our Time, p. 244.


27. General Donald V. Bennett, US Army Military Research Collection, Senior Officers Debriefing Program Interview AY 1976, Tape 7, (pp. 22-23).


33. "One such was the 1002nd Supply and Service Company, which had its movement to Vietnam held up by Justice William O. Douglas in September 1968. In the end, the Supreme Court denied the plea and declared the mobilization legal, and units earmarked for Vietnam were sent there as rapidly as possible. Most Reserve units that served in Vietnam did well. A few were excellent." Kinnard, War Managers, p. 122.


"A standard approach to welfare sees the development of such institutions in modern industrial societies as a counterpart of the decline of traditional agencies which perform so-called "welfare functions," such as the extended family. All societies have institutions to deal with residual person and populations: the poor, widows, orphans, the disabled and others. In modern societies these activities become formalized and invested in specialized agencies." p. 137.

He observes however, that the military depends upon its aura of social honor to remain effective, and that this is incompatible with a view of it as a welfare institution. Great caution in such use is therefore necessary.

37. General Westmoreland observed, "The inequality of student deferments is dramatically and tragically illustrated by statistics on deaths in Vietnam by state in relation to population. A higher percentage of men served and died from states with generally lower incomes. The highest percentage of deaths per hundred thousand of population—39.8 percent—was from West Virginia." William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1976), p. 298. (Note: The "39.8 percent" should probably read "39.8"—certainly 40% of the West Virginian population did not die in Vietnam—but nearly 40 deaths per hundred thousand of total population, not just the drafted population, would be a very high figure).


Table 21, p. 42. Data for Enlistees from Table 33, p. 52. For a full discussion of the development and use of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), see p. 9.


46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., pp. 47-48.


57. Steven Canby, *Manpower Procurement*, pp. 4-5.


59. Roger W. Little, *Selective Service*, p. 1. Little continues:

The adverse reaction to the federal enrollment officers of the Civil War led to development of the local draft board concept, introduced more than fifty years later in the draft legislation of 1917 and continued unchanged to the present day. Originally it appeared to be relevant to a society with a very simple industrial structure and a relatively diffuse relationship between local communities and the federal government. In recent years, however, profound changes in American society, such as urbanization, mass communications and transportation, a heightened awareness of social inequities, and the pervasive and direct influence of the federal government on the local community, have greatly altered the relevance of such a concept as the local board.


67. Fallow, *Class War*. 

1-56


70. Ibid.


72. Ibid.

73. Based on data collected by the University of Notre Dame.

74. Badillo and Curry, pp. 402.

75. Ibid., p. 402.

76. One who has noted this trend is Colonel Robert S. Nichols, who remarked on it in an unpublished paper entitled "The Characteristics of the US Soldier and Their Impact on Operations in Vietnam." He observed:

As the war continued, more and more enlisted personnel came from the lower social classes, or minority groups, or both. The more talented and better educated avoided the draft by use of college deferments and/or enlistment in the guard and reserve. This led to a situation when there was a major gap between the goals, capabilities and motivations of those who led and those who were led.

While the original leadership group, both officer and CO, was well-selected and trained, the rapid turnover of personnel and the expansion of the Army led to use of much poorer quality officers (in the company grade levels) and NCO's.


81. Ibid.

82. Roger W. Little, *Selective Service*, p. 17. Some of the comparisons can be usefully presented in the following tables:
TABLE 1. A COMPARISON OF ENLISTEES AND DRAFTEES BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>REGULAR ARMY</th>
<th>SELECTIVE SERVICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College graduate and higher</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College, 3-4 years, nongraduate</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College, 2 years</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College, 1 year</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school, 1 year</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school graduate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2. RE-ENLISTMENT RATES, BY BRANCH OF SERVICE AND PROCUREMENT SOURCE, 1950-1967

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*Data for Fiscal Years rather than calendar years, indicating a 12-month period beginning on July 1 of the previous calendar year and terminating on June 30 of the year indicated.


87. Gabriel and Savage, *Crisis*, Table 14, p. 194.
88. Ibid., Table 10, p. 190.
98. Ibid., p. 320.
99. Ibid., p. 317.


106. Roger W. Little, Selective Service, p. 34.
The most notable training achievement in Army history was the creation of a great Army and Air Force between 1940 and 1945. Churchill said, "The rate at which the small American Army of only a few hundred thousand men, not long before the war, created the mighty force of millions of soldiers is a wonder of military history. ... This is an achievement which the soldiers of every other nation will always study with admiration and envy." The pre-World War II Army that accomplished that feat did not have nearly the capability or expertise that today's Army has. The leaders of that Army, however, had a training knack that has been lost. The task at hand is to recapture the art. 1/

LTG Arthur S. Collins, Jr., 1978

In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military. 2/

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, 1933

A. INTRODUCTION

The Army's training achievement in World War II was indeed remarkable, and American armed forces emerged from that war as one of the best trained and most formidable fighting forces the world had ever seen. Indoctrination was hardly a problem; the enemies were easily delineated and clearly deserved a beating.

Five years later, ill-prepared troops, augmented with only a handful of combat veterans, were rushed to Korea to face the invading North Korean forces. 3/ The Army's training system turned away from the liberalization
of the Doolittle Board, toughened its requirements, and again began producing well-trained, combat-ready soldiers. Troop indoctrination was conducted essentially as an information program, an approach that contrasted sharply with the intensive political and ideological indoctrination provided by communist countries to their military and civilian populations.

The US forces that deployed to Vietnam beginning in 1965 were, according to credible observers, the best trained American forces ever fielded at the outset of a war. Though some may question the lack of emphasis on counterinsurgency doctrine in the syllabi governing the training of the average soldier, that soldier performed with exceptional competence in the first four years of US combat involvement. Only after US withdrawals from South Vietnam began did serious deficiencies arise. Some problems were training-related, but most derived from other causative factors which are discussed in the other chapters of this volume. Herein the concern is training the US soldier for combat in Vietnam.

Enormous problems faced the Army as it geared up its training base to prepare for major troop commitments in Vietnam. President Johnson's refusal to mobilize the Reserve Component meant that Reserve training divisions were not available to handle the greatly increased training load. Moreover, the training base also had to meet the needs of US forces in Europe, Korea, and elsewhere. Further, the war in Vietnam provided a new and different challenge in many respects. Sam C. Sarkesian, a noted social scientist, assessed one of the major training problems that Vietnam presented for the US Army:

One of the major problems faced by the military is the conduct of realistic training in preparation for combat. It is difficult to create combat situations in training, since the soldier is aware that the exercise is not intended to hurt him. For conventional wars, the problem is difficult enough. For revolutionary war and unconventional tactics, new elements are added which make the training problem almost insoluble. The fact that the revolutionary battlefield may include a conglomeration of military forces, civilians, officials, police, with indistinct lines delineating enemy from friend, and combatant from non-combatant, makes it
highly problematical that realistic simulation can be achieved, not only in the physical, but also in the psychological sense. Superimposed on this environment is the requirement for learning combat skills and instinctive response. Not only must the soldier be trained in the combat skills, but he must also be trained in understanding the nature of revolutionary war and the social and political context in which he must operate. Given the nature of the cultural gap between industrial and developing societies, this becomes, at best, a rather dubious undertaking. 6/

This assessment underscores the extremely important challenge that Vietnam posed for the US training effort. While many other problems hindered the training effort for Vietnam, this particular one prompted the advent of new training and indoctrination requirements which, owing to the very nature and timetable of the conflict, gave rise to a number of training innovations and deficiencies. This chapter assesses these aspects of the US training and indoctrination effort.

B. INFLUENCE OF THE KOREAN WAR

1. Expansion of the Training Base

   The armed forces of the United States were not well prepared for the Korean War. Few units were available for immediate commitment to Korea, and these, owing to rapid personnel turnover, lacked sufficient training. 7/ Of the ten Army and two Marine divisions in the active forces, only the 1st Cavalry Division in Japan was near its authorized strength.

   Some 310,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen were called to active duty, providing an immediate, important source of trained personnel. 8/ Their early assignment to active duty also allowed time for the training base to be expanded.

   After the Chinese intervention in late 1950, the replacement training system had to operate at peak capacity to meet the urgent battlefield requirements in Korea. The Army training base expanded markedly, and by FY 1954 more than 600,000 personnel were included in the training load. By the end of the Korean War, ten training divisions and eleven branch material Reserve Training Centers were functioning. 9/
2. **Legacy of the Korean War**

Combat operations in Korea were comparatively stationary for two years beginning in 1951. Because of the conflict's evolution to a more static mode of warfare, US soldiers found themselves increasingly involved in patrol activities and bunker building. The nature of the conflict at the time also illustrated the merits of training in survival techniques, including the erection of defense fortifications. However, it was the Chinese soldier who demonstrated the benefits of such skills; the American soldier, trained for more fluid, less stationary warfare, did not, as a rule, excel in fortification digging or building.

Another important training legacy grew out of the US soldiers' Korean experience. The war highlighted the need for training soldiers to meet the rigors of and to deal appropriately with the stresses and strains of capture by the enemy. The advent of a new Code of Conduct was inspired by the unfortunate plight of many US servicemen who were captured by the North Koreans during this period. 10/

With the end of the war in Korea, and with the Soviets and Chinese apparently contained in Northeast Asia, attention returned to Europe. Training programs were structured to prepare for the threat perceived in Europe and only a few select units were geared to the threat of guerrilla warfare.

C. **US Army Training Philosophy and Programs, 1954-1964**

1. **Impact of National Policy**

During the Eisenhower administration, efforts to achieve a balanced budget restricted defense spending. The administration's emphasis on massive retaliation as the most cost-effective deterrent had an appreciable impact on the size and scope of US conventional forces. Collective security was given particular emphasis and in 1954, some 400,000 men served in US units in NATO Europe. 11/ Army training programs and philosophy were shaped largely by requirements that grew out of the US focus on and commitment to Central Europe. Conventional and tactical nuclear warfare
dominated the training, and the "Pentomic Division" was born to accommodate the nuclear battlefield.

2. The French Experience

The French had been engaged in combat with Ho Chi-Minh's Viet Minh forces from 1946 to 1954. Occasional US observers reported on the progress of that war, but there is no evidence to suggest that the lessons learned (or not learned) by the French during this period impacted in any appreciable way on US training, then or later. 12/

3 The Special Forces

On 20 June 1952, the Special Forces activated the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; this group became the nucleus of the Special Warfare Center, now known as the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. In 1957 the 1st Special Forces Group was activated on Okinawa and a team from that unit conducted training for 58 Vietnamese Army personnel at the Commando Training Center at Nha Trang. 13/ The Special Forces eventually became intimately involved in training and operations in Vietnam.

In 1959 the faculty of the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg undertook the task of converting their knowledge of guerrilla warfare into a doctrine for anti-guerrilla operations. The Chief of Doctrine in the school published the first Army field manuals on counterinsurgency which incorporated pertinent information needed by soldiers training in counterinsurgency. 14/

While details concerning the origin and operation of the Special Forces are treated in detail in Volume VI, Chapter 2, it is important to mention that the Special Forces were initially trained to conduct guerrilla warfare; later training was expanded to include combat against guerrilla forces. Their mission, at least as it was presented in 1961, was thus:

... to develop, organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Special Forces may also advise, train, and assist indigenous forces in counterinsurgency operations. 15/
4. **A New Era**

President John F. Kennedy, attending a meeting of the National Security Council on February 1961, requested that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with other interested agencies, examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of counterguerrilla forces. His request was formally transmitted on 3 February in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 2. The president's sudden interest in counterguerrilla operations stemmed from Nikita Khrushchev's 6 January 1961 speech in which he spoke of (national) liberation wars or popular uprisings.

On 9 March 1961, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, signed NSAM No. 28; this directive called for the views of the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence on the launching of guerrilla operations in Viet Minh territory. Presidential interest in guerrilla operations and, shortly thereafter, in counterinsurgency operations had considerable impact on the services. Service journals were quick to solicit articles dealing with these subjects and training courses in counterinsurgency were added to the curriculum of most officers' schools, at least through the level of Command and General Staff College.

5. **Individual Training**

In the early 1960s, Army planners set in motion a revitalization program designed to give a "new look" to the Army's training program. In September 1963, Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance requested Stephen Ailes, then Under Secretary of the Army, to survey recruit training, particularly the Basic Combat Training (BCT) phase, "to ascertain what our program is, what stages are in progress or being planned, and what remains to be done. . .". In his report Mr. Ailes noted that the FY 1963 centralization of authority for individual training under CONARC had already brought about considerable improvement. Formerly BCT had been supervised by the CONUS army commanders, and standards for trainee performance had varied considerably at the various training centers. In particular, Mr. Ailes noted the recently adopted 8-week BCT program in which lecture time was reduced, purely infantry subjects were deferred to a later stage of
training, and the time allotted for drills, ceremonies, physical training, marches, and bivouacs was increased substantially. His report saw the new program as representing "... a long step forward toward making BCT more demanding and more effective as a physical and mental conditioner of recruits." 19/

Mr. Ailes recommendations became keystones in the Army’s training program and resulted in: 20/
- A standardized training organization;
- Upgrading of cadre assignments at Army training centers;
- Rewards (promotion to E-2) for excellent trainees;
- Standardized "end of cycle" tests; and
- The Drill Sergeant concept.

6. Training for Staff and Advisors 21/
Personnel detailed to Vietnam prior to 1959 did not receive any special training or preparation for their staff or advisory duties. While senior officers were often required to report to Pacific Command headquarters for an orientation briefing, the majority of personnel sent to Vietnam did not receive such briefings, primarily because of their technical background. Their Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) was the only criterion that truly mattered. In isolated cases a working knowledge of French was a prerequisite to duty in Vietnam, and at least one officer during this time frame was sent to the Vietnamese Language School to prepare for duties as head of the (Vietnamese) translator pool. 22/ This lack of language training presented a number of difficulties for the US advisory effort. This and other problems associated with advisor training are discussed more fully in Volume VI, Chapter 12 - "The Advisory Effort."

President Diem required all of his senior officers to learn English. Consequently most US advisors conducted English classes for their counterparts. The reverse case was, however, a rarity.

In 1959 the Military Assistance Institute (MAI), a private contract school under supervision of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
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offered courses in area studies. 23/ The Vietnam course was useful, providing general background information on the country, its diverse population, and local customs. Bernard Fall, one of the few western experts on Vietnam at that time, was one of the speakers in 1960. 24/

The Kennedy administration placed considerable emphasis on counterinsurgency and in March 1962 National Security Action Memorandum 131 was issued requiring that basic courses be taught in counterinsurgency: 25/

These courses included:

- The historical background of counterinsurgency, required throughout the school systems for junior to senior levels and personnel of all grades.
- Study of departmental tactics and techniques to counter subserv-ison insurgency, required for company and field grade officers and for CIA, State Department, AID and USIA officers.
- Instruction in counterinsurgency program planning, required at the staff college/war college level for the military services and principal agencies.
- Specialized preparation for service in underdeveloped areas, required for middle and senior grade officers about to occupy important posts in underdeveloped countries.

7. The Military Assistance Training Advisory (MATA) Course 26/

In February 1962, CONARC established the Military Assistance Training Advisors (MATA) Course at Fort Bragg's Special Warfare Center. Students bound for Vietnam were trained in four categories: officers and enlisted men for infantry battalions, civil guard, and Self Defence Corps advisor teams; artillery officer advisors and chiefs of firing batteries; field radio repairmen supervisors; and armor repair supervision. All students attended a 130-hour common course.

The MATA program of instruction initially provided a four-week course of 172 hours, 136 of which were designated for academic subjects and 36 for processing, physical conditioning, and other non-academic work. Academic subjects included area studies, counterinsurgency operations, communications, weapons, and demolitions. Night field training averaged 10
hours a week. Beginning with the fourth class, the length of the MATA course was increased to six weeks, which included 61 hours of area studies and language.

MATA personnel made continual changes in lesson plans for the course, responding to the continually changing conditions in Vietnam and to the changing needs of advisors there. Personnel returning from assignments in Vietnam were assigned to the MATA staff, and used their recent experiences to update the lesson plans. MATA staff officers also made visits to Vietnam to gain additional experience and instructional insights relevant to area studies and training requirements.

Upon arrival in Vietnam, all officers and NCO's were sent to Quang Trung Training Center to fire all basic infantry weapons. No other formal training or familiarization was scheduled, but on-the-job training (OJT) was a continuing requirement.

8. Training and Indoctrination 1954-1964 - A Summary

From the initial commitment of US advisors in Vietnam until 1960, US political and military leaders lacked an appreciation of the nature of the threat in Southeast Asia. In 1959 President Eisenhower envisaged a "... fantastic conspiracy, international communism..." as the major threat to the free world in general, and to South Vietnam in particular. 27/ General Maxwell D. Taylor sees 1960 as the turning point in Washington's appreciation of the guerrilla threat in RVN, crediting LTG Lionel McGarr, USA, and BG Edward G. Lansdell, USAF, with having driven home the actual nature of the threat during a major briefing in Washington in late 1960. 28/

Because the nature of the threat was not appreciated initially, no special measures were taken to prepare US personnel for their duty assignments in Vietnam. The short unaccompanied tour of 12-14 months for most personnel made intensive preparation appear to be a non-cost-effective approach to training. No formal indoctrination was required, and the MAI and MATA courses focused primarily on national and cultural history rather than on preparations for personnel readiness for and acclimation to the Southeast Asian theater. 29.
No significant effort was made to learn from the French experience and to modify training or indoctrination based on French lessons. 30/ There was no indoctrination during the early period with the possible exception of Special Forces personnel. Even high-ranking officers did not receive the training, indoctrination, or information they considered necessary. LTG Lionel McGarr, Commander US MAAG, Indochina, referred to the erroneous concept of peacetime training in RVN and complained that before assuming his MAAG job he had only been briefed on "peacetime conditions as a peacetime MAAG Chief." 31/

The lack of a real indoctrination program is reflected in the foreword to Special Warfare, circa 1962, by Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr. The secretary urged "... commanders to draw upon this material in their training and Troop Information programs..." 32/ Though that publication was useful, particularly at that early date, and contained several interesting and informative essays, it also had the appearance of a slick, public information approach to a serious problem. In no sense did Secretary Stahr's exhortation serve as the basis for implementing an indoctrination program.

Whether or not an indoctrination program was necessary in the period 1954-1964, and what shape such a program might have taken if one had been implemented, is beyond the scope of this Volume. Although political indoctrination of the American soldier appears infeasible, the soldier should possess an appreciation of the nature of his duties, the nature of the enemy and the civilian population, and the consequences of military defeat and victory in the conflict in which he is involved. However his immediate mission should be the most important to him, particularly since "... the soldier [is] concerned with his own day-to-day survival, [and not]. . . the decisions of state that brought him into combat." 33/

D. TRAINING -- ON THE WAY IN (1965-1968)

Training is influenced by a great number of factors. However, when a conflict begins, nothing affects training more than the actual nature of
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the conflict and enemy. Figure 2-1 provides a summary of the primary factors that affected the training and indoctrination of the US soldier serving in Vietnam during this period.

1. Snapshot of Training in 1965

CONARC (Continental Army Command) administered the Army's training program in 1965. At that time, recruit training had changed little from the post-Korea era. The US soldier's training commenced with an eight-week basic training course, followed by advanced individual training (AIT). During FY 1964, many courses were shortened by several weeks in order to permit rapid assignment of trained soldiers to operational units. In an accompanying move, many thousands of graduates from basic combat training were assigned directly to units for advanced individual training. Many of the problems related to training the new soldier were the responsibility of the Human Resources Research Office (HUMRRO), which was then under contract to the Army for the purposes of research and development on basic combat and advanced individual training. 34/

Recruit training for counterguerrilla operations, according to FM 31-16, emphasized a diverse array of subjects; including the objectives and operations of insurgent movements, with complementary training in counter-PYSOP and counterguerrilla operations. Cross-training in the employment of all types of weapons was also emphasized. Additional emphasis was placed on intensive physical training; greater stress was placed on foot marches, physical training drills, hand-to-hand combat, survival, evasion and escape training, and confidence tests.

Unit training for counterguerrilla operations also featured a diverse array of instruction which would later be applied in Vietnam: intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic actions, and advisory assistance operations. This training was necessary to prepare US units to recognize, understand, and combat the guerrilla forces in their own environment. In addition, all ground units -- from battalions to rifle squads -- were trained to conduct airmobile operations with support helicopters. This training complemented that which US helicopter pilots received during their own program of instruction.
An Uphill Battle - Some Factors Which Affected Training and Indoctrination

- Mood of population over an unpopular war
- Military ticket-punching, as best troops wanted to serve in RVN, not in US-based training facility
- US planners did not understand the nature of the war
- Quality of recruit, which dropped as the war progressed
- Unit cohesion disrupted by DEROS (fixed, one-year tour) concept

Conditions in the RVN → US Army Training & Indoctrination

The Enemy

Figure 2-1. Factors Affecting Training and Indoctrination
Battalions and brigades were directed to conduct extensive training exercises to gain proficiency in counterguerrilla operations. This requirement directed that realistic opposed-forces exercises be conducted, with realistic simulation of guerrilla tactical forces, sympathizers, and "non-committed" civilians. Model Vietnamese villages and quick-fire reaction courses were established in each training center. 35/

Army doctrine called for various subjects to be integrated into normal individual and unit training. Topics from general, individual training courses were integrated into counterguerrilla training; these included guard duty, tactical intelligence, and field sanitation. Normal unit training was enhanced with additional counterguerrilla training, including patrolling and squad tactical training, crew-served weapons training, communications, field fortifications training, landmine warfare, and concealment and camouflage. 36/

The best trained units in the services were the first to be committed to Vietnam. With the one-year tour in effect, the implications were clear. Most of the combat experience gained by these first units would be lost at the end of the year. This phenomenon had a negative impact on the overall viability of unit training. Ideally, units function most efficiently when personnel turnovers are minimal. The training cycle of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade provides a clear example of how a unit should be trained and prepared for battle. 37/ The 196th Brigade was activated at Fort Devens, Massachusetts in August 1965 and, because of the foresight of its commanding officer, it trained together in tactics designed to seek and destroy Viet Cong insurgents. The Brigade was organized on a "train and retain" basis. In August 1966 it arrived in Vietnam. Several of its officers had had previous tours in RVN, and their influence on the Brigade's training was exceedingly important. Other units were unfortunately activated without such training. As the war dragged on, the urgent demands for more units and more personnel militated against the orderly and productive "train and retain" system. The perceived need to balance the monthly end-of-tour losses further disrupted training and unit cohesiveness through inter-unit transfers made to achieve the desired balance.
2. **In-Country Training**

The requirement for in-country training was paramount during the period of rapid US buildup. This training was complicated by the turnover of officers, but was made possible in large part, by innovative, informal "brainstorming" sessions involving staffs and company commanders; from these sessions emerged solutions for dealing with the enemy's sapper and antiarmor tactics, for conducting effective night operations, and for clearing swaths in jungle areas with Rome Plows and other heavy equipment. A particular challenge was the need to train drivers, maintenance crews, and infantry units in the effective care and use of M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and related equipment such as flamethrower APCs. In the monsoon, season drivers were taught how to maneuver APCs in the mud, and how to move an APC out of a morass. In this context, soldiers who had earlier been trained to fight from APCs had to learn to fight dismounted. Soldiers were hastily trained in the subtleties of airmobile operations, occasionally just prior to an impending airmobile campaign. Moreover, Army units in the field had to train their incoming intelligence officers (S-2) to "go to school on the enemy" just as the enemy had long been "going to school" on US forces. 38/

LTG A. S. Collins, Jr., then Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, recommended that all who command or aspire to command read the report, "Observations of a Brigade Commander," submitted in 1967 by then Colonel Sidney B. Berry, Jr. With respect to training, Col. Berry pointed out that it was obviously desirable to give replacements in-country training before their assignment to Platoons or Companies for combat operations. 39/ He considered the battalion to be the ideal level for such training but reluctantly conceded that only at brigade or division level could the administrative and personnel load be managed. Berry recommended that all lieutenants, enlisted, and noncommissioned personnel receive a five to seven-day course taught by experienced personnel. Subjects would include:

- Digging a standard firing position;
TRANFJ BENEFICIAL EFFECTS

- Firing principal infantry weapons;
- Squad and platoon tactics;
- VC mines and booby traps;
- Road clearing operations;
- Daylight reconnaissance patrols; and
- Night ambush patrols.

These recommendations were integrated into US ir-country training programs, primarily at the brigade and division 1 1, although some battalions were also able to train their soldiers in these necessary skills. Levels of effort varied, however, as did the quality of training received.

One of the most perplexing and tragic illustrations of poor training and leadership was the 1968 incident at My Lai. The Peers inquiry of the incident found that the manner in which the 11th Brigade was activated, trained, prepared for overseas movement, and deployed to Vietnam had some impact on the events at Son My and My Lai. The Peers report described the situation as follows:

11th Brigade elements underwent an accelerated training program, received a substantial input of replacement personnel shortly before deploying, and eventually deployed earlier than originally had been scheduled. Shortly after arriving in Vietnam, planned makeup training was effected by another infusion of replacements (to overcome a projected rotation "hump") and by early commitment of brigade elements to active combat operations. 40/

As a result, the troops received only marginal training in several important areas, including the provisions of the Geneva Convention, the handling and safeguarding of civilians, rules of engagement, and identification of and response to illegal orders. Those and other training deficiencies were believed to have played a significant part in that fateful operation.

3. Major Changes in Training, 1965-68

At the Honolulu Conference in February 1966, Army Chief of Staff, Harold K. Johnson informed Secretary of Defense McNamara that the Army was shortchanging certain overseas areas to increase training cadres in CONUS. He added that because of the effect on the Strategic Reserve resulting from
deployments already made, the quality of new units would diminish below the present level. This situation prompted the Army to devise new methods to teach the soldier's basic skills. Basic combat training (BCT) courses were supplemented with courses in map reading, land navigation, and "quick kill" marksmanship, and in 1968 a course on the new M-16 rifle was added. Soldiers learned how to plant land mines (in terrain similar to that of South Vietnam) and how to search a "captured VC." Helicopter pilots learned to conduct airmobile assaults. Other training suitable for Vietnam included tunnel destruction and denial, land-clearing tactics, scout dog operations, and detection of boobytraps. During the war years, over a million soldiers trained at Fort Polk, Louisiana, where engineers created rice paddy environments and hamlets in jungle-type terrain. In 1967, the advanced individual training program for Vietnam-bound infantrymen was improved upon at the four major Army training centers involved in training programs for Vietnam. These AIT programs lasted for a period of nine weeks. Training requirements called for expansion in some MOSs (such as helicopter pilots) and cutbacks in other areas. In addition, domestic unrest in the US led to the extensive use of US Army personnel in quelling civil disturbances; this led to crash training programs such as that run by the MP School at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

The low quality of many recruits also prompted the US Army to open a pilot program of remedial reading at 12 basic combat training centers for members of Project 100,000 (soldiers with marginal education) who had less than a fifth-grade reading level. Over 1,300 completed the six-week course in FY 1968.

One significant change in the training program was the introduction of the Infantry Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Combat Leaders Course, which began in mid-1967. This course was designed to meet a critical shortage of NCOs and supervisors in the grades of sergeant and staff sergeant, especially for duty in Vietnam. CONARC established the initial courses at Fort Knox and Fort Sill, and instruction in 13 separate military occupation specialties began in November 1967. The program continued to expand in the following years until late 1971. In 1969, a CONARC
review of the program concluded that (in terms of leadership, practical application of MOS training, and other key skills of graduates) the program had been successful in the three combat arms. Some seasoned veterans noted that the graduates of these courses were still "very green." On balance, however, most believed the program to be sound.

4. Feedback to Training

By Army Regulation AR525-24 (superseded by AR-19, 25 May 1965), a feedback mechanism was established from the field to US-based training programs. The system required unit commanders in theaters conducting combat operations to furnish CONARC quarterly command reports. These reports included commanders' recommendations on the combat operations of their commands pertaining to doctrine, organization, tactics, and training. The primary purpose of the reports was to ensure that lessons learned in combat had a timely influence on subjects taught in the US soldier's training and indoctrination courses. 47/

In October 1965, CONARC began publishing a quarterly pamphlet designed to gather in one document the lessons learned from these combat reports which were applicable to training programs. The pamphlet was distributed widely: to CONUS armies, to the DA staff, to DA schools, and to others involved in training activities.

In 1966, CONARC received authority from Headquarters, DA to conduct quarterly visits to Vietnam by teams composed of representatives of the service schools and training centers. The visits were integral to the establishing of a responsive feedback system from the field to responsible schools. Moreover, specific deficiencies of school and training center graduates could be identified, potential problem areas could be improved upon and data directly applicable to courses of instruction could be added to the training curriculum. 48/

5. The Advisors

US advisors in RVN had increased from 692 in 1960 to about 11,000 advisory and support personnel in 1962. By 1967 some 4,000 military personnel and 800 civilians were involved in CORDS. In 1969 approximately 13,500 US Army advisors were in country, with about half of that number
assigned to CORDS. Several senior Vietnamese officers described the US advisor and his training in these terms:

The requirements for US Army officers assigned to advisory duties in Vietnam seemed to be based on three major criteria: language ability, branch of service, and training. Some degree of fluency in Vietnamese, for example, was required of officers assigned to the PF/PF, particularly those advising the PF training centers and the district chiefs. Experience, however, showed that this linguistic requirement was seldom restrictive and that these advisers rarely achieved a desirable fluency for effective professional communication. US Army officers selected for staff or technical service advisory duties were usually matched branch for branch, but here again, this requirement was sometimes not strictly observed, chiefly when the advisory position was classified as branch-immaterial. The training criterion applied mostly to key advisory positions or specialized areas of duty. Depending on the level, graduates of the National or Army War Colleges, Command and General Staff College, branch Career or Advanced courses were required. Specialized areas of duty usually related to such courses as Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare, Psychological Operations, Special Forces, Civil Affairs, etc. The majority of advisory positions, however, required graduates of the Military Assistance Institute or Military Assistance Training Advisory Course. But regardless of position or specialization, the one-year tour seemed not conducive to more extensive preparation of US officers for advisory duties other than perfunctory requirements and a brief orientation course prior to field deployment.

E. Aviation Training

COMUSMACV established a requirement in February 1964 for a heavy armed/armored helicopter, an off-the-shelf aircraft that could be refitted to meet the survivability and firepower needs of the US advisory and support personnel already in country. After US combat forces entered Vietnam, a steady expansion occurred in the use of helicopters of all types. The active inventory of aircraft reached 8,098 in FY66 and 9,375 in FY67, requiring 12,908 trained aviators by the close of FY67. About 500 aviators were assigned to the Army training base as instructors to meet the expanding requirements. However, the requirements for aviators in FY67
was set at 21,500 pilots; hence, the Army was faced with a severe shortage of aviators. The training base could not produce pilots fast enough, so aviators below the grade of lieutenant colonel could expect only one year in CONUS between combat tours. And requests for volunteers mailed to 2,000 aviators in the Reserves produced only 60 replies. 53/

The chronic shortage of aviation personnel was not overcome until about mid-1968 through the expanded output of the Army Aviation School and the leveling off of requirements in Vietnam. The 1st Aviation Brigade, the largest single Army aviation command in the world, had more than 25,000 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel on its rolls on 31 July 1968. 54/

7. Training and Indoctrination, 1965-1968 - A Summary

Training on the M-16 rifle was provided to units deploying to Vietnam beginning in 1966, but not until 1969 were sufficient weapons available to conduct M-16 training throughout BCT. The AIT course was increased from eight to nine weeks to accommodate a five-day field exercise oriented toward Vietnam requirements. The program of instruction for the Infantry Officer Basic Course was revised to prepare newly commissioned officers for their first duty assignment with troops; emphasis was placed on the practical application of leadership under simulated combat conditions based on experience in Vietnam. 55/

Changes in the Officer Advanced Courses resulted mainly from the Haines Board findings rather than from the Vietnam experience, although the war was not ignored in the syllabi.

CONARC evaluation of the Infantry Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Combat Leaders Course in 1968 determined that reports from Vietnam indicated that over 80% of all graduates were accomplishing the job for which they were trained.

CONARC issued a 16-hour training program that was required for all units scheduled for deployment to USARPAC and all individuals assigned to Vietnam. The program was condensed, taking into account the limitations of training time for units deployed on short notice. The training was
judged to be particularly valuable for combat service support units and personnel whose training had not been combat oriented. 56/

The president's unwillingness to mobilize the Reserve Component imposed severe hardships on the Army's training system. Plans for the expected mobilization called for the activation of up to four Reserve training divisions to run training centers. In the absence of the Reserves, CONARC had to draw on its own assets with a most deleterious effect on the readiness of the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF), an overburdening of the school and training system, and a delay in preparing units for overseas deployment. 57/ The need to raid the Reserves for selected items of equipment imposed additional training problems on the Reserve Component.

Despite the difficulties facing the training system, accelerated training was required to speed up the preparation of newly formed units for deployment to RVN. The experience of FY1966 showed that accelerated or compressed training programs did not result in an acceptable level of training readiness. Further, personnel and equipment often joined units at the port of embarkation, and the soldiers did not receive the necessary training or readiness testing prior to deployment. In February 1967, this unsatisfactory situation was corrected when CONARC reinstituted the full Army Training Program as the basis for computing times for unit deployment. 58/

With a monthly output of 610 pilots per month beginning in July 1968 the Army found itself training more aviators than all of the other services combined. Officer accessions numbered over 16,000 from the ROTC program and another 8,900 from the JCS program. However, ROTC personnel acquisition and training was constrained significantly by increases in anti-ROTC sentiment on the nation's campuses. 59/

During the period 1965-1968, the Army's training system succeeded in training over 1,000,000 personnel for Vietnam service, despite the lack of planned-for Reserve mobilization which figured so prominently in plans for expanding the training system. And while some training deficiencies
were noted, many of which were serious and the correction of which was not always timely, on balance, the US Army's training effort was a remarkably professional job.

In-country training and indoctrination were essential to the US training effort. And, as always, training quality varied with the interest and competence of the unit commanders. Senior commanders who knew and understood training requirements and personally supervised the execution of training efforts invariably possessed excellent programs and effective units. Commanders who relegated these tasks to their staffs or subordinates were faced with inadequately trained soldiers and, overall, with shoddy results. In addition, the personnel policy of interunit transfers, designed to achieve a balance of tour dates (DEROS), had a significant impact on the quality of training and the unit's ability to meet training to develop the necessary teamwork within the units. According to TRADOC (which superceded COMARC in 1973), constant review and modification of training programs were required to reflect recent experience in Vietnam. Hence, the one-year tour did offer one significant benefit to the US Army's training effort: it allowed for the infusion of fresh combat experience and related, useful insights in the Army's on-going training effort.

How effective was the US training and indoctrination of the American soldier destined for Vietnam? BG S.L.A. Marshall, USA (Ret) visited Vietnam in 1966 and reported that there was no lack of a will to fight and that "the average soldier withstood the stress of engagement better than ever before." But on the negative side, "our marksmanship and musketry were deplorably bad, and furthermore, . . . about one third of our losses in action were our own fault, owing to carelessness about security." 60/ In 1968 General Westmoreland stated that training had "greatly improved, with particular attention paid to security and fighting in the cities." 61/ In the latter case, just as in Seoul, Korea, 18 years earlier, troops learned their house-to-house fighting through on-the-job training.
E. TRAINING AFTER TET, 1968-73

Analysis of US performance in combat during the 1968-73 period strongly suggests that training programs improved while the morale of the average soldier, beginning in 1969, declined markedly. This contrasts with the earlier period when training programs required improvement, but the morale of the troops was generally high. In the period under discussion, training troops -- particularly draftees -- was hampered greatly by the steadily declining quality of the draftee, the failure of policy-makers to make clear "why we are fighting," and the Army's own personnel problems.

The size of the Army's training base had, by this period, leveled off, after several earlier fluctuations caused by the expanded commitment to the RVN. During FY 1968, about 530,000 active army trainees and 325,000 Reserve Enlistment Program trainees entered the training base. 62/ Significantly, Army Reserve units were not mobilized; this placed a heavy load on regular units, which had to provide their own support--something reserve units might otherwise have done.

1. Snapshot of Training in 1968

The Army's training priorities were committed largely to support the on-going effort in Vietnam. In FY 1968 all AIT was converted to training for Vietnam, providing an additional week designed to prepare trainees for service in the RVN. Fort Ord, California and Fort Lewis, Washington converted in mid-1968 and Fort Dix, New Jersey was programmed to follow in FY 1969. 63/ The Army's specialist school system also tailored many of its classes to support the effort in Vietnam.

Instruction during this time appears to have been well tailored to conditions in the RVN. Army doctrinal literature indicates that US Army planners emphasized instruction in numerous types of patrols: ambush patrols, search and attack patrols, motorized patrols, and others widely employed in Vietnam.

The Army's skill development base program was designed to improve manpower for grades E-5 and E-6. The program, which generally ran from 21 to 24 weeks in duration, was undertaken immediately after BCT and AIT.
Some 42 courses were offered. Over 11,000 enlisted men passed through the courses in FY69 and were promoted to E-5 or E-6. But while those young NCOs may have been well trained, they lacked experience. One distinguished armored cavalry regiment commander (a general in 1979) described the NCO situation in 1968 and 1969 in these terms:

...we had a bunch of young inexperienced NCO's leading a bunch of young inexperienced soldiers; overwatched by a bunch of young inexperienced lieutenants and captains; all oversupervised by a bunch of older, but equally inexperienced, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and generals. The result on the ground in the jungle just wasn't good at all.

It is interesting to note that General William DePuy, former TRADOC commander, cited as one of his main problems in 1966 during his command of the 1st Division in Vietnam, the lack of proficiency of lieutenants at the platoon level.

2. In-Country Training

In-country training continued during the final period of US involvement, and, as usual, received varying levels of emphasis according to the unit. Unit turbulence continued to present commanders with a continuing requirement for in-country training.

An excellent example of in-country training can be found in the program devised by the 11th ACR. All newly assigned personnel, up to and including the grade of major, were required to attend a two-week training course. The training included information on:

- RVN and the current area of operations;
- The enemy and his units facing the 11th ACR;
- Enemy operating procedures and the firing of captured weapons;
- Firing, care, cleaning, and maintenance of all ACR weapons;
- Operation and maintenance of all ACR vehicles; and
- Tactics, techniques, and SOPs of the regiment.

The 11th ACR commander (now CG TRADOC) described the training (circa 1969-1970) in this way:
It was a good course; it was a tough course; people grumbled at having to go through it; but it was necessary. After they had been in a few fights, no one questioned the wisdom of the course—in fact they wanted to make it tougher. In a similar situation in the future, it would be necessary. It does take time and resources, either or both of which might be hard to come by; but it must be done. My judgment is that it is best done in the unit of assignment—division or whatever, rather than in a Theater Army Replacement and Training Command—resources permitting of course. 68/

Entire brigade and battalion staffs, according to one account, had to be "retrained again." Many combat soldiers required additional training in patrol, ambush, and airmobile tactics. The rapid withdrawal of US units in the early 1970s required that some service and support units be trained to defend themselves; these units had to be taught small-unit tactics, marksmanship, security, and construction of fortifications. During 1972, when the enemy launched the Easter Offensive, ASA detachments required training in antitank weapons such as LAWs (light antitank weapons) and 90mm recoilless rifles.


CONARC continued its on-going mission of training troops to ensure combat readiness. By the early 1970s, training was re-oriented somewhat away from Southeast Asia and more toward the Army's worldwide requirements. Thus, CONARC concentrated on subjects such as mechanized infantry training and combat in urban areas—more in line with the European theater.

In late 1971 General Westmoreland tasked BG Paul F. Gorman to head the Board for Dynamic Training; the Board examined ways to tailor training to assist the Army in meeting its worldwide objectives. In his charge to the board, General Westmoreland attributed the Army's training problems to "the Vietnam strait jacket," the Army's continuing need to concentrate all its efforts on supplying troops to the war. 69/ This need, he believed, left the service incapable of meeting training requirements for other areas.
During this time frame, for example, SACEUR/USCINCEUR General Goodpaster reported in a discussion with Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, that he was 10% short on people. His shortage, however, was concentrated in tank and engineer MOSs in which he was from 30% to 50% short. Thus a 10% shortfall did not equate to a 10% loss in readiness; the situation was substantially worse. 70/

General Goodpaster added some additional remarks which are extremely important if we are to appreciate the service-wide impact of Vietnam:

Another thing that troubled me when I got back to Europe in 1969, and in 1970 and 1971 was to discover that some of the old faults and mistakes in the psychology of leadership and command responsibility had crept back in. I had evidence that commanders were trying to avoid reporting some of the difficulties that they were having with drugs and discipline and the like, because just the reporting of those difficulties in their units was thought to reflect adversely on their records. I found also that there was difficulty in getting first-class officers to come over and command. One officer who came up from a troop unit and joined my headquarters used a revealing expression one time. He said that I should know if I didn't already that Europe had now become known as "The graveyard of military reputations." Well, I talked to the chain of command about that and I told them that the existence of that kind of an attitude suggested to me that the people up the line were not taking their responsibilities but were passing the buck down to a lower echelon. I think that we were able to do something to overcome that, but I would not for a moment claim that it was wholly eradicated. In fact this, I think, has been and remains one of the very troubling aspects of our command situation and of, I would say, the professional ethic in the Army. Those would be the main points that I would make about the situation in '69 and later. 71/

The Gorman Board found a number of obstacles to good training, stating that "the Army has marginally adequate training not because of inadequate trainers but because of a systematic difficulty in assigning and
articulating training objectives for its trainers and providing them requisite resources." 72/  See Table 2-1 for a summation of these inadequacies identified by the Gorman Board.

General Westmoreland, following one of BG Gorman's recommendations, established a new board at Fort Benning to improve training in the combat arms. BG Gorman then embarked on a round of briefings to promote his ideas throughout the Army. At his job at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, BG Gorman developed a program for programmed learning that replaced the staid, out-of-date field manuals with a multimedia learning approach consisting of TV and voice tape cassettes, films, slides and programmed textbooks that could be used in small units. 73/ BG Gorman was transferred from Fort Benning in July 1972, but the requirement for streamlined training was addressed the following year by the newly-formed TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) under General William DePuy.

In June 1971 the Deputy USCINCEUR had taken a slightly different view of the training problem within units as opposed to the formal school system. He described his view of the problem in a memorandum to General Goodpaster:

As I looked over units during the past year and tried to account for the shortcomings in operations overall, and training in particular, I was persuaded that our problems stemmed from a lack of perception of proper standards and a lack of knowledge of the demands of their jobs on the part of many of our lieutenants, colonels and colonels. I am more certain than ever that this is a major factor we must recognize. 74/

The significance of the Gorman Board, the study on professionalism undertaken at the Army War College, and other similar self-examinations should not be overlooked. The Army and its leadership was willing to take a hard, insightful look at itself. Often findings of these and other studies are interpreted in an accusatory sense, yet it is to the credit of any institution when self-analysis is initiated and the commensurate corrective action taken. 75/
# TABLE 2-1: FINDINGS OF THE GORMAN BOARD

Findings of the Gorman Board, (1971)...
The Army's System of Training Support Assessed From the Field*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE OF SUPPORT FOR UNIT TRAINING</th>
<th>SHOULD PROVIDE</th>
<th>ACTUALLY PROVIDES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY TRAINING LITERATURE</strong></td>
<td>- Planning Guidance</td>
<td>- Irrelevant Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Field Manuals</td>
<td>- Doctrine (What to Teach)</td>
<td>- Out-of-Date, Incomplete Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ATP, Subject Schedules</td>
<td>- Training Techniques (How to Teach)</td>
<td>- Little or no Technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DA Circulars, Pamphlets</td>
<td>- Trained Trainers</td>
<td>- Ill-prepared Trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SERVICE SCHOOLS</strong></td>
<td>- Correspondence Courses</td>
<td>- Little or no Technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAINING AIDS CENTER</strong></td>
<td>- Technique of Training</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUDIO-VISUAL CENTER</strong></td>
<td>- Devices</td>
<td>- Outmoded in Medium and Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGHER COMMANDER</strong></td>
<td>- Audio-Visual Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Missions, Goals, Priorities</td>
<td>- Distractions from Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Resources (en, Money, Equipment, Facilities, Ammo, Ranges, etc.)</td>
<td>- Constraints on Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Visits to 103 active and 35 reserve Army units; survey of more than 2,600 men; consultations with representatives of 16 foreign military establishments and with nine retired US generals.

SOURCE: BDM Research and Analysis
4. **Training and Indoctrination, 1969-1973**

Unit training readiness declined in FY1971 as a result of funding limitations, personnel turnover, and shortages and imbalances in military occupational specialties. With the continuing withdrawal from Vietnam, priority was accorded to units reinforcing Europe. Limits on funding impacted severely on major exercises, and training and combat readiness suffered as a result. For more than four years, no division exercises were held due to budget constraints.

The continual withdrawal of US combat forces from Vietnam shifted emphasis back to the advisory role and two new courses for advisors were established in FY1971 for security advisors and program advisors.

An acute shortage of trained and qualified noncommissioned officers became evident in the late 1960's, but it was not until FY1971 that attention was focused on a long-range development program for noncommissioned officers. The NCO Education System was established as a three-level program to formalize and upgrade the education and professional development of enlisted careerists with basic, advanced, and senior courses.

At no time during the war was troop indoctrination more important than in the 1969-1973 period, when US public support of the war was dropping and when the media and Congress were questioning continued US presence in Southeast Asia. Yet trained leadership capable of instilling a requisite amount of military indoctrination was too often found wanting during the same period, particularly in base camps and other rear areas. During that period and throughout the entire war, the US soldier had only a vague notion of the causes of the conflict, its background, the issues involved, and, most of all, what US national goals were in Vietnam. Indoctrination was primarily realized by acquired experience and osmosis in-country, rather than by planned training, education, and indoctrination by the US military and political leadership.

**F. A SUMMARY OF CRITICISM ON US TRAINING FOR VIETNAM**

Several authors have levied charges against the services for poor training, inept leadership, corruption, and even service disintegration.
during the Vietnam War. Such charges must be taken seriously. Some may be accurate; others can likely be assessed as exaggeration or pure fabrication.

Gabriel and Savage, in their study *Crisis in Command*, claim that "...the Army began to border on an undisciplined, ineffective, almost anomic mass of individuals who collectively had no goals and who, individually, only sought to survive the length of their tours." 79 While this claim is partially true it's validity can be applied only to the period from about 1970 on. At that time, although the formal school system was probably operating at its peak performance, having incorporated the lessons of Vietnam and having the advantage of veteran instructors, the all-important unit schools in-country were suffering from unit turbulence of an inordinate degree as withdrawal planning was implemented. In short, training was good to excellent, but indoctrination was not succeeding in many of the rear areas where disciplinary problems increased markedly. Of course, indoctrination alone could not resolve the serious problems of that era.

BG Douglas Kinnard's *The War Managers* does not dwell on training, but rather on leadership and professionalism. Yet the relationship of these issues to training is obvious. Good training depends on leadership and professionalism, and the shortcomings in those areas described by the generals who responded to Kinnard's survey are also an indictment of some aspects of the training and indoctrination effort undertaken during the Vietnam War. 80

But the point to be made is this: the Army faced a massive task during the Vietnam War in training, equipping, and deploying a force which, at its peak, numbered more than 500,000 men. It also advised, trained, and equipped the RVNAF. And both armies were simultaneously fighting a clever, shadowy insurgent enemy with a tough, resourceful main force organization. Training and indoctrination were not always at their best, but they accomplished the job that was necessary, particularly during the first four and a half years of the fighting. During the last three years of the American combat presence in Vietnam, serious problems arose which affected training
and indoctrination to a marked degree. Mistakes were indeed made. Efforts have since been made to identify and correct the mistakes. Many improvements have been accomplished, but since training and indoctrination are not static, the Army's leadership must continue its self-examination, revision, and upgrading of training methods to meet present day requirements. Threats change. Many valuable lessons were learned in the rice paddies and jungles of Southeast Asia. These lessons must not be lost to future generations which may find themselves in a similar environment.

G. SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS

The following useful insights are derived from the foregoing discussion of US training and indoctrination efforts during the Vietnam War.

- Despite many obvious shortcomings, the Army's training effort during the Vietnam War was a remarkable and comprehensive effort, accomplished without mobilizing Reserve assets.
- The BCT, AIT, basic officer, and the scores of specialist schools in the Army training system were generally responsive to requirements worldwide and particularly to requirements in Vietnam. Lessons learned in combat were fed into the system, with varying degrees of success in lesson assimilation.
- Units that trained and deployed as units generally performed far better than those in which personnel were assigned as individuals. The "train and retain" concept, while more expensive than one in which individuals are assigned separately, pays off in results, and in the long run may prove to be cheaper owing to the higher calibre of trained soldiers.
- Unit schools are essential, particularly in a combat zone, and brigades or divisions are the best equipped to conduct professional unit schools.
- The key trainers are company and battalion commanders because of their experience, proximity to the troops, and the nature of their tactical responsibilities. However, these commanders
require the interest, support, and guidance of their seniors if they are to ensure the best possible training and indoctrination of the US soldier.

- The one-year combat tour and the six-month command tour, in vogue during the Vietnam conflict, operated to the detriment of training. Some commanders seemed to believe their short tours absolved them from the responsibility of resolving underlying training and leadership deficiencies in their units. Problems could be left unsolved for the next commander to face. This is not an indictment of the many excellent commanders who served in Vietnam, but the record does show that there was a substantial number of opportunists in command positions in Vietnam.

- The combat efficiency and unit cohesion that was evident in the early days of the war, at least until the post-Tet drawdown began, suggests that indoctrination was not a serious problem within the Army at that time. Most divisions conducted indoctrination for newly arrived troops which enhanced their orientation, acclimatization, and knowledge of rules of engagement.

- Indoctrination programs conducted during 1970-1972 appear to have been ineffective. This was due in large measure to the changing society and its impact on the young recruit coupled with antiwar sentiments expressed by the media and Congress during the US drawdown. The services were slow to acknowledge or recognize the changed situation and to initiate remedial action. Training and indoctrination alone could not be expected to produce the desired results in combat, however, since personnel policies often destroyed unit cohesion through transfers designed to balance individual rotation dates.

H. LESSONS

The following lessons are developed from the material presented above:

- Training and indoctrination are dynamic rather than static, requiring constant attention from commanders. One extremely
important aspect of training that is not always appreciated by senior commanders is the changing nature of society and the resulting changes in the attitudes of young people who provide the recruiting base for the services. Senior commanders must apprise themselves of the changes, open-mindedly and objectively, and devise realistic approaches to training and indoctrination.

- Although the composition of the Army is a cross-section of US society, the Army cannot afford to "pass the buck" to society for a trainee's perceived lack of values. Instead, the Army must make a maximum effort to legitimize its role to a generation of young persons who are more aware of social issues and far more cynical about the government and military than the World War II generation.

- Changes in formal military training curricula tend to be slowly implemented and, therefore, are not always responsive to the changing needs of commanders in the field. Unit schools, or in-country training, therefore constitute the commander's best tool for influencing the quality and readiness of his unit. The quality of these schools is in direct proportion to the experience and ability of the personnel assigned to run the schools.

- Training, supervision of training, and teaching subordinate commanders how to train is a command responsibility which, if exercised properly, will produce combat effective units. To fulfill this responsibility field grade and general officers must be adept at training and capable of discharging these responsibilities aggressively and enthusiastically.

- There are always impediments to training, particularly in units, but the innovative, training-conscious officer or NCO finds ways to train effectively.

- Borrowing a lesson from Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, "The best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training."


4. Several BDM personnel who served in Korea and have since retired from the Army commented on the deleterious effect that the Doolittle Board had on Army morale, training, discipline, and efficiency in the period just prior to the Korean War. Those problems were exacerbated, however, by budget and manpower shortages, an annual personnel turnover rate of 43%, lack of training areas, and a Career Guidance Program that was detrimental to combat efficiency. The Career Guidance Program had resulted in many qualified leaders being assigned a directed MOS, and they could not be placed in command of troops where they were needed. Similarly, enlisted men could not be assigned from one MOS field to another. See Schnabel, pp. 53-54.


Lyman L. Lemnitzer commented that the US Eighth Army in Japan was unprepared, in terrible shape and that General Collins had warned President Truman of that situation. For details of small-unit combat in the early days in Korea reflecting significantly on leadership and training see S.L.A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1953) and S.L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1956).

8. Bernardo and Bacon, p. 485, based on Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense. By June 1952 the Army had increased from 10 to 20 divisions, 18 separate regiments and regimental combat teams, over 100 antiaircraft battalions, and more than 150 other combat battalions.


10. The Code of Conduct was devised to standardize training for personnel who might in the future become POWs (PWs) by establishing simple, common ground rules. Much of the impetus for the Code stemmed from such works as the HUMRR-33 Study which was misunderstood but nonetheless popularized by Kinkead, In Every War But One. It is interesting to note that in December 1979 the Department of Defense announced that the Code of Conduct applies in peacetime in such situations as the Marine Corps security guards held hostage in Iran. For a critical account of the captured US soldier of the Korean War and his generation, see: Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1959). Major William E. Mayer, US Army, Medical Corps, "Why Did Many G.I. Captives Cave In?", Interviewed in U.S. News and World Report, February 24, 1956 added to the poor picture of the soldier. Mayer, a psychiatrist, stressed the misbehavior of a few US POWs and failed to balance his numerous presentations by recounting heroic acts by POWs. The imbalance on the part of such an articulate public speaker and writer added to the erroneous picture of the US soldier that emerged after the Korean War. Another study was misunderstood: Julius Segal, Factors Related to the Collaboration and Resistance Behavior of U.S. Army PW's in Korea. HUMRR Technical Report 33, for the Department of the Army (Washington: George Washington University, 1956). This HUMRR 33 study was based on criteria developed by the Department of the Army that ostensibly delineated collaborators and resisters. Dr. Segal later clarified his statistical findings, comparing POW behavior in other wars, and said that his study actually proved the great normality of the POW situation in Korea.

12. When asked if he thought US leaders could have learned more from the French Indochina experience, an experienced observer responded with an emphatic "yes." Colonel Croizat, USMC (Ret) graduated from the Ecole Superieure de Guerre and in 1954 was assigned to General O'Daniel's staff as a liaison officer to the French High Command. Croizat, who later translated a volume of the High Command's study on lessons learned in Vietnam, attributes the American failure to take advantage of training lessons to having seen "...in the French defeat a repudiation of their experience, which was shortsighted indeed." He also pointed out that in the early 1960s, the MAAG Chief in Saigon, and many other US officials, having been apprised of the study on lessons learned by the French (1955), preferred to read the British lessons in Malaya despite the fact that they dealt with a different geo-political environment, a different enemy, and different type of operations. Letter from Victor J. Croizat to J. Angus MacDonald, The BDM Corporation, 11 September 1979.

Other qualified observers who made the same point include LTG Vernon A. Walters, USA (Ret), former Defense Attache in France, interviewed at The BDM Corporation on 8 June 1979; and Anita Lauve Richardson, former foreign service officer and Rand consultant, interviewed in Washington, D.C., the same date, 8 June 1979.


15. Department of The Army, Field Manual, FM 31-21, September 1961, p. 18. Note that President Kennedy's intense interest in counterinsurgency, articulated immediately after he became president in 1961, spurred all of the services to expand their training in that special field.


20. Challenge: Compendium of Army Accomplishment. A Report by the Chief of Staff, July 1964-April 1968, General Harold K. Johnson. This document is still classified SECRET but the section on training, pp. 329-346, is unclassified.

21. See Volume VI, Chapter 12 for more detailed treatment of advisors.

22. MG Charles T. Horner, Jr., US Army (Ret.), as a Colonel in 1957, was selected on the basis of his qualification in the French language to become advisor to the Secretary General for National Defense, General "Big" Minh. After one month in that capacity, he became Chief of Staff of MAAG/TERM. General Horner recalled that the captain who had attended the Vietnamese Language School was the only military officer he knew in 1957-59 who spoke Vietnamese. He knew of only one other American who spoke the language, the Consul at Hue. BDM interview with MG Horner, 6 December 1979.


24. Colonel Thomas A. Ware, US Army (Ret.), a student at MAI in 1960, preparatory to a tour as ranger advisor in RVN.


26. Information on the MATA course was provided by the TRADOC Historian in a paper, "Questions and Answers on How the U.S. Soldier was Prepared for Vietnam," prepared 9 November 1979 in response to a request from The BDM Corporation. Hereafter cited as TRADOC Historian.


General Taylor added that the US goal was to train a 72,000-man police force, since the need for a good police force was very clear, but it was not possible to raise and train that number plus a sizeable military force at the same time. The coup leaders who overthrew President Diem in 1963 suspected the police, especially those specializing in the VC threat, and they were jailed, dissipated, or fired. See pp. 8-9.

29. Nulsen interview, supra note 14. Colonel Nulsen was slated for MAAG Laos in 1962. He was not scheduled for any training or indoctrination before his departure from CONUS, but he requested assignment to the MAI course, then being conducted in the Foreign Service Institute facility at Arlington Towers in Virginia. Colonel Nulsen was diverted from his Laos assignment when the MAAG was closed, and he requested duty in Vietnam where he served as the Senior Advisor to the Commander of Phouc Binh Thanh Special Zone in 1962 and 1963. His US Army War College Research Element (Essay), "Advisory As A Prelude to Command," 28 February 1969, provides an interesting description of his tour as an advisor. See pp. 1-16.

30. Supra note 12.


32. Special Warfare, supra note 17. Foreword by Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., p. 5.


36. FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, pp. 142-149.


44. Woolnaugh, p. 40.

45. US Department of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1968 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 174. See the DoD annual report for FY 1967 for additional details about Project 100,000. Project 100,000 enlistees did reasonably well in training for infantry, gun crews, and allied specialties, but a very high percentage of these men were clearly out of their element for more technically-oriented jobs. In retrospect, Project 100,000 proved of little use to the services (and to the men taken in under the program), although it helped to provide a few thousand more men to carry rifles in Vietnam. In December 1971, DoD dropped the lowered enlistment quotas, and Project 100,000 died a quiet and little-noted death.


46. TRADOC Historian, pp. 8-9.

47. CCNARC Summary 1 July 1965 - 30 June 1966, p. 184.

48. TRADOC Historian, p. 7.

49. CINCPAC/COMUSMACV Report on the War, supra Note 5, p. 171. This remark followed the Tet Offensive, the first occasion on which the enemy had employed urban combat on a large scale.

50. General Cao Van Vien, LTG Ngo Quang Truong, LTG Dong Van Khuyen, MG Nguyen Duy Hinh, BG Tran Jinh Tho, Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, and LTC Chu Xuan Vien, The US Adviser. Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program, Prepared for Department of the Army, Office of Chief of

2-38
51. CONARC Summary, p. 184.

56. DCSPER, Army Training Base, supra note., p. 33.


54. Ibid., p. 201.

55. TRADOC Historian, pp. 4-5.

56. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

57. Ibid., p. 12.

58. Ibid., p. 13.

59. DA Summary, FY 1969. Chapter III.


61. GEN Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam, p. 171. This remark followed the Tet Offensive, the first occasion that the enemy had employed urban combat on such a wide scale.


64. DA Summary FY69, Section 3.

65. Personal letter to Colonel Thomas A. Ware USA (Ret), a member of the BDM study team, from General Donn A. Starry, Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 14 November 1979. General Starry, who commanded the 11th ACR December 1969 - June 1970 after having
severed in a key J-3 billet in USMACV, provided his valuable and candid views in response to Colonel Ware's request on behalf of the Vietnam study.

66. Letter from MG De Puy, 21 December 1966, to Dick (not otherwise identified) filed with General De Puy's private papers in the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The general went on to say that it took a long time to teach officers to use all of the fire power available. He felt that successful operations against the VC required small unit training, speed, plus firepower.

67. Based on General Starry's letter. See endnote 65.

68. Ibid.


71. Ibid., Section 4, pp. 12-13.

72. Loory, supra note 45, p. 124. The large number of sources consulted by the Gorman Board lend to its credibility.

73. Ibid., p. 131.

74. Collins, supra note 1, p. 12. General Collins' book on training should be read by all officers, particularly generals and field grade officers. Lieutenants and captains cannot benefit materially from the good advice found in Common Sense Training unless they have the cooperation and support of their seniors.

75. General William De Puy made a strong point regarding the Army's willingness to examine itself and to initiate appropriate reforms. He noted, "Some credit should go to an Army that appoints Gorman to a board -- listens to him -- and adopts much of what he proposes -- in short could tolerate the unvarnished truth."

76. This section is based mainly on DA Summaries for FY 1969 through FY 1973.

78. Ibid.


80. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover, New Hampshire: Published for the University of Vermont by the University Press of New England, 1977), Appendices I and II.
Max Taylor had always believed... [t]he Army would contain the finest young men of the society, well-educated civilized young officers... The war of course had ravaged the Army; the kind of officer Taylor sought for the Army suffered because of it and was increasingly driven out of the service. A bad war means a bad system; the wrong officers were promoted for the wrong reasons, the best officers, often unable to go along with the expected norm, the fake body count, the excessive use of force, wither along the way.

David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest 1/

Officers of all grades perceive a significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or operative values of the officer corps. This perception is strong, clear, persuasive, and statistically and qualitatively independent of grade, branch, educational level, or source of commission...

US Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism 2/

Evidence of a decline in officer quality is beyond question.

Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, Crisis in Command 3/

A. INTRODUCTION

It seems clear that the average American soldier and officer in Vietnam carried out his mission in an admirable and highly professional manner. 4/ At the same time, though, it is also clear that, as a whole, the US armed forces in Vietnam developed serious internal problems during the prolonged drawdown period, if not before. 5/ The morale and discipline of American troops (the topic of the next chapter) deteriorated markedly during this period, with this change manifesting itself in corruption, drug
use, racial problems, fragging, and, in at least several cases, even mutinous disregard of orders. It is important not to underestimate the strength and staying power of an institution as large and as well established as the Army, but it is significant when a person as well placed and generally cautious as McGeorge Bundy declared, in May 1971, that "Extrication from Vietnam is now the necessary precondition of the renewal of the US Army as an institution." 6/

1. Leadership

The causes of these problems were manifold, with the most important probably being the frustrations inherent in a prolonged withdrawal from an inconclusive and politically complicated military campaign. 7/ Most sources agree, though, that they were aggravated, and at least partly caused, by a failure in leadership at various levels of authority. At one level, this involved the political and strategic failures of national, political and military leaders including a succession of presidents—i.e., the type of failure which, in Halberstam’s opinion, created a "bad" war. Similarly, General Westmoreland complained about civilian bureaucrats who lacked the "special knowledge" to run a war but insisted on trying; others have concluded that "the special knowledge that Westmoreland and most of his subordinates had equipped them poorly to understand the political and social dynamics of the war in Vietnam." 8/ Be all of this as it may, and there is certainly some truth in each of these charges of inadequate leadership, this chapter focuses on the more specific failure in military leadership that directly affected the combat performance of troops in Vietnam.

Inadequate leadership can, and in some cases did, result in poorly planned operations and imprecise orders. It can also negatively affect the morale and psychological well-being of troops and create an environment conducive to discipline problems, as was documented in the "Peers Report." 9/ What is more, instances of atrocities committed by US troops in Vietnam—My Lai being the most notable example—had, virtually without exception, the common thread of weak leadership. 10/ In Vietnam as
in other wars, strong and effective commanders were generally able to keep their subordinates under control, even in situations of great stress.

Putting things into perspective, it is probably true that the caliber of officers in Vietnam was no different than that of officers in World War II. Vietnam created an environment, though, that highlighted weaknesses and, in some cases, made effective leadership virtually impossible. By 1972 some were even arguing "that virtually all officers and NCOs [had] to take into consideration the possibility of fragging before giving an order to the men under them." This was indeed a difficult situation for even the best officer. But if Vietnam created demands greater in certain respects than those of previous wars, it is also true that the Army was less than successful in meeting this challenge.

There is no universally accepted definition of military leadership. However, the motto of the infantry school, "Follow me!," implies its most important element, the ability to motivate one's subordinates to carry out required missions. Soldiers must frequently perform tasks which are routine, mundane, boring, and sometimes even trivial. They must face hardship and deprivation, and be willing to risk their lives. They must be loyal and willing to sacrifice for a cause. The absence of motivation to do these things makes an army an undisciplined collection of individuals which will fare poorly in the face of an enemy.

Effective military leadership also involves respect for one's subordinates. It entails ensuring that a soldier's daily life is not unnecessarily repetitious and boring, that hardship and deprivation are kept to a minimum, and that risk of life serves a valid military objective. Effective leadership also requires knowing when not to obey an illegal or capricious command from a superior.

This is no small order, especially given the environment that existed in Vietnam during the drawdown period. Effective leadership is also more difficult in the complex bureaucratic setting of the high-technology modern Army than it was in years past. To quote Col. Samuel H. Hays, the director of military psychology and leadership at West Point for four years during the 1960s,
The problem is not that the demonstrated abilities of our leaders today are poorer than those of other times. On the contrary, by most standards current leaders are more skilled, better educated and more adept in handling subordinates than they have ever been. The apparent difficulty stems from the fact that leadership techniques have not adjusted rapidly enough to meet the mounting demand. Rapid social change creates requirements for flexibility, for new approaches and for much more sophisticated handling of people if primary objectives are to be reached. 12/

The leadership challenge faced by the military in Vietnam (and after) thus reflected certain environmental changes. These included the influence of changes in society at large, but it is important to remember that, as the Army War College study concluded, "there appears to be little justification for blaming the bulk of the imperfections extant in our profession on the general trends which some sociologists discern in our society or which plague the outside world in general." 13/ Instead, as Col. Hays summarized, "Our rapidly changing environment poses grave challenges in meeting the demands of effectively managing the complex human organizations of our military establishment. These challenges can be met if we recognize them for what they are, if we diagnose them properly and if we prepare the necessary policies to cope with them." 14/

2. Military Ethics

A second problem that paralleled and in certain respects contributed to leadership problems during the Vietnam period was a decline in ethical standards within the officer corps—i.e., the "significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or operative values of the officer corps" which the Army War College study noted. Quoting Col. Hays again:

The system of professional ethics provides the rules governing the attitudes and much of the behavior of the officer corps. This system protects the general society and its members from the usurpation of authority and the misuse of the vast potential power entrusted to military authorities. The existence of a professional code creates the atmosphere of trust and confidence that is needed to support unit cohesion under the pressures of combat. These principles cannot
be found in any textbook or regulations. Some have been referred to under the general heading of "customs of the service." Others can be recognized only through the attitudes and behavior that have long characterized soldiers. 15/

To the extent that the professional ethics of the officer corps can be capsulized, they can be thought of as the standards of conduct implied by an officer's commitment to "Duty-Honor-Country." The Army's idea of (and commitment to) leadership and ethical behavior is further elaborated in "An Officer's Creed," which is quoted here in its entirety since it provides an excellent standard against which the reality in Vietnam can be measured.

AN OFFICER'S CREED

I will give to the selfless performance of my duty and my mission the best that effort, thought, and dedication can provide.

To this end, I will not only seek continually to improve my knowledge and practice of my profession, but also I will exercise the authority entrusted to me by the President and the Congress with fairness, justice, patience, and restraint, respecting the dignity and human rights of others and devoting myself to the welfare of those placed under my command.

In justifying and fulfilling the trust placed in me, I will conduct my private life as well as my public service so as to be free both from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, acting with candor and integrity to earn the unquestioning trust of my fellow soldiers—juniors, seniors, and associates—and employing my rank and position not to serve myself but to serve my country and my unit.

By practicing physical and moral courage I will endeavor to inspire these qualities in others by my example.

In all my actions I will put loyalty to the highest moral principles and the United States of America above loyalty to organizations, persons, and my personal interest. 16/
A belief in these ideals has long characterized the traditional officer in the eyes of both the armed forces and civilian society. During the Vietnam War, these ideals were challenged by events and attitudes within the military, government, and society at large. The Army's own recognition of the fact that these events and attitudes had seriously compromised its ability to carry out its assigned missions, especially in Vietnam, was indicated by General Westmoreland's April 1970 request that the Army War College study the "moral and professional climate" within the Army. 17/

It should also be remembered, when considering questions of leadership and ethics within the military, that, "The subjects of ethics, morals, technical competence, individual motivation, and personal value systems are inextricably related, interacting, and mutually reinforcing. All of these aspects of the professional climate, taken together, produce a whole which is greater than the sum of its separate, component parts." 18/

B. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECLINE IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS

Speaking about the incidence of atrocities in Vietnam, Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-Calif.) asked, only in part rhetorically, "What the hell is wrong with a country, the military establishment, the Administration, Congress and others who permit such things to happen?" 19/ There were, of course, many things wrong, or at least many problems which had been dealt with imperfectly. Those most directly affecting military leadership and ethics are discussed below.

1. Wartime Expansion of the Army and the Decline in Officer and NCO Quality

Between 1964 and 1967 the buildup for the Vietnam War brought about a 60 percent increase in Army strength, with enlisted personnel increasing during that period by 64 percent and officer strength increasing, in a buildup stretching from 1964 to 1969, by 56 percent (see Table 3-1). This rapid expansion took place without mobilizing the reserves and thereby drawing upon the pool of experienced reserve and National Guard
**TABLE 3-1. STRENGTH OF THE ARMY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Personnel</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>101,236</td>
<td>771,842</td>
<td>873,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>110,276</td>
<td>854,950</td>
<td>965,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965*</td>
<td>111,541</td>
<td>1,079,700</td>
<td>1,191,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>117,205</td>
<td>1,296,600</td>
<td>1,413,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>142,964</td>
<td>1,401,700</td>
<td>1,544,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>165,569</td>
<td>1,357,000</td>
<td>1,522,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>171,882</td>
<td>1,153,000</td>
<td>1,324,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>160,814</td>
<td>1,161,444</td>
<td>1,262,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>148,623</td>
<td>971,371</td>
<td>1,120,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>120,982</td>
<td>636,692</td>
<td>807,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>117,860</td>
<td>703,031</td>
<td>820,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>110,260</td>
<td>689,646</td>
<td>799,906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Warrant officers are included in officers data after 1965.*
officers. The reserves had been mobilized for World War II, the Korean War, and even the Berlin crisis of 1961, but for a variety of reasons, some of which were political, they were not called up for the Vietnam War until 1968, and then only in token numbers. 21/ At the same time, growing anti-war sentiment on college campuses caused the number of officers coming from ROTC programs to decline sharply. ROTC enrollment dropped by 68 percent between 1965 and 1972, from 231,000 to 73,000 (see Table 3-2). Since the service academies and direct commissioning (which was used primarily to promote aviation warrant officers to the commissioned ranks) could not make up the ROTC shortfall, OCS was increasingly relied upon to provide the requisite number of new officers.

While it is difficult to judge the quality of those officers who continued to come from ROTC programs (one factor possibly influencing this was that some cadets were enrolling in ROTC not out of a desire to serve as a military officer, but to avoid the draft themselves—"If I'm going to go, it might as well be as an officer."), it seems clear that there was a drop in the quality of those coming from OCS. Given the drop in the number of ROTC-commissioned lieutenants and the need for a war-swollen officer corps, 22/ there was no real alternative to lowering OCS admissions standards if OCS was to fill the void. Nearly half of the officers commissioned in 1967 were OCS graduates; 23/ and it was common knowledge in Vietnam that many of the officers coming from OCS were not high caliber. 24/ Under peacetime conditions a man like William Calley probably would never have achieved officer rank, but after Calley's conviction for the My Lai murders a colonel at Fort Benning expressed the opinion that "We have at least two or three thousand more Calleys in the Army just waiting for the next calamity." 25/

To be fair, perceptions of junior-officer quality in Vietnam were far from universally negative, as one would expect given the multiplicity of variables, many of which lend themselves only to subjective analysis, which enter into an assessment of quality. Thus, for example, in a survey of general officers, one third felt that the quality of junior officers actually improved during the Vietnam War, while one third felt it remained constant and one third felt it declined. 26/
TABLE 3-2. ROTC ENROLLMENT 1960-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SENIOR ROTC, TOTAL</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IN THOUSANDS, FOR MAY, END OF SCHOOL YEAR
Certainly many extremely talented junior officers were commissioned throughout the war; but the rapid wartime expansion of the officer corps made a drop in standards impossible to avoid, especially when the war became increasingly unpopular among the group from which junior officers had to be recruited. Student deferments and other draft loopholes were used by many from higher socio-economic backgrounds to avoid military service. Only 36 of the 1,203 members of Harvard's class of 1968 served in the armed forces, of which only 26 went to Vietnam and none died in action. Only 18 members of the Harvard classes of 1960 to 1971 died in Vietnam. 28/ As was discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume, there were numerous reasons why the Selective Service System allowed Vietnam to become, at least to a larger extent than was morally justifiable, a "working man's war." Such a manpower procurement policy had, in General Westmoreland's words, "serious effects for the United States Army," 29/ not the least of which was to compound the already difficult task of finding enough top-quality young men to serve as junior officers in Vietnam.

In the final analysis, there can be little doubt that there was at least some drop in the quality of the officer corps, and in particular of junior officers, from the pre-war standard. As Richard A. Gabrie and Paul L. Savage put it in Crisis in Command, "During a rapid expansion of officer strength, and particularly when the recruiting base is tightly restricted, it is almost unavoidable that the quality of the average officer will tend to suffer." 30/ Similarly, Col. Robert S. Nichols of the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute commented that "While the original leadership group, both officer and NCO, was well selected and trained, the rapid turnover of personnel and the expansion of the Army led to the use of much poorer quality officers (in the company-grade levels) and NCO's." 31/ Major W. Hayes Parks, chief trial counsel of the First Marine Division in Vietnam during 1968-1969, concurs, writing about the hastily assembled Americal Division:

Units so assembled were built from drafts from adjacent units . . . [which use] the quota imposed as an avenue for removal of its deadwood. . . . In the G-3 office of
the American Division, for example, among the field-grade officers there was only one major who was a graduate of Command and General Staff College. Of the majors, all but two had been passed over for promotion to lieutenant colonel. 32/

According to Parks, a shortage of qualified leadership personnel was by 1966 already a significant factor in the occurrence of serious acts of misconduct. 33/ Parks blamed inadequate training for some of these problems, but also blamed "the war time policy of lowering qualification standards for military personnel, both officer and enlisted." 34/

The same pressures that led to a lowering of standards for new officers (and enlisted men) led to the rapid promotion of those already in the service, a possibly necessary but probably undesirable development. Thus, when the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute conducted a meeting about "Lessons Learned in the Viet Nam Conflict: The U.S. Soldier," it was noted that

...rotation of leadership coincided with an increase in the rapidity of promotion. Some battery/company commanders could not function effectively because of their inexperience and immaturity. The acceleration of promotions also hurt the non-commissioned officer image and "instant NCO," another soldier term, expressed contempt for this practice. 35/

Even the Inspector General History, 1964-1972 (MACV), a very cautious work, noted "the inroads that rapid promotions of junior officers and noncommissioned officers had made into the expertise of both groups." 36/ When Marine deployment to Vietnam created an acute shortage of company-grade officers, an attempt was made to fill the gap by providing temporary commissions to more than 5,500 experienced NCOs. This may have helped ease the officer shortage, but it highlighted the more general personnel crisis by adding to the shortage of qualified NCOs. 37/

In fact, the problems faced trying to maintain standards within the officer corps during a time of Army expansion were mirrored--magnified is probably more correct--in the problems faced trying to maintain standards amongst enlisted personnel. There can be little question that standards for enlisted men fell from their pre-war levels. To begin with,
during the early stages of US involvement the average American soldier was a career man. Increasingly as the conflict progressed, soldiers were there because they were drafted. This in itself did not mean that the personal qualifications of the average soldier dropped, but it did imply a very different general attitude towards morale and discipline. 38/ Many of the more highly qualified mental groups obtained draft deferments, while many of the better draftees or recruits ended up being selected for OCS. Rapid turnovers and promotions meant that many NCOs received little or no leadership training before filling positions of responsibility. And the Army, faced with the incessant manpower demands of the war, was forced in "Project 100,000" to accept men of lower intelligence ratings who were ill-suited for the demands of a counterinsurgency war like Vietnam. 39/ (All of these problems are discussed in further detail in Chapter 1 of this volume.) By the later years of the war, there could be little question that the quality of both NCOs and junior enlisted personnel had, on average, declined significantly.

It is important, however, to remember that this trend towards decreased officer and NCO quality was only one of many factors influencing the leadership and overall performance of US troops in Vietnam, be it in combat or in a support mission. The most talented military man can function either well or poorly depending upon his training, experience, and attitude, not to mention the overall excellence, or lack thereof, of the organization of which he is part.

2. Lack of Experience and Ticket Punching

A second problem affecting the quality of leadership by American officers and NCOs in Vietnam was that personnel policies calling for 12-month tours of duty (except for general officers) and six-month command tours encouraged inexperience. As Guenter Lewy wrote:

While this rotation policy, also used in Korea, had a highly beneficial effect on morale, it exacted a heavy price in terms of personnel turbulence—weakening unit cohesion and effectiveness— and, most importantly, by preventing the achievement of an institutionalized memory. The continuous turnover and influx of new people, a civilian observer noted in 1968, tended "to ensure that our operations will always be vigorous, will never grow tired, but also will never grow wiser."

3-12
Each new generation repeated at a higher level the errors of the previous one, or, as John Paul Vann is said to have put it, "We don't have twelve years' experience in Vietnam. We have one year's experience twelve times over." 40/

Or, as Lt. Col. David K. Holmes elaborated on the same theme:

Extended practical experience and rapport with indigenous counterparts is required to develop an understanding of the political/psychological character of paramilitary operations, to maintain the quality of leadership required to uphold appropriate ethical/moral standards and to acquire the particular small-unit tactical skills involved in counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency operations cannot, therefore, be conducted effectively using peacetime "business as usual" personnel policies.

Advisors, key noncommissioned officers and commanders--particularly at company and battalion level--should not be subject to the premature rotation caused by the short-tour concept. Frequent rest and recuperation--to include respite in the Continental United States--should be used to provide the required breaks from battle. The short-tour policy, which often produced command tours as brief as six months, undoubtedly contributed to the instances of mutiny, corruption, drug abuse and "fragging." It also probably reinforced the "ticket-punching" careerist syndrome still visible in today's officer corps. (Emphasis added.) 41/

There can be little doubt that at an operational as well as a personal level the short-tour policy figured centrally in the American experience in Vietnam. 42/ The long-term consequences of the rotation system on combat effectiveness were, according to Moskos, difficult to assess. When US involvement in the war was on the upswing it probably made a positive contribution to troop morale and performance; but during the drawdown it heightened anxieties about being the last man killed in a war the US had given up on, thus hurting morale, discipline, and, of course, combat effectiveness. 43/

Rotation policies contributed to discontinuity in command and a lack of unit cohesion. By encouraging weak leadership and inexperience
among troops it also contributed to the incidence of atrocities and other serious breaches of discipline. Parks, for example, explained that "the average Marine involved in a serious incident in Vietnam was twenty years of age. He was a replacement or new to an incoming unit. He had been in Vietnam less than four months. He had been in the Marine Corps less than fourteen months." 44/

Given the inexperience, less-than-stellar quality, and obvious career orientation of many officers, there developed a vicious circle in which weak leadership and troop resentment fed upon each other. Quoting Gabriel and Savage:

Under such conditions [i.e., short command tours and careerism], officers could hardly gain the confidence of their troops, much less their respect. . . . If troops' regard for their officers is important to cohesion, and we submit the evidence is overwhelmingly clear that it is, then in a situation which does not permit such regard to develop, primary-group cohesion cannot be affected. In Vietnam the result was a kind of "military anomie"--a situation where troops came to have no sense of belonging and became increasingly hostile to their officers. 45/

Rather than feeling that they were led by an officer corps which was worthy of respect and which was sharing the burden of sacrifice, the feeling became widespread among American troops that they were expendable pawns being used to further the development of an experienced corps of officers. 46/ Soldiers frequently had more combat exposure than their commanders. Moreover, combat battalions under experienced commanders suffered only two thirds the combat deaths of battalions under commanders with less than six months of command experience. 47/

Given evidence of the importance of stable leadership to unit cohesion and effective combat performance, even General Westmoreland speculated that "It may be that I erred in insisting on a one-year tour of duty for other than general officers." After weighing the pros and cons of a longer tour, he added that "Perhaps an eighteen-month tour for all officers, as was always the case for general officers, might have been a workable compromise." 48/
There were important considerations underlying the rotation system for US troops—morale was a central factor; it was reasoned that staff work (for example, the planning of operations) could be best handled by someone who had fighting-level command experience; etc. 49/ These management-oriented factors were complemented by the fact that the officers being rotated perceived that each of their assignments in Vietnam—command experience, staff work, etc.—was, along with certain other assignments such as time spent acquiring a masters degree or a teaching billet at West Point, an important step on a successful career path. 50/ A tendency towards "ticket punching" by career-oriented officers thus provided an important impetus for the perpetuation of the rotation system, the jack-of-all-trades status of the average officer, and, consequently, the less-than-optimal nature of military leadership (especially combat leadership) in Vietnam.

Ticket punching was nothing new during the Vietnam period—it is generally considered to have had its origins in the World War II experience—and it was clearly much more than just a cynical manipulation of the system in an effort to get promoted. Westmoreland, for example, said that "It was instead a result of a natural desire of efficient young officers to hold positions of responsibility, to meet the challenges of command, and a similarly natural desire of higher commanders to want officers on their staffs who had had local command experience." 51/ In some cases, at least, this was certainly true. But as the Army has become more modern, more technical, and more bureaucratic, it has also developed a strong institutional tendency towards ticket punching, a tendency for which there are no simple or easy remedies. In particular, the omnipresent efficiency report reflects a highly comprehensive evaluation system that places great value on quantifiable, non-subjective indices of performance. Officers perceive, usually correctly, that certain types of experience must be obtained (and, of course, recorded on paper) before it is possible to move from one phase of a career to another. Unfortunately, as Sam Sarkesian noted, "The desire for the best and most profitable career pattern and professional status becomes a motivating force for many officers.
and may detract considerably from pursuing the high ideals of the profession." It has already been noted how this encouraged a system of rapid rotation from assignment to assignment. Acquiescence to "body-count" demands was another manifestation of the problem. In some cases, at least, it must certainly have also led to specific combat decisions being more oriented towards impressing one's superiors than towards ensuring the most effective completion of one's mission or even the greatest safety of one's subordinates. In this case, if not elsewhere, the contrast between ticket punching (and the more general phenomenon of careerism) and the standards of leadership and professional ethics traditionally expected of a military officer is tragically apparent.

3. Careerism (the new military ethic?)

In recent years it has become almost a cliche to bemoan the ascendence of careerism over traditional standards of military ethics and behavior. Excessive use or even abuse of the term should not be allowed, though, to obfuscate the basic underlying fact—a problem does exist. As the Army War College's 1970 Study on Military Professionalism concluded, speaking in terms of the general goals and behavior of the officer corps, the "climate . . . is sufficiently out of step with our time-honored aspirations and the traditional ethics of the professional soldier to warrant immediate attention at the highest levels of the Army." 54/

Success for a military officer has come to be defined in terms of career advancement; and career advancement has increasingly come to depend on doing it all—being a technocrat and student as well as a combat commander. One should be both Patton and a systems-analyst whiz kid. Promotion depends upon receiving favorable efficiency reports; and favorable efficiency reports depend upon impressing one's superior. The "can-do" ethic is essential, with its corollary being the "cover-your-ass" (CYA) syndrome. Conformity and zero defects are rewarded, not originality and brilliance. 55/

All too often, the result of these developments has been that ethical standards are sacrificed on the altar of career advancement. As
Col. Robert Nichols noted about officers in Vietnam, "they not only had to
do their part in the war as best they could, but they also had to keep an
eye on the way the nature and quality of their wartime performance would
affect their subsequent careers." In the extreme case, according to
Nichols, "Because of their career status and goals, many leaders became
insensitive to ethical issues in order not to jeopardize their career
progression."  56/

The body-count syndrome, false reporting of combat activities,
and ticket punching were manifestations of the problem. One major commented
on the body-count syndrome after visiting the tactical operations center of
a brigade located south of Saigon: "I noticed that there were four charts
on . . . opposite walls, and each one of these charts had recorded on it
for an entire year the monthly kill, one battalion against another, like it
was a game. It is of these kinds of things, I'm certain, that rank is
made. The most upsetting thing was the way it was condoned."  57/ In fact,
"condoned" is perhaps too soft a word. Not only is the emphasis that many
senior officers placed on body counts clear; there is significant evidence
that at least some general officers, and not just lower-ranking officers,
were themselves guilty of inflating such figures.  58/ Careerism has also
led to officers and NCOs obediently following their commander's orders even
knowing they were illegal or unethical. In the extreme case such behavior
has led to the committing and/or covering up of atrocities.  59/ More
frequently, and possibly more damaging to the Army as an institution,
careerism has led to the CYA syndrome and the necessity of keeping dissent
private if one desires promotion.  60/

As was mentioned previously in the context of ticket punching,
careerism as a problem affecting the modern Army probably has its roots in
the World War II experience.  61/ The problems experienced by the Army in
Vietnam, though, caused significant attention to be focused on questions
relating to the professionalism and ethical standards of the officer corps.
This interest has subsequently been encouraged by Watergate and the general
post-Watergate tendency to question the integrity of those in public
office.  62/
The Army War College study is the best known of the studies on military professionalism and careerism, but its conclusions are not unique. Thus, for example, when the US Military Academy's Office of Research wrote an in-house report about the resignations of several officers from the class of 1966, the reasons cited for the resignations included the fact that many senior officers (particularly colonels and lieutenant colonels in command positions) "... were forced [by the demands of the "system"] to abandon their scruples and ignore the precepts of duty and honor; and if necessary to lie and cheat in order to remain successful and competitive." 63/ The War College study elaborated on this question of integrity, the lack of which was noted in the results of all four War College interview teams (the persons interviewed were officers of all grades at various Army posts). One team noted that "Dishonesty is across-the-board." A second team noted the view among the officers interviewed that "... in their judgment, integrity was a luxury that a junior officer could not afford in today's Army and survive." Similarly, a third team concluded that "unless you are willing to compromise your standards, even ever so slightly, you will not survive in the Army system." And the fourth team noted that "Junior officers felt that the barrier to their integrity was the senior officers' lack of integrity." 64/

It seems that the institutional pressures that have encouraged careerism among officers have also taken their toll at West Point, where one would hope that the highest ethical standards were being inculcated in the Army's future leaders. Despite West Point's emphasis on its honor code it has had its share of troubles, including the highly publicized 1976 scandal in which 184 members of the junior class were formally accused of cheating. 65/ Class standing is of great importance to a cadet's military career and is affected by performance on innumerable small tests. Instructors do not change tests or quizzes for different sections of the same class, relying on the honor code to guard against cheating. This is, as Gabriel and Savage noted, a situation which "Maximizes temptation and minimizes risk in a way similar to the [military] system as a whole." 66/
West Point also tends to reflect the ethical dilemmas of the Army on matters unrelated to cheating or class work. Thus, for example, Lt. Col. John H. Johns, then associate professor of military psychology and leadership at West Point, spoke in 1970 about the strain upon professional honor resulting from My Lai, and West Point's non-reaction:

I wanted an uproar around here. But there wasn't any. I even tried to provoke one, and got nowhere. We rationalize too much. We have a... different problem in Vietnam because of the frustrations, and anyone who has been there understands these. I can understand it. But look, once you begin to break down, break down discipline and break down in general, it tears into a man's self concept. I wanted the people here to grasp that, to look at it and understand it, to renew our own integrity. I wanted more of a reaction. I wanted us to clean it up in-house. 67/

At the time Johns was interviewed, there were only two hours of ethics in the entire MP & L course. The staff of the department had met for a couple hours to come up with their collective reaction to My Lai, and the gamut, according to Johns, ran from blaming the media to blaming the American system. A colonel who chaired a department at the time said of Johns: "He was more upset about My Lai than the damned Chief of Staff of the Army." 68/

The implication, it seems, is that such concern was unjustified: the chief of staff, after all, had to answer to the president and think about public relations; Johns only had to teach future Army leaders.

But even if the ethical callousness noticeable in the Army's general reaction to My Lai (which is not to say noticeable amongst all Army officers or even in the final prosecution of Calley and the other involved parties) can be seen as related to a general deterioration of professionalism and military ethics, there is no simple solution to the latter. The pervasiveness of the problem and, in this case, its relationship to society at large were summed up by Wilson Carey McWilliams:

All the bureaucratic tendencies visible in the Army are characteristic of all organized power in America. But the Army accentuates and exaggerates bureaucracy because it is bureaucracy without competitors; conformity, careerism, cultivation of the right attitudes and the safe style become almost necessary obsessions, difficult for any but a very few to resist. 69/
This is a situation in which self-service is considered essential by junior officers; it is also one in which senior officers frequently set the tone. Over half the general officers who served in Vietnam received decorations for bravery, according to Edward L. King, a phenomenon also observed by William L. Hauser. Hauser also cited incidents of senior officers receiving silver stars for imaginary acts of bravery. Highlighting the farcical nature of these decorations is the fact that physical danger, as measured by combat deaths, was not a significant part of the average general officer's tour (or tours) in Vietnam, with only three generals dying in combat from 1961 to 1972.

Awards inflation, rapid promotions, and the command-rotation policy all encouraged thinking first about "old number one," whether a given soldier was a private, an NCO, a lieutenant, or a general. One must conclude, too, that in Vietnam careerism and a generally self-centered approach towards one's existence were also attributable to a "bad war," the phenomenon noted by David Halberstam (see the Halberstam quotation at the beginning of this chapter). As the conflict progressed it became increasingly clear that American troops were not fighting for "freedom" or "democracy," or, by the end, even to achieve a military victory in Vietnam. When the ideal or goal one is fighting for seems to be something as vague as a "decent interval" before an inevitable communist takeover—with "decent" being defined, at least in part, by what the president and his advisors think is politically safe for them—why not look out for number one? It certainly was not clear during the drawdown period in Vietnam that those higher up would look out for you if you did not yourself.

Speaking generally about careerism and the failure of leadership in Vietnam, Gabriel and Savage concluded that "the connection between an officer corps perceived as unethical and even incompetent and an army of lesser ranks displaying every sign of disintegration is clear." This is possibly overstated, but consider the Army War College's finding that

A scenario that was repeatedly described in seminar sessions and narrative responses includes an ambitious, transitory commander—marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties—engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to
talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates. 74/

Such behavior is not only significantly at odds with the characteristics described by Ginsburgh, Sarksian and Ganron, Wheeler, Huntington, and others as collectively constituting military professionalism and ethics, 75/ it certainly does--and during the Vietnam War, did--affect the general effectiveness of, and climate within, the military.

4. Morale, Discipline and the Failure to Motivate Subordinates

Col. Samuel H. Hays noted in 1970 that "Guardhouse riots, dissident soldiers, low reenlistment rates, alleged profiteering and racial conflicts should not be shrugged off as the results of a civilian infection that somehow have crept into the service. Maintaining discipline, unit cohesion and morale is clearly a function of leadership." 76/ Others have made similar arguments. G. L. Tischler, for example, has noted a soldier's psychological need for an authority figure; 77/ while Edward Colbach and Matthew Parrish concluded that "most often, specific problems have arisen as a result of poor leadership and a subsequent decline in morale." 78/ Another psychologist noted the importance of unit cohesion and a soldier's relationship with his peers, adding that "The quality of this group allegiance and alliance, generally termed morale, is in turn largely a function of the quality of leadership of the men and of a lesser degree influenced by the vicissitudes of the particular group's circumstances and experiences." 79/ One should be careful not to underestimate the importance of these special "circumstances and experiences." They included such important variables as the psychological and motivational effects of the extended drawdown process and the related effects on morale and discipline of soldiers associating their leaders with what was seen as the irrationality of the war--seeing, in many cases, their commanding officers as the personification of all that was bad about being in Vietnam. But at the same time it is clear that many officers failed to accomplish the difficult task of motivating their subordinates to carry out their assigned missions and
Thus, by definition, must be considered to have failed to accomplish their own leadership missions.

It is unnecessary to elaborate at this point upon the ills that beset the Army in Vietnam after 1969 or 1970. A short list, however, includes refusals to obey commands, the incidence of atrocities (abuse of prisoners, rape, murder, etc.), debilitating drug abuse, racial problems among GIs which at times bordered on gang warfare, antiwar protests among troops, the appalling (and terrifying) frequency of fragging during the later years of US involvement, high levels of corruption (e.g., the black market for currency) among both enlisted personnel and officers, etc. These problems are discussed elsewhere in this volume in the chapters on manpower and discipline, race relations, drug abuse, personnel policies and problems, combat effectiveness, etc. The most important point here is that they did not develop in a vacuum, and, moreover, that failures in leadership were a significant, though by no means the only, factor underlying their development.

Previous sections of this chapter noted the relationship between leadership problems and declining officer quality, inexperience, and careerism. It should also be noted that certain matters of overall policy or environment made effective leadership difficult. Thus, for example, the negative effects of involvement in a "bad" war were very important. This is not to say that the war was bad in terms of the purpose underlying our initial involvement. Regardless of the relative merits of the two sides in terms of economic welfare, political freedom, nationalism, etc., the fact is clear that during the early and middle stages of our involvement US troops believed they were fighting to halt the spread of communism and generally performed well. The war did get "bad," though, when it became apparent during the drawdown period that we were not going to win, that we were fighting for relatively esoteric political and strategic goals such as a "decent interval," and so on. As was asked already in this chapter, who wants to be the last person to die in a losing effort? This was all compounded by the collective impact of the other maladies affecting our troops--racial tensions, drugs, boredom, lack of respect for one's
superiors, etc. By the end, as Eugene Linden commented, the result was that "All reference points for determining morality, honor, and valor [had] . . . been ripped from their foundation." 81/

At a second level, leadership problems were exacerbated by policies which, though still general, are at least easier to isolate than those just discussed. There were, for example, the adverse effects of the rotation system and ticket punching. The rotation system not only affected the experience, expertise, and in some cases goals of officers and senior NCOs (as was discussed above), it also encouraged self-centered individualism (at all ranks) which militated against unit cohesion and the general existence of a favorable command environment. 82/

Problems were also created in Vietnam by the existence of a circular logistics system which exposed the average "grunt" to the relatively privileged existence of officers and support troops at base camps. There were definite morale-related advantages to the base-camp system, but it seems that the contrast between the hazards of combat and the comforts of base camp caused sufficient resentment of those staying behind that, on balance, there was a disruptive effect on morale and discipline. 83/

Related to this question of sharing the burden was the general feeling among many of the "grunts" that those higher up did not share fairly in combat danger, that officers were "managing" their deaths rather than sharing in the sacrifice. 84/ (The truth of this assertion seems, in fact, to have varied depending on rank, as is illustrated by Table 5-2.) There was even a technological twist to this problem in that extensive use of helicopters by commanders directing operations made them appear distant and manipulative. Certainly it is no easy task for a commander to inspire and lead by example if, when the chips are down he is only a voice on a radio. The problem of commanders being distant and not respected can be highlighted by contrasting the situation in Vietnam with that of a highly effective fighting force such as the Israeli Army, 85/ or even, for that matter, with the esteem with which many commanders were held during the American Revolution or the Civil War. 86/
### Table 3-3. Comparison of US Army Officer-Enlisted Strength and Combat Deaths (by Officer Rank) 87/1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Officer Strength in Vietnam (1971)</th>
<th>Officer Deaths in Vietnam (1961-72)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Enl. Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1:1,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>5,947</td>
<td>1:163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>14,577</td>
<td>1:67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>22,266</td>
<td>1:44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>49,073</td>
<td>1:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>23,907</td>
<td>1:41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>13,666</td>
<td>1:71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.O. 1-4</td>
<td>18,689</td>
<td>1:52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total US Army Officers | 148,623 | 1:65 | Total Officer Losses | 3,269 | 1:8.33 |
| Total US Army Enlisted Personnel | 971,871 | | Total Enlisted Losses | 27,222 |
Most would agree that a certain distance must be maintained between a combat commander and his troops in order to ensure a proper command environment. When under fire there is not time to talk it over and convince a person to do something; an order must be given and it must be obeyed. In Vietnam, however, there developed certain major gaps in thinking and communications between commanders and their troops which had a distinctly negative effect on morale and discipline as well as the ability of commanders to lead effectively. Col. Robert Nichols has noted, for example, that "The senior Army leadership (field grade officers and above) were [sic] ideologically sympathetic to the stated purposes of the war. This was much less true of their subordinates, especially during the later years of the war." 88/ This obviously raised basic questions of commitment and motivation. Nichols also noted that many senior officers were reluctant to admit that things were going badly, a characteristic which lent itself to the development of a credibility gap between the officers and their subordinates. 89/ Studies about drug-related problems in Vietnam have indicated a second gap, more informational than philosophical, in that the higher ranks seem to have frequently been out of touch with lower-level realities. An unavoidable distortion of information as it proceeds up the chain of command is one explanation; a lack of honesty in communications between higher and lower grades is a second. Whatever the cause, though, numerous studies including the Army War College's have indicated that senior officers were not well informed about lower-level troop conditions. 90/ A third gap between officers and their troops was noted by Eugene Linden in the context of fragging. According to Linden, "the key to the violence is the severe cultural divisions that exist in the Army and that are related to and expressed by differing attitudes towards the war." 91/ Going one step beyond Linden's analysis, one can see that this culture gap was not only a matter of differing attitudes towards the war, it was also a matter of socio-economic background and problems of communication. To paint the extreme picture, it is no easy task for a middle-class officer or one from some small southern or midwestern town to empathize with, let alone effectively handle, the frustrations and undisciplined behavior of a hard-core criminal from an inner-city ghetto.
These problems were exacerbated in Vietnam by the fact that NCOs frequently did not fulfill their important role as a communications link or buffer between officers and lower-rank enlisted personnel. On this problem, Linden noted that in World War II the NCO served the function of absorbing resentment and siphoning off frustrations before they reached a critical level. The NCO was there to talk to nervous and troubled men in his unit and often to mediate between the hard demands of officers and the practicality of the situation. Because of distrust of the drug-using, anti-authoritarian draftee, ... the current career NCO often retreats from contact with his men and consorts only with others of his breed. This means a critical tension-lessening relationship has broken down. 92/

What is more, by the end of the war senior NCOs had to worry about fraggings or other types of intimidation from their subordinates in the same way, if not quite to the same extent, that officers did. 93/

Another factor adding to the difficulty of exercising effective leadership in Vietnam was that many of the American troops sent there were inadequately trained. It can be seen, too, that this training problem was another that not only made it more difficult to exercise effective leadership, but was itself aggravated by the absence of such leadership. As Gabriel and Savage noted, "The lack of effective and professional officers to act as catalysts in the process of military socialization probably caused disintegration to be accelerated by other factors." 94/ Just as strong and effective leadership could have minimized the incidence of atrocities, it could have minimized the extent to which other problems—racial, drug-related, training-related, etc.—reached crisis proportions.

The breakdown in leadership and the command environment was also assisted by the fact that military leaders were seen (fairly or not) by their subordinates as being guilty of callousness, cynicism, and, in some cases, moral turpitude. Along this line, Gabriel and Savage argued that "the failure of the officer corps to come to grips with the problems of drug use in Vietnam represented a clear failure of moral expectations." 95/ This is stated a bit strongly, but it is significant when they continue that, "In any event, there appear to have been no 'protest' resignations
over the drug racket. Indeed, the number of protest resignations for any reason at all while the US Army was coming apart as an effective combat mechanism seems pathetically small. 96/

Every officer cannot be expected to take the Army's burden on his own shoulders, but it is true that in Vietnam there was a psychological void among the young, impressionable, scared, resentful, and sometimes poorly trained troops. Instead of being able to fill this void by reference to strong authority figures who were worthy of respect, these troops frequently saw their officers as immoral figures concerned with little but their own careers and safety. This impression was bolstered by such factors as officers acquiescing to (and covering up) atrocities, 97/ official toleration of ARVN corruption and incompetency, 98/ the body-count syndrome and other types of false reporting to superiors in Vietnam and/or Washington, and high-ranking complicity in the NCO club scandals. 99/ Taken together, these examples of high-ranking behavior did not exactly add up to the stereotype of an inspirational leader.

And finally, the command environment was hurt by a breakdown in the disciplinary process itself. Granted that flexibility is necessary to ensure that a potentially productive soldier is not, at great expense and to the advantage of no one, relegated to a stockade for the duration of his association with the military. And granted that the type of assignment in Vietnam—counterinsurgency activities, free-fire zones, etc.—created a very difficult environment for troops, both physically and psychologically. But the fact remained, as is discussed in Chapter 4, "Morale and Discipline," that the infrequency of punishment for even the most serious offenses lent itself to the quasi-anarchic environment that existed by the time of the final US withdrawal. It can be seen, too, that the system of rewards, and not just that of punishments, was inadequate for motivating troops in Vietnam. Towards the end, at least, it was clear that winning the war was no longer a potential reward for valiant service; instead, it became clear to all that the foremost award anyone could strive for was getting home alive. Certainly combat decorations and promotions lost much of their intrinsic value as motivators, particularly for draftees and other
non-career personnel, when they began to be passed out almost indiscrimi-
nately. As Col. Nichols concluded, "As the local commander's power to
reward and punish diminished, discipline [and more generally, effective
combat leadership] became harder to maintain." 100/

C. INSIGHTS

There are no easy answers to why leadership and ethics were not of a
uniformly high standard in the Vietnam-era military; and there are no easy
ways to improve upon this situation. Many factors external to the
military created an environment that made leadership and adherance to the
highest ethical standards difficult for even the best officers. There were
also factors internal to the military, but very difficult to change, which
created an institutional bias towards ticket punching, careerism, and other
aspects of what has been labelled the "new ethic." There were also differ-
ences between the problems besetting different levels of leadership;
certainly those relating to senior officers were different than those
relating to junior officers, which were different again from those relating
to senior NCOs. It seems clear, for example, that senior officers would
not have been affected by the lowering of entrance standards (e.g., for
OCS) that negatively affected the quality of junior officers. At the same
time, though, senior officers possibly even more than those below them may
have been constrained in the conduct of their duties by worries about their
careers or by other institutionally created problems.

Many of the problems discussed in this chapter related to the neurotic
environment created by the prolonged drawdown of US involvement. Similar
phenomena have occurred before; Westmoreland, for example, compared the
problems during the Vietnam drawdown with those experienced with troops
awaiting their return home after World Wars I and II. 102/ One of the
important differences between the situation in Vietnam and that after the
two world wars was, on the other hand, that after the world wars troops did
not have to wait three years to go home—or even one year, if one's frame
of reference is the individual soldier's tour in Vietnam rather than the
overall withdrawal period. Moreover, soldiers awaiting their return home
after the two world wars were not being shot at, or killed or maimed by mines or booby traps. Whatever political or strategic advantages were gained from the US policy of withdrawing slowly (hoping to obtain a better deal at the negotiating table—whatever shape it ended up being—and a decent interval before the ultimate communist takeover), the effects of this policy on the Army were catastrophic. The leadership task confronted by Army officers became overwhelming when their subordinates equated them with the war effort, which as time went on became more-and-more manifestly futile.

The war experience highlighted the developing problem of careerism among the officer corps, a subject that has been discussed at length. Similarly, it has been noted that the values and training necessary for effective combat leadership are distinctly different than those required of a commercial manager. And yet the Army, perhaps as a manifestation of its love-hate relationship with McNamara and his "whiz kids," seemed to have moved increasingly towards making the skills required of business leaders those necessary for a successful military career. Related to careerism and this managerial ethic is the pervasiveness of the "can-do" ethic. In some cases, of which our Vietnam involvement ended up constituting an important example, the Army and its leaders have to accept that it "can't do," whether this is because of military or political reasons. Somehow, too, it must be internalized that it is not a sin to pass on bad news or even, when unavoidable, to be responsible for a mistake. The Army as an institution must accept that not even the best officer can actually have "zero defects," and not punish those who have the ethical fortitude or candor to admit to being human.

More specific matters have also been discussed, each of which was a lump of sorts helping to throw the tire out of balance. The lack of unit cohesion, for example, militated not only against primary-group identification and ties, but against the creation and maintenance of a healthy relationship between commanders and their troops. Policy changes in the direction of rotating units as a whole rather than individual soldiers might have reduced this problem. The problem might also have been reduced somewhat by extending the tour of duty, though the net effect of such a
change on morale, discipline, and combat effectiveness is far from clear. Moreover, since the most serious problems usually associated with the one-year tour of duty only developed towards the end of US involvement in the war, factors relating to the drawdown may have been more important than the one-year tour itself as causes of these problems.

The problem of decreasing officer and NCO quality as war needs swelled troop strength at the same time that the recruitment pool for both groups, and especially for junior officers, actually shrank was serious, and possibly insoluble. Recruitment efforts can be upgraded and training procedures improved, but what do you do if the political support necessary to provide a willing pool of qualified manpower does not exist? Possibly manpower shortfalls could have been alleviated somewhat by calling up the reserves, but this too is contingent upon a certain level of political support.

This only highlights the fact that the problems relating to leadership and ethics in Vietnam were generated from the military perspective, both internally and externally. The military should strive to correct the internal conditions that helped create these problems; but at the same time both military and civilian leaders have to recognize the extreme difficulty of effectively conducting a prolonged and relatively large-scale combat effort without the domestic political will to do it properly.

D. LESSONS

The following lessons are derived from the material presented above:

- In order to ensure high standards of leadership and ethics among military leaders, some action must be taken to combat the institutional tendency within the armed forces towards "careerism."
- Greater emphasis has to be made in the selection, training, and promoting of officers to ensure that high standards of professionalism and conduct are understood, practiced, and rewarded.
- Some accommodation must be reached between the inevitably bureaucratic nature of the armed forces and the imperatives that have
developed for success within these bureaucracies. In particular, phenomena such as the "can-do" ethic and the "zero-defect" syndrome must be recognized as prevalent, but somehow must be kept from becoming career-related obsessions that undermine professional ethics.

As with so many other subjects analyzed in this study, the relationship between the existence of high standards of leadership and ethics and the political environment in which military operations are conducted must always be remembered. There are limits to the survivability of even the healthiest institutions in a perverse and non-supportive environment.
CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES


2. US Army War College, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 30 June 1970), p. iii (hereafter called, in the endnotes and the body of the chapter, the "Army War College study" or "AWC Study").


4. Innumerable sources could be cited to support this conclusion. For example, William Westmoreland wrote in A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1976), p. 297, that "Having fought in three wars, I am convinced the United States never fielded a more professional force than in South Vietnam during the years 1966-69." And similarly, Representative Paul N. McClosky, Jr. (R-Ca.) wrote, in a personal letter to Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger dated March 17, 1975, that "While I feel our policy in Vietnam since late 1964 has been one of the most tragic military misjudgments in our history, I did want you to know of my respect for the job done by so many of our best company-grade officers and NCOs."

5. Throughout this chapter the discussion applies rather broadly to the entire US military establishment in Vietnam. However, given the disproportionate role and numerical strength of the Army, the emphasis and most of the data are mainly on the Army. Similarly, for convenience, the discussion will generally be phrased in terms of "Army" rather than "the armed forces" or "the military."


7. Such frustrations were not unique to Vietnam. Note, for example, Westmoreland's comments in A Soldier Reports (supra note 4) about fragging: "Fragging in one form or another has occurred in all wars but increases when a sense of unit purpose breaks down and esprit de corps fails and when explosives and weapons are loosely controlled. Anyone familiar with problems of morale and discipline among troops waiting for transportation home after World War I and II could hardly have been surprised."


11. Eugene Linden, "Fragging and Other Withdrawal Symptoms," Saturday Review, January 8, 1972, p. 12. This is not to imply that all officers were intimidated or in some way "ran scared," but there can be no question that it did affect the overall command environment.


13. AWC study, supra note 2, p. 28. Among other sources arguing that societal changes were of less-than-primary importance to military problems is Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3, which gives this question considerable attention in Chapter III, "The Officer Corps."


15. Ibid. p. 40.

16. AWC study, supra note 2, p. 55. As Gabriel and Savage noted (Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3, p. 58), the very fact that the Army went to the trouble of composing "An Officer's Code," after getting along without it for nearly 200 years, indicates its own recognition that a problem exists. In particular, the drafting of "An Officer's Code" can be seen as a spin-off of the AWC study.

17. A copy of General Westmoreland's letter to the Commandant of the US Army War College requesting this study is included as "Enclosure 1" in the AWC study, supra note 2, pp. 53-54.

18. AWC study, supra note 2, p. 1.

19. Department of the Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for the Record dated 27 April 1971. This memorandum summarized hearings, chaired by Congressman Dellums, about atrocities in Vietnam.
20. This table is derived from a more comprehensive table (Table 5) in Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3. Gabriel and Savage got their data on the pre-1964 period from Russell F. Wingley, History of the United States Army (New York: MacMillan, 1967), pp. 566-569. Their data on the post-1964 period were from numerous sources, but primarily Senate Armed Services Committee and House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations publications for fiscal years 1966-75.


22. Gabriel and Savage suggest (Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3, p. 83) that expansion of the officer corps could have been held down, citing the historical examples of well led German, British, and French military forces which had far fewer officers per enlisted man than the US Army in Vietnam. This is certainly possible, there being nothing necessarily sacred about the existing officer-enlisted man ratio, but their's is a minority opinion.


28. Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3, pp. 81, 82.

29. Westmoreland, supra note 4, p. 297.


32. Parks, supra note 10, p. 34.

33. Ibid., p. 35.
34. Ibid. For further analysis of the relationship between military professionalism and misconduct in the form of war atrocities, and in particular of the tendency for the "amateur, citizen soldier" to be more brutal than his professional counterpart, see Peter Karsten, "On the Causes of War Crimes and Some Measures that Could Make Such Crimes Less Likely in the Future," unpublished paper (University of Pittsburgh), p. 7.


37. Parks, supra note 10, p. 35.


39. Lewy, supra note 8, p. 331.

40. Ibid., p. 118.


43. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

44. Parks, supra note 10, p. 38.

45. Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3, p. 72.

46. See for example, Hughes, supra note 35, p. 3; and Lewy, supra note 8, p. 118.


48. Westmoreland, supra note 4, p. 417. It is interesting to note that the eighteen-month tour for generals was the rule, not the reality. As Kinnard (supra note 20, p. 115) noted: "Of the 183 generals who commanded in Vietnam, over half served there as generals (frequently in more than one job) for less than a year, and a quarter for less than eight months. In part, this high rate of turnover was probably
unavoidable owing to promotions, new job requirements, and, toward the end, a reduced force structure."

49. Ibid., p. 296.

50. Ticket punching is a recurring theme in studies of the modern army and criticism of the officer corps' performance in Vietnam. One can refer, for example, to the AWC study (supra note 2), Lewy (supra note 8), or Gabriel and Savage (supra note 3). An additional source which describes this phenomenon quite well, giving both examples and an analysis of its implications, is Ward Just, "Soldiers," Atlantic, October 1970.

51. Westmoreland, supra note 4, p. 296.


53. For the purposes of the present study, "careerism" is defined rather simply as putting one's personal advancement ahead of obedience to ideal standards of conduct.

54. AWC study, supra note 2, p. v. For historical perspective regarding the development of military professionalism in the US, one can refer to Allan R. Millett's short monograph, Military Professionalism and Officership in America (Columbus, Ohio: The Mershon Center of The Ohio State University, 1977).

55. Innumerable sources discuss careerism. A few which might be referred to for their general discussion of the phenomenon are:

AWC study, supra note 2.

Sarkesian, supra note 52.


Just, supra note 49.

Lewy, supra note 8.

Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3.

Kinnard, supra note 20.


58. See, for example, Kinnard, *supra* note 20, p. 115.


60. See, for example, Maureen Mylander, *The Generals* (New York: Dial, 1974), pp. 210-211.

61. Kinnard, *supra* note 20, pp. 112-113. By 1960 careerism was already being noted by students of military affairs. See, for example, Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1971), the first edition of which came out in 1960. It might also be added for perspective that, in a general sense, careerism obviously dates from before World War II -- having undoubtedly been a problem since man first functioned in organizational settings.

62. Jack F. Lane, Jr., "Military Code of Ethics: A Proposal," *Military Review*, October 1979, p. 66. LTC Lane provides a useful up-to-date survey of thinking on the question of military ethics and suggests that the military adopt a more specific code of ethics similar to the legal profession's *Code of Professional Responsibility*.

63. These results from the USMA study were cited in the AWC study, *supra* note 2, p. 17.

64. All of these quotations from the AWC study are cited in Sarkesian, "An Empirical Reassessment . . .," *supra* note 55, p. 15.


68. Ibid.


72. Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3, Table 7. Gabriel and Savage got their data on this subject from the Department of Defense's Computer Study of Casualties in Vietnam.

73. Ibid., p. 94.

74. AWC study, supra note 2, pp. 13-14.


80. Most of the sources cited thus far in this chapter discuss, at least in passing, these problems. One might refer, for example, to Lewy, supra note 8; Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3; the AWC study, supra note 2; Westmoreland, supra note 4; the MACV IG History, supra note 36; Moskos, supra note 42; Just, supra note 50; The Winter Soldier, supra note 57;
etc. One should also, of course, refer to the discussion of these problems in other chapters in this volume.

81. Linden, supra note 11, p. 17.
82. Moskos, supra note 42, p. 37.
83. This phenomenon is discussed by numerous analysts of troop behavior in Vietnam. One might refer, for example, to the discussion in Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3, p. 63.
84. Gabriel and Savage discuss this problem in various sections of their work (supra note 3). See, for example, pp. 54, 63, 81, 95.
85. Ibid., p. 95.
86. John Balkind thus wrote in "A Critique of Military Sociology: Lessons from Vietnam," The Journal of Strategic Studies, December 1978, that "In both the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, the idealism and commitment of the officer corps were great assets to morale and to ultimate victory."
87. This table is compiled from data in Tables 6 and 7 in Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3.
89. Ibid., p. 3.
90. Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3, pp. 91-92.
91. Linden, supra note 11, p. 16.
92. Ibid. This role of the senior NCO as a buffer is also discussed in Just, supra note 50, p. 83.
94. Gabriel and Savage, supra note 3, p. 78.
95. Ibid., p. 60.
96. Ibid., p. 61.
97. One can see numerous examples of such acquiescence or even complicity in the testimony of Vietnam veterans in The Winter Soldier, supra note 56. Another theme which seems to recur is the giving of instructions "not to do that today, someone from the press is with us." The best-
known example of a cover-up, of course, was the initial military reaction to My Lai.

98. See, for example, the notes on this in Hughes, supra note 35, pp. 3-4.

99. See, for example, Michel Costino, Memorandum for the Record on "Senate Hearings on NCO Club Irregularities," AMCSA-C, October 14, 1969; Just, supra note 50, p. 83; or any of the numerous other published reports about these scandals. Among those implicated in the NCO-club scandals were a three-star general and the sergeant-major of the Army.

100. Nichols, supra note 31, p. 4.

101. It should be noted, for example, that the AWC study (supra note 2, p. 32) concluded, on the subject of military professionalism and ethics, that "The present climate is not self-correcting, and because of the nature and extent of the problem, changes must be credibly instituted and enforced by the Army's top leadership."

102. Westmoreland, supra note 4, p. 296.
There is nothing wrong with the United States junior officer and soldier. 1/

General Clutterbuck

The morale, discipline and battleworthiness of the US Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly in the history of the United States. By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and noncommissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near-mutinous. 2/

Robert D. Heinl
Historian-advocate of the military

A. INTRODUCTION

Both Clutterbuck and Heinl describe the morale and discipline of the US soldier in Vietnam. So did General S. L. A. Marshall when he wrote, "My overall estimate was that the morale of the troops and the level of discipline of the Army were higher than I had ever known them in any of our wars." 3/ So, too, did Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss when they documented that "a random group of 100 Army soldiers would have produced the following disciplinary incidents: 7 acts of desertion, 1; AWOL incidents, 20 frequent marijuana smokers, 10 regular narcotics users, 2 disciplinary discharges, 18 lesser punishments, 12 complaints to congressmen." 4/

Can these men be describing the same war? Admittedly there will always be differences of opinion, but such a polarity of views from generally reliable sources cannot be dismissed simply as differences of interpretation. Conceding a degree of accuracy to all of these views is easier if one fact in particular is noted: Marshall and Clutterbuck were describing the pre-1966 soldier; Baskir, Strauss, and Heinl were writing about the mid-1971 situation. While distinct differences of opinion do
exist regarding the state of morale and discipline in the US Armed Forces during their involvement in the Vietnam War, one fact which is generally agreed upon is that the level and quality of morale and discipline deteriorated markedly as the war drew to a close. The precise timing, extent, and nature of this decline are still debated, but the general trend is fairly clear. 5/ 

At the same time, there can be no denying the importance of morale and discipline to the effectiveness of a fighting force. As Colonel Robert S. Nichols notes with regard to declining morale in Vietnam:

As morale deteriorated, soldiers began to quarrel among themselves, and began to polarize across cleavage lines that also were becoming an issue in civilian life throughout the world: black vs. white, young generation vs. the older one, those with power vs. those who lacked it, those who favored the status quo vs. those who didn't, those who were materially well-off vs. those who weren't. Such differences can be overlooked in a successful Army with high morale, but they were exacerbated by the failures being experienced in Vietnam. 6/ 

High morale, then, can smooth over the rough spots in an organization or situation; low morale magnifies them. 

Frequently cited symptoms of low morale and discipline in Vietnam include: high rates of desertion; serious drug abuse; racial problems; half a million less-than-honorable discharges; hundreds--perhaps thousands--of "fraggings;" incidents of combat refusals and atrocities; frequent complaints to Congress; rapid awards inflation; and the surfacing of antiwar groups within the military. 7/ The seriousness and extent of these occurrences must be determined if any evaluation of morale and discipline is to be made. The conclusions cannot be expected to be precise and definitive--much depends on subjective analysis and the personal observations of participants, and some evidence which could be quantified (such as accurate statistics on fraggings or the incidence of "search-and-avoid" missions 8/) will never be available. Even given these limitations, however, there is much evidence to be considered.
B. EVIDENCE OF A DECLINE IN THE MORALE AND DISCIPLINE OF US TROOPS IN VIETNAM

1. Personal Observations

Numerous personal statements, by individuals or groups, on the state of morale at various times and places in the Vietnam War are readily available. Together these statements constitute an impressive store of in-country experience and cannot be dismissed as baseless opinion. What personal observations sometimes lack in breadth or scientific objectivity they can often compensate for with telling detail or subtle analysis. Many combine these qualities.

Statements abound regarding the excellent state of morale during the early years of the war—at least through 1966 and sometimes significantly longer. General Marshall and General Clutterbuck have already been quoted. Richard Boyle, accompanying an advisor named Meyerkord in 1965, observed that "Many of the young officers I met in 1965 shared Meyerkord's views, and most of them shared his high morale. .. Over Leers the young American lieutenants and captains would say--like the brass in Saigon--that it would take only a couple of American divisions to clean up the whole thing." 9/ High morale meant, among other things, that criminal offenses remained few. As the Vietnam studies series states, "Criminal offenses in the Army were not a serious problem in the early years of US involvement in Vietnam. At the beginning of 1965 the monthly Army court-martial rate in Vietnam was 1.17 per thousand. .." 10/ Zane Finkestein, a colonel in the judge-advocate corps, recalls that during his tour of duty with the 1st Cavalry Division in 1967-1968 morale was very good. 11/

Another observer, in this case an infantry officer whose three tours in Vietnam (1960-61, 1967-68, and 1971-72) came at three critical stages of US involvement, notes that boredom helped keep motivation and morale only average in 1960-1961, but that troop morale in 1967-1968 was generally fairly high, particularly in the field. 12/ This trend of steadily improving morale through the early and mid 1960s is confirmed by Marshall, who wrote, "In the following spring--1962--I went on my only
mission to Vietnam for the Defense Department.... Our mission was in
[sic] investigate the state of our troops as to morale, discipline, supply
and general outlook.... While troop morale was far short of high tide
at that point, the MAAG advisers in the field were unusually steadfastly
solid." By earlv 1965 he felt "that the morale of the troops and the level
discipline of the Army were higher than I had ever known them in any of
our wars." 13/

By the late 1960s, though, one could see the beginnings of a
distinct decline in morale and discipline. Charles C. Moskos, one of the
preeminent scholars on the American military, notes this turnabout in a
dpaper on the American combat soldier in Vietnam. According to Moskos, "the
morale of the American army in Vietnam changed markedly over three rather
distinct and successive periods: 1965-1967, relatively high cohesion and
morale; 1968-1969, a transitional period of mixed cohesion and demoraliza-
tion; and 1970-1972, widespread breakdowns in troop discipline." 14/ Robert
Nichols, giving one of the reasons for this decline in morale and disci-
pline in the late 1960s, concurs:

The enlisted personnel were careerists during the
early years of the war... at the NCO level, but as the war
continued more and more enlisted personnel were
draftees who did not want to be there and lacked many
of the requisite skills and attitudes of a good
soldier.... morale and discipline deteriorated
markedly as the years went by. 15/

Or as another observer noted the change in 1969:

I had heard grousing and bitching before, but with
these men it was different. They cursed the politi-
cians who had got them there. They were nearing the
breaking point; fifty days of constant pounding by the
NVA, days with no hot food, with little water and less
sleep--it was taking its toll. "I'll tell you," said
one of them who had just lost one of his best buddies,
"our morale is very low. They just have to bring
American troops in and end this experiment." 16/
as Heinl remarked about disaffection amongst US troops in Vietnam during the winding-down period:

The rear guard of five hundred thousand-man army, in its day (and in the observation of the writer) the best army the United States ever put into the field, is numbly extricating itself from a nightmare war the Armed Forces feel they had foisted on them by bright civilians who are now back on campus writing books about the folly of it all. 17/

The existence of problems became sufficiently obvious that in April 1970 General Westmoreland, prompted by "several unfavorable events," requested that the Army War College study "The Morale and Professional Climate of the Army." The War College's rapidly completed study was willing to go somewhat beyond Westmoreland's cautious assessment ("several unfavorable events") to conclude that there was a "significant difference between ideal values of the officer corps and its operative values." 18/

At about the same time, 19/ forty combat officers sent a letter to the president in which they remarked about "the extent of disaffection among the American troops." This cautiously reasoned assessment came from persons in a good position to observe the situation, and was not meant to gain attention--no copies were sent to the press and the war was not directly criticized. Looking back even Westmoreland took a stronger stand, acknowledging "that serious morale and disciplinary problems arose" after the start of American withdrawal in 1969. "That was to be expected," he continued. "Men began to doubt the American purpose. Why die when the United States was pulling out?" 20/ As another officer recalls, the situation in 1971-72 was a "brand new ball game. There was a very noticeable, but not unexpected, drop in discipline, morale, esprit, and combat effectiveness as well as a dramatic increase in race, drug and crime incidents." 21/

Taken together, these statements constitute a compelling reason to take a closer look at what other evidence is available regarding the state of morale and discipline amongst US forces in Vietnam. Unfortunately, such evidence does not fall logically into neat compartments;
neither is it an easy task to assess the reliability or meaning of a given piece of information. Indeed, some evidence can be cited in different contexts to back up widely varying arguments. But some order, however arbitrary, must be chosen. Evidence regarding drug abuse (variously considered as a symptom and/or a cause of poor morale) and race relations is treated separately in chapters 5 and 6 of this volume and will receive mention here only insofar as it bears on other matters of morale and discipline. Evidence in this section will be grouped under such general headings as deserters and discharges, fraggings and combat refusals, the role of the military justice system, the evidence from the Inspector General's Office, and so on. The causes of changes in morale and discipline will then be examined.

2. Evidence from the Inspector General

As personal staff officer to the Commander of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the Inspector General (IG) "is responsible for advising the Commander on matters relating to the performance of mission and state of discipline, efficiency, and economy of the command. He conducts investigations, inquiries, inspections and surveys as directed by the Commander. He receives and acts upon complaints by individuals and agencies." 22/ With such responsibilities, the Inspector General's Office is in an excellent position to assess the state of morale and discipline in the military. Though much specific information remains classified, the MACV Inspector General History, 1964-1972 provides interesting (if extremely cautious) evidence relevant to this chapter. 23/

In early 1967 the MACV IG Office consisted of only four officers and four enlisted personnel, a fact which reflected the general absence of troop-related problems up until that point.

From the time General Westmoreland assumed command of MACV in January 1964 until 1966 a requirement for the expansion of the Inspector General system proportional to the overall increase of U.S. troops had not been necessary. There had been few United States units and the quality of advisory personnel was such that complaints or requests for assistance were relatively minute. 24/
By 1967, however, an increase in IG capabilities was becoming necessary. During 1967 there were 252 complaints and requests for assistance involving such matters as disciplinary action, promotions, mail, malassignment, rotation, awards, and lost baggage. Not all complaints were particularly serious, and the total number of complaints was still small compared to the total number of American troops in Vietnam. But the contrast with the earlier period of few problems and few complaints was becoming clear, with, for example, the IG Office's investigative function becoming increasingly important as acts and/or allegations of corruption increased. 25/ As the official record documents:

The Investigations Division of the MACV IG experienced a dramatic increase in investigative cases during 1968. In previous years, there had been twenty-one investigations: two in 1965; six in 1966; and thirteen in 1967. In 1969 alone there was a total of thirty-seven cases investigated. . . . There was also a significant increase in the number of complaint cases in 1968. In 1967, 252 cases were opened; whereas, in 1968, the case load more than than tripled to a total of 327 opened, of which 759 were closed during the year. 26/

The increase in personnel necessary to handle this increasing workload is shown in Table 4-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED (AVERAGE)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the History notes, this increase in staff did not necessarily imply any general deterioration in the quality of the performance of military and civilian personnel; after all, troop strength was increasing
rapidly. However, US military strength in Vietnam crested in April 1969 and thereafter began to decline without there being a commensurate decline in the MACV IG workload. Investigations actually increased as the number of troops declined, with one of the contributing factors cited in the History being "Low level of combat activity with attendant idleness and mischievous behavior of United States troops." Things worsened with the accelerated drawdown in 1971. As the IG History notes, the coincidence of a drawdown and problems was no accident:

The drawdown of United States units created many problems that previously had not been as evident nor [sic] as pronounced. With the loss of offensive combat missions many units were withdrawn into enclaves on the coast or in populated areas and began processing for their return to the United States. This resulted in more free time for the troops. The additional free time not constructively channelled resulted in increased drug abuse, imagined problems, and a tendency by some to blame anything that went wrong on the "system" or on other people. As a result, some units were plagued by increased drug usage and racial polarization manifested in a rapid deterioration of small unit discipline.

A second study done by the MACV IG Office, "Lessons Learned: Racially Oriented Incidents," provides, in its discussion of racial problems, an interesting picture of the general deterioration of discipline in some units. This study is included, in part, in the endnotes.

Works done by the MACV IG Office thus tend to bear out the picture of an army suffering from morale and discipline problems, especially during the drawdown phase, but noticeably from 1967 onward.

3. The Deserters and the Discharged

One of the most frequently cited indices of the decline in military morale and discipline is the desertion rate. In fact, desertion appears to be particularly sinister as it is often considered to be a statement of antiwar sentiment, a conclusion reached by numerous authors when analyzing the high rates of desertion in Vietnam.
Comparison of desertion rates in Vietnam with those in World War II and Korea is difficult because of differing conditions and even differing definitions of desertion. Nevertheless, Savage and Gabriel paint a gloomy comparative picture:

An examination of the data indicates that the desertion rate in Viet Nam far exceeds rates for those of World War II and Korea. Indeed this rate reached disastrous proportions between the years 1965-1971 where it increased by 468 percent. Even more pertinent is the fact that in this same period after 1968 the level and intensity of combat actually dropped off.

Remarking on the limitations of a comparison of Vietnam with World War II, they continue that,

nonetheless the comparison of Viet Nam with Korea is valid in that the Korean War was peripheral, limited and extracted comparatively few human resources and sacrifices from the system. At their highest, desertion rates during Viet Nam reveal that some 7.13 percent of the Army was in a deserter status, a rate 3.5 times higher than Korean levels. If those absent without leave are included 17.2 percent of the Army were in an absentee status in 1971.

Baskir and Strauss, on the other hand, observe that by historical standards, combat-related desertion was rare in Vietnam.

More than 100,000 self-absent soldiers were still at large when the Civil War ended in 1865, almost all of them front-line troops. As recently as World War II, more than 20,000 soldiers were convicted for desertion in combat. But throughout the Vietnam war, only a few thousand men were court-martialed for unauthorized absence in Vietnam or for disobeying orders to go to the combat zone, and just twenty-four were in fact convicted of deserting with intent to avoid hazardous duty.

Who was most likely to desert? Soldiers in Revolt notes that the meager evidence available on deserters indicates that they were educationally and socio-economically somewhat below the average for enlisted personnel, a group which itself tended to be low-income working class and possess something less than a high school education.
careful study confirms this. 38/ Baskir and Strauss give a detailed prototype of an Army deserter and compare him with deserters from other services:

If there is such a thing as a "prototype" Army deserter of the Vietnam era, he lived in a small town and grew up in the South. He came from a low-income family, often with only one parent in the home. He had an IQ of 90, and dropped out of high school in the tenth grade. He enlisted to get away from problems back home, to learn a skill, or just to find something to do. He finished advanced training and had almost two years "good time," which often included a full tour in Vietnam. However, he rarely progressed beyond the lowest ranks. He was arrested at least once by civilian police, and he frequently committed other minor infractions against military discipline. After going AWOL once or twice, he went home to stay, usually because of family problems. Two years later, he was arrested and given an undesirable discharge in lieu of court-martial. He entered the service at age eighteen, committed his first serious offense at nineteen, and was discharged at twenty-one.

About 75 percent of all deserters were white, but a nonwhite serviceman was twice as likely as a white serviceman to become a deserter. Only about one hundred were women.

Marine deserters were younger and more poorly educated than their Army counterparts. They were more likely to desert because they could not tolerate military life and were punished more severely for their AWOL offenses. Navy deserters were overwhelmingly white, with long histories of petty misconduct and minor punishments. Air Force deserters tended to be black, better educated, and discouraged about the menial tasks to which they had been assigned. They were also more likely to go AWOL at least partly out of opposition to the Vietnam war. 39/

Why did these young men desert? The idea that the majority of deserters were antiwar protestors voting with their feet does not seem valid. Pentagon officials put the antiwar-deserter figure at around 10 percent. 40/ The official Defense Department study on AWOL offenses notes the most common reasons: "The reasons are as old as man--financial or
family trouble, romantic involvements, earlier misconduct that led to
disciplinary action, inability to adjust to military life, or family
"resure before going overseas." 41/ The Bells and Baskir and Strauss,
among others, agree that factors other than antiwar sentiment tended to
motivate deserters. They, and most other analysts of Vietnam-era deser-
ters, return to the same theme: the vast majority of deserters were
neither conscientious nor cowardly. A useful survey of the evidence is
provided by the Bells:

Both the Joint Alternative Service Board (JASB) and the
mental health interviewers obtained information about
reasons for leaving service. The two most frequently
mentioned reasons given by JASB were personal/family/
financial problems (50%) and problems in adjusting to
Army life (27%). The comparable figures for the mental
health interviewers were 40% and 24% respectively.

Reasons having to do with the Vietnam war or war in
general were mentioned to the board by 12% of the men
and to the interviewers by 14%. Other JASB reasons
were Army mismanagement (9%) and other (3%). The
remaining interview reasons were administration or
leadership (20%), drug-related problems (2%) and legal
difficulties (1%). 42/

Some programs were available for those with family or personal
problems--counseling, home leave, compassionate reassignments, even hard-
ship discharges--but they were often administered ineffectively. Many
deserters felt that the military not only failed to help them with their
problems, it tended to aggravate them. Many instances of unnecessary
inflexibility have been alleged. President Ford's Clemency Board found
that 14 percent of all absence offenses could be attributed to "procedural
unfairness." The military cannot be expected to solve a soldier's personal
problems, but in many cases it actually exacerbated them. 43/

For those to whom the Vietnam-era desertion rates seemed ominous,
the less-than-honorable discharge rate must have seemed appalling. The
100,000 Vietnam-era troops discharged for absence offenses were a drop in
the bucket when compared to the 463,000 who received less-than-honorable
discharges for other reasons. Some of these less-than-honorable discharges
were, of course, neither a direct consequence of the war nor a direct commentary on poor morale, 44/ but it is equally obvious that large numbers of less-than-honorable discharges do not speak well of morale or discipline. 45/ Figures 4-1 46/, 4-2 47/, and Table 4-2 48/ provide a breakdown of desertions and less-than-honorable discharges in the Vietnam-era military. They help document the view presented here--that the increasingly serious desertion and less-than-honorable discharge rates of American troops in Vietnam, though not unique or as serious as some writers have contended, certainly deserve careful attention and are indicative, directly or indirectly, of a decline in morale and discipline.

The data indicate, for example, that several aspects of the desertion and discharge problem during the Vietnam war were different than those of other twentieth century American wars. These differences are instructive; for while Pentagon estimates that only about 15 percent of Vietnam-era AWOLs were motivated by opposition to the war (the others being no different than AWOLs in other wars) are probably correct, the Pentagon analysis overlooks several factors which highlight the extent to which Vietnam was different. Thus, for example, only the short-term AWOL rate (less than 30 days) in Vietnam was comparable to that of earlier wars; and short-term absences nearly always involve petty misbehavior or personal problems that bear little relationship to the war. The statistics for long-term absences, which increased to an unprecedented level, tell a different story. In 1966 the Army and Marines reported about 15 desertion cases per thousand. By 1969 this had climbed to 50 and by 1972 to 70 cases per thousand. 49/ Long-term absence rates in Korea were only about 25 per thousand. The problem cannot be overlooked; the connection to a decline in morale appears strong and the cost to the military clear:

During the entire period of the Vietnam war, there were approximately 1,500,000 AWOL incidents and 500,000 desertion incidents. At the peak of the war, an American soldier was going AWOL every two minutes, and deserting every six minutes. This had an enormous impact on the ability of the armed forces to function. Absence offenses caused a total loss of roughly one million man-years of military service, almost half the
Vietnam-Era Active Force Troops:
7,575,000

AWOL Incidents:
1,500,000

Desertion Incidents:
550,000

Less-Than-Honorable Discharges:
563,000

Court-Martial Discharges for Civilian-type Crimes:
11,300

Less-Than-Honorable Discharges for Absence Offenses:
100,000

Other Discharges:
451,700

Unrelated to Vietnam Service:
68,000

Related to Vietnam Service:
32,000

Failure to Report to Vietnam:
7,000

AWOL during Vietnam Tour:
5,000

AWOL after Vietnam Tour:
20,000

AWOL in Combat Zone:
2,000

AWOL in Noncombat Zone:
1,000

Desertion to Avoid Other Offenses:
1,976

Figure 4-1. Military Offenders
Figure 4-2. Military Punishments
TABLE 4-2. RATES OF DISCHARGE, PER THOUSAND ENLISTED STRENGTH, FOR MISCONDUCT, UNFITNESS, AND UNSUITABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>112.4</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, All Services</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
total number of man-years American troops spent in Vietnam. The Senate Armed Services Committee estimated that in 1968 alone, well before AWOL and desertion reached their peak, absenteeism was costing the military the equivalent of ten combat divisions of fifteen thousand men each. While few of these young men were consciously voting against the war with their feet, their behavior was unmistakably connected with the unusual stress which they and the armed forces experienced during the Vietnam era. 50/

4. Fraggings and Combat Refusals

After the disastrous battle of Hamburger Hill, GIs in the 101st Airborne put out an underground newspaper offering a $10,000 reward for the assassination--or fragging--of the officer who gave the order for the attack. What is worse, it seems that it was not unusual for such bounties to be raised to reward the murder of unpopular officers or NCOs. 51/ As a sign of poor morale and the failure of military discipline there can be little more dramatic evidence. If it is true, as many sources have claimed, that fraggings increased dramatically after 1969, the case for a decline in US troop morale and discipline as the drawdown approached is so much the stronger.

The trouble, of course, is finding the evidence. Murdering an officer is not something one tends to advertise or answer questions about on surveys. Sometimes the evidence is clear--particularly in the 'classic case' of a fragmentation grenade being slipped under the officer's hootch--but more often it is sketchy at best, especially if the fragging took place in the field.

Not surprisingly then, statistics on fragging, when available at all, vary widely. Even "official" figures do not agree. For example, Major General Kerwin testified before a House subcommittee that incidents in 1969 and 1970 totaled 239 and 386, respectively, whereas Defense Department figures for these same years are 126 and 271. 52/ (The Defense Department's figures are reproduced in Table 4-3, with General Kerwin's testimony inserted in parentheses. 53/) Many have suggested that even Kerwin's figures significantly underestimate the incidence of fragging, some officers in the Judge Advocates Corps estimating, for example, that
### TABLE 4-3. ASSAULTS WITH EXPLOSIVE DEVICES - VIETNAM

**As of 31 December 1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCIDENTS INVOLVING EXPLOSIVE DEVICES</th>
<th>INTENDED VICTIM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL INCIDENTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 69 (239)</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 79 (386)</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 71</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 72</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS (1016)</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Actual Assaults - Motive determined as intent to kill, do bodily harm, or to intimidate.

2/ Possible Assaults - Possible motive determined as intent to kill, do bodily harm or to intimidate.
only 10 percent of fraggings ended up in court. Some estimates of total fraggings—including those resulting in injury and not just deaths—range up to 2,000 for the entire Vietnam period. Whichever figures one accepts—and even the official Defense Department figures are high enough to give pause—another question must be faced: was the incidence of fragging in Vietnam any different than in other wars? General Davis says no, citing the threats of violence at Cedar Mountain during the Civil War and claiming that similar situations have existed in all American wars. But others disagree. Another source concludes, for example, that:

... in World War I, which involved over 4,700,000 American military, fewer than 370 cases of violence directed at superiors were brought to courts-martial. This low ratio was fairly constant through World War II and the Korean police action... Since January 1970 alone, a period during which roughly 700,000 Americans were in Vietnam, there have been 363 cases involving assault with explosive devices... and another 118 cases termed "possible"...

Historical analogies are always difficult, but it seems fair to say that fragging reached disturbingly high, if not new or unique, levels in Vietnam. And significantly, there was a distinct rapid increase in these incidents during the last stages of the drawdown. As Moskos observed, "outbreaks of fraggings reached epidemic proportion toward the latter years of the war -- three to four hundred by official Army records and undoubtedly several times that number in reality." The motivations for fraggings were studied carefully by Moskos, whose conclusions warrant quoting at length since they bear directly on the relationship between fragging and morale:

... two broad categories of fraggings can be ascertained.

The first type, probably accounting for less than 20 percent of all incidents, were the acts of solitary individuals pursuing a kind of personal vendetta. Such individuals developed a diffused resentment against the whole military system rather than toward a specific
person -- though a particular noncom or officer might come to represent symbolically the system. These were cases in which the perpetrator was likely to be personally unbalanced or psychologically disturbed at the time he resorted to violence. In this type of fragging no collusion with others is involved, little if any warning is given, the lethal instrument is usually one's personal weapon, happenstance often determines the ultimate victim, and the culprit makes little effort to hide his identity.

The second and much more common type of fragging systematically involved small group processes. These fraggings occurred in response to soldiers' groups believing their integrity had been violated in some way. Three variants of such group-engendered fragging can be specified in probably declining order of frequency: (a) racially inspired fraggings, typically by blacks against what is regarded as a racist white superior; (b) "dope hassle" fraggings arising from informal groups of drug users seeking reprisal against enforcers of antidrug regulations; and (c) fraggings in combat groups against a noncom or officer who is seen as too gung-ho in risking the lives of his subordinates. 59/

Bill Karabaic, a drug counselor with the 101st Airborne, cites an example combining the latter two motivations, in addition to the general feelings of confusion:

Karabaic spoke of a near-fragging connected with heroin. Headquarters company received a new lieutenant fresh out of West Point who immediately alienated his men with his niggling enforcement of petty regulations. "The first day he was smoked." said Karabaic. "The second gassed. The third day he was building a frag-proof hootch (quarters)." Presently the lieutenant received an assignment. One of the men he picked to go to the field was a black who had just returned from Amnesty, the Army's hero in detoxification program. As Karabaic described him, "He was still really strung out (suffering from withdrawal) and clearly not ready to go to the field." Yet, the lieutenant ordered the GI into action despite his and Karabaic's protests. The GI refused, saying, "You're crazy." The lieutenant proceeded to make life miserable for the GI. Finally, the GI approached Karabaic and said, "I'm going to frag the
THE BDM CORPORATION

"bastard." Karabaic argued to no avail. In resignation, he said, "That's murder." The GI replied, "Don't mean nothing." But he hesitated, and as he walked away he handed Karabaic the grenade he had intended to use. 60/

Sometimes general feelings of resentment and confusion even developed into confrontations disturbingly similar to class warfare. The gassing and smoking of the officers' club near 2/11 artillery at Camp Eagle is one example. In this case a well-organized assault was to culminate in an attack with M-79 grenades, though this was fortunately called off. 61/ The common thread running through each of these incidents can be seen to be a direct or indirect breakdown of morale or discipline, or both, with the first motivation listed by Mosko being perhaps the least predictable and controllable and the last the most ominous.

Another indication of serious morale and discipline problems is the incidence of combat refusals (mutinies) or other forms of insubordination. Here, too, reliable information is hard to come by. Indeed, the Department of the Army claims not to keep statistics on combat refusals -- a surprising lapse for such an actively self-examining organization. 62/ However, Senator John Stennis obtained some information stating that there were 68 refusals to fight in 1969 and, in 1970, 35 refusals in the 1st Air Cavalry Division alone. Savage and Gabriel extrapolated that if all divisions averaged the same number of refusals in divisions as the 1st Air Cavalry, there would have been 245 such refusals to fight in that year alone. 63/

Reports -- undoubtedly of varying accuracy -- giving accounts of numerous combat-refusal incidents exist. Boyle cites a case in which the Bravo Company 1/12, 1st Cavalry Division declared their own private cease-fire with the enemy, agreeing not to fire until fired upon. 64/ In another incident, black GIs at Long Binh Jail revolted, holding out against hundreds of MPs until finally overcome. Legal defense worker David Addlestone reports encountering dozens of combat refusals and hundreds of minor acts of insubordination during his year in Vietnam. 65/
The revolt of Alpha Company at the battle of Khe Sanh is one of the better known combat refusals. As one source tells it:

The battle for Queson [sic] started when the North Vietnamese Army launched a powerful offensive against the American Division guarding the northern coastal region of South Vietnam. The battle was a meatgrinder, with each side pouring in its best battalions to be chewed up. Alpha Company had been in the worst of it, the fight for AK Valley.

For four days Alpha Company had assaulted the same North Vietnamese bunker system, and each time they suffered high casualties. Then the commander of the battalion and Ollie Noonan of AP, with whom I had flown into Ben Het, were shot down in a helicopter over the AK Valley and Alpha Company was ordered in to find their bodies.

The next day Lt. Col. Robert C. Bacon, the new battalion commander, ordered the company again to storm the North Vietnamese bunkers. Two newsmen, Peter Arnett and Horst Fass of Associated Press, were with Bacon at his battalion headquarters at Landing Zone Center when a call came in. A nervous voice crackled over the radio receiver: it was Lt. Eugene Schurtz, Jr., the commander of Alpha Company:

"I'm sorry, sir, but my men refused to go... We cannot move out." Bacon turned pale and fired back into his radio phone: "Repeat that, please. Have you told them what it means to disobey orders under fire?"

"I think they understand." said the lieutenant, "but some of them have simply had enough, they are broken. There are boys here who have only ninety days left in Vietnam. They want to go home in one piece. The situation is psychic here."

Bacon ordered his executive officer, Maj. Richard Waite, and Pfc. Okey Blankenship to "go out there and give them a pep talk and a kick in the ass." When they got there, Schurtz was crying, and the men poured out details of their five terror-filled days.

Blankenship told the men that another company, down to only fifteen men ("I lied to them." he admitted later), was still on the move. An Alpha troop asked why,
the sarge sneered in contempt: "Maybe they got something a little more than you've got." With fists raised, the enraged soldier charged, shouting, "Don't call us cowards, we are not cowards."

Somehow Waite and Blankenship managed to convince Alpha Company that the NVA had already left the bunkers (apparently this was true), and the men moved out. 66/

None of those refusing combat received jail sentences. Alpha company received a three-day standdown.

The New York Times reported another incident in which, on April 12, 1972, Company C of the Second Battalion, First Infantry of the 196th Infantry Brigade, refused for an hour and a half to go on a patrol mission in the hills surrounding Phu Bai. In the end, however, all 142 of the men complied with the command. 67/

One combat commander cited two combat refusals in his battalion in 1967-1968, in both cases involving members of a Scout Platoon which had been ambushed in daylight not too far from base camp. Both were talked into going back out and both received suspended sentences. This is probably typical of many combat refusals in Vietnam. In 1971-1972, as commanding officer of the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, the same officer had to deal with one major combat refusal, "The Phu Bai 13." As he details, the Battalion Commander was on R and R and an inexperienced company commander tried to bargain with the troops. The men, all blacks, ... took over small barracks and wanted to serve "demands" up the chain of command; this was ignored. Heavy pressure from Divisional leaders to break up ASAP, by force, if necessary. This potentially counter-productive and dangerous approach not employed. After 1 day plus men peacefully broken up and ten counselled individually by Assistant JAG, also Black. All were tried and found "guilty" -- most of the men were new to Bn. and generally poorly educated and highly impressionable. Suspended jail sentences of all but the militant agitator/leader. No further trouble from the other 12, but they were broken up and transferred to other units. 68/
By 1971 the Department of the Army was releasing figures to the House Internal Security Committee which documented that courts-martial cases involving "certain acts of insubordination, mutiny and willful disobedience" showed a steady increase in numbers from 252 in 1968 to 382 in 1970. One reporter estimated that cases for similar offenses in 1971 would exceed 450.

5. The Military Justice System

Much can be learned from the records of the military justice system about the state of morale and discipline in Vietnam. Table 4-4 provides a statistical summary of US Army disciplinary actions during the years of our heaviest military involvement in Vietnam. It can be seen that disciplinary actions increased as troop levels rose, but did not decrease at the same rate during the drawdown period. This is particularly true for the most serious category of actions--general courts martial--and the most frequently administered category of actions--Article 15s. What is more, the statistics in Table 4-4 are significant in their exclusion of cases disposed of via administrative action. For numerous reasons, including the difficulties created for the military courts by tour-of-duty policies which encouraged a rapid turnover in personnel, administrative solutions to disciplinary problems were increasingly relied upon as the war progressed. If anything, then, the statistics in Table 4-4 understate the existence of disciplinary problems, especially during the later years of war. The handling of drug and race-related problems, both of which are discussed in separate chapters, illustrates this phenomenon.

As was noted earlier, criminal offenses by US troops were not a serious problem during the early years of US involvement in Vietnam. The army-wide courts-martial rate during 1965 was only 3.55 per 1,000. This began to change, though, after 1965. With escalation and the short tour-of-duty policy the relatively experienced and professional soldiers of the earlier period were replaced by new recruits or draftees who were young and inexperienced. On the civilian side, the rapid escalation of the war created an environment in which unscrupulous contractors could lead an exciting life of adventure while making easy, and not always legal, money.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General courts-martial tried</th>
<th>Special courts-martial tried</th>
<th>Summary courts-martial tried</th>
<th>Nonjudicial punishment administered (Article 15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>2723</td>
<td>2187</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>4840</td>
<td>2090</td>
<td>46,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>6796</td>
<td>2119</td>
<td>59,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>7314</td>
<td>2231</td>
<td>66,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>4964</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>64,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>3678</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>41,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>3,283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures do not include cases which were investigated but never tried, or cases that were disposed of through administrative action.
The military justice system soon felt the effects of these changes. Much of the system's energy was directed against corruption and drug abuse, problems discussed in separate chapters. The rotation policy meant that if justice was to be done at all it had to be swift. The rapid turnover of personnel affected the legal staff, the suspects, the witnesses, and even the victims. Complicating the situation further was the fact that jurisdictional problems arose in cases in which Vietnamese were involved. Similarly, the military command in Saigon and the State Department debated the jurisdiction of military courts over crimes committed by civilians, until the ruling in the William Averette case rendered this question moot. Thereafter administrative sanctions were the only allowable method for countering illegal civilian activities. 73/ This, then, was another example of the trend towards the administrative disposal of cases. The special circumstances created by the war also made the use of Article 15s increasingly attractive, a fact reflected in the statistics in Table 4-4. As one source commented about this development:

Another sign of extensive turmoil is the growing number of non-judicial punishments administered to enlisted people. Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) allows commanders to summarily impose penalties without resorting to court martial. The rate of these punishments has increased in recent years from 137 per thousand in fiscal 1968 to 183 per thousand in 1972. Significantly, the largest percentage gain in Article 15's during 1972 occurred within the Air Force, again confirming our thesis that disaffection among airmen grew as a result of the Indochina air war. 74/

Surprisingly, one measure of criminality which cannot be used to assess the discipline of US troops in Vietnam is the standard set regarding war crimes by the Geneva Accords, at least as they existed during most of the Vietnam period. As already noted, 75/ the Accords were not written with a war such as that fought in Vietnam in mind, and thus were silent on many of the issues relating to the behavior of US troops. "Atrocities" committed by a soldier against an enemy were, for example, considered war crimes, but the same atrocities committed against an ally were not. Some
of the reported mistreatment of South Vietnamese citizens by American soldiers therefore could not be prosecuted under sanction of the Geneva Accords even if conclusive evidence were available. Court-martial statistics such as those provided in Table 4-5 thus provide the only official quantification of such incidents. Here too, however, the figures may well be significantly understating the problem because of the reliance on administrative action as opposed to the cumbersome court martial process. As Baskir and Strauss observed, the simple fact was that courts martial were not practical in the field. The paper work, time, and trouble they required could not be afforded. Sending a man to the rear to stand trial operated as a reward, freeing him from combat. Courts martial therefore tended to be reserved for the most violent crimes or for desertions made under the most aggravated circumstances.

The type of person most likely to face disciplinary proceedings did not differ markedly from the type most likely to desert. As one official study concluded: "A fairly clear picture emerges of the serviceman who is prone to encounter disciplinary problems. Such an individual is likely to be young, in his first term, low ranking, single, relatively uneducated and serving in a relatively low skilled military occupation." This can hardly be surprising.

The evidence from the military justice system thus tends to support the description of an increasingly severe morale and discipline problem amongst US troops in Vietnam, though in this case the evidence is not quite as striking as that from certain other sources. It has been seen, moreover, that some evidence which might otherwise have been more striking was obscured by the increasing reliance upon administrative proceedings.

C. CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF MORALE AND DISCIPLINE AMONGST US TROOPS

As has been shown, then, there is a significant body of evidence indicating that as American involvement in Vietnam drew to a close there was a sharp decline in the morale and discipline of American troops. By


## TABLE 4-5. COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTIONS INVOLVING VIETNAMESE VICTIMS, 1965-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Murder</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault with intent to commit murder, rape, or indecent assault</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutilation of a corpse</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manslaughter</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>165</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note #1:** Disparity in certain offense categories between services occurred due to differences in categorization, charging, and/or compilation of offenses by each service.

**Note #2:** Few of these offenses constitute violations of international law. For example, United States v. Stamats, NCM 70-3765, 45 CMR 765 (1971), involved the robbery-murder of a South Vietnamese Army soldier who was a drug pusher. While extending protection to enemy combatants, international law does not provide for protection of one ally from another.
itself this is perhaps not overly shocking or interesting: the fact is already generally accepted and the general phenomenon of war weariness and a resulting decline in morale and discipline is not new. But further analysis of the causative factors is still important. Can the causes be isolated? Will similar circumstances produce similar effects in the future? Can either the causes or the cause-effect relationships be controlled? To what extent can these things be predicted? It would be presumptuous to expect to answer these questions definitively; but material bearing upon the answers can be presented and, in some cases at least, tentative conclusions can be drawn.

1. Ferment at Home

A constantly heard theme—which often takes the form of a complaint from military leaders—is that the problems experienced within the military have their origin in society at large. This contamination-from-outside theory is used to explain such problems as racial tensions, drug abuse, and class stratification. The Navy Department, for example, explained that the rising administrative discharge rate was:

... due to "adverse attitudes towards military service, increased disciplinary cases and expanded incidents of drug abuse." General Edwin Wheeler of the Marine Corps told the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1972 that such problems "must be viewed against the background of this country's commitment in the Republic of Vietnam and recent sociological changes within the U.S." 79/

Eugene Linden concluded in his comprehensive study of fragging that "the roots of these murder attempts lie outside the military and even the war. They lie in the clash of forces that brought an Army in Vietnam to its present state." 80/ Moskos concluded that the antiwar movement, after 1969 at least, had a noticeable effect among troops in Vietnam. 81/ A major US periodical was reporting in late 1971 that morale, already low, was being hurt by the GIs' sense that support from home was diminishing and that many citizens believed that combat was all but over. 82/ A report by the
Strategic Studies Institute at Georgetown University noted this same home-front influence, but added that the Army at least shared in the responsibility: "In part, the seriousness of the race problem resulted from a steady stream of incoming personnel who had been part of the drug culture or various civil rights activities. In this sense, the Army did not bear responsibility for all the problem. On the other hand, the Army did not handle these problem areas effectively and actually contributed significantly to them." 83/

Some observers, on the other hand, believe that the impact of external domestic conditions on US troops in Vietnam was minimal. One source, for example, asserted that problems often blamed on society should more correctly be blamed on poor leadership. 84/ Savage and Gabriel concur, citing many examples in which military standards have been maintained in the face of a crumbling society. 85/ With respect to the disintegration of the US Army in Vietnam, Savage and Gabriel believe that society's problems were largely irrelevant. They observe that the Marine Corps, with its emphasis on traditional military values and reinforcement of primary military groups was not as badly scarred as the Army by the Vietnam experience. Further they point out that the permissive self-indulgent young person who rejects the notions of "duty, discipline and sacrifice" tends to be from precisely those classes--the middle and upper middle--that were best able to avoid the draft and least likely to enlist. They conclude that "this implies of course, that it is primarily the military subsystem itself which may be at fault when armies lose coherence and decay. Stated otherwise, it is the officers and the maintenance of traditional systems that count and not social conditions at large." 86/ Similarly, the Army War College Study on Professionalism tends to downplay, though not discount, the importance of society to the morale, leadership, and ethics of the Army. 87/

There seem to be elements of truth in all these views. Certainly the military, through its policies and practices, has an opportunity to lessen or aggravate the problems 'injected' into it from society-at-large, problems such as racial tension, drug abuse, permissiveness, and so on. Some armies in the past have handled similar problems and maintained their
professional esprit and combat effectiveness. It is difficult, on the other hand, to compare problems experienced at different times and places by different groups, and thus is unfair to imply as a certainty that other forces in similar situations would have done better. Indeed, given the abundance and severity of obstacles to good performance by US troops in Vietnam, many observers are surprised that the majority of these troops did as well as they did.

Of all the "societal inputs," perhaps the most subtle, but in the end the most powerful, was that which might be called "creeping doubt." As stated goals seemed to provide less and less reason for the continued American presence in Vietnam, as support for the war dwindled at home, and as the war itself appeared more and more purposeless, actions which in other contexts would have appeared absurd seemed normal. As Eugene Linden observed (in the context of fragging, but in a manner which has a general application to other morale and discipline questions):

The frustrations that spawn fraggings have to do with the collision of a people who don't accept our mission in Vietnam and those who do. We are still [1972] killing people in Vietnam; yet there are no convincing arguments to continue doing so. If you can kill Vietnamese without convincing arguments, you can kill officers without them too, because to the battle-weary grunt the gung-ho, nitpicking officer is as inhuman and remote as a gook. 88/

Unless the military assumes the constitutional right of civilian policy makers to formulate overall national policy (a role some such as Douglas MacArthur have thought is perhaps not a bad idea), it will continue to have a limited capacity to determine the socio-political setting for its operations. Given the rather severe drawbacks to such a change in role, however, the military will just have to make do with what at times may be a less-than-ideal socio-political environment. The Vietnam War situation illustrates, however, that there is considerable room for improving the efficiency of military operations even given these external constraints.
2. Careerism

Careerism—a type of behavior or system of values in which an officer places his personal good or career above that of his country or the military profession—is frequently cited as one of the prime evils behind the decline of morale and discipline during the Vietnam war. The Army War College's study of professionalism singles out some of the aspects of careerism—particularly the importance of short-term statistical indices of success—as the prime culprits behind the "significant difference between the ideal values of the officer corps and its operative values." There can be little doubt that the performance of an organization will suffer when a percentage of its higher-ranking members value a good record over a good performance.

The relationship between careerism and the decline of morale and discipline during the war is, of course, not a simple matter of cause and effect. The confusion of political, social, and military goals and requirements which dominated US involvement in Vietnam created an extremely frustrating environment for many senior officers, some of whom might therefore respond with suspicion, distrust, and even deceit. This was a situation in which the war helped further careerism, which in turn furthered the problems of the war.

Obviously, careerism is nothing new and cannot by itself account for the changing situation in Vietnam. William Skelton of the University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point has observed, for example, that careerism in the US military goes back to the 19th century. Self-serving, self-seeking individuals are certainly much older than that. Why then, if careerism is nothing new, is it singled out for such notoriety in Vietnam?

For one thing, circumstances made this disease, if careerism can be so termed, more virulent. The 'can-do' spirit of many in the military has its place—indeed has many advantages—but only in situations where one in fact can do—where decisive, well directed efforts will result in success. In many ways Vietnam was not such an environment, but, given no corresponding change in the can-do spirit, something else had to give. That something was the primary emphasis on actual success, an orientation
THE BDM CORPORATION

quickly replaced by a CYA mentality. A young officer, fresh out of a military academy, trained essentially in the art of deploying men for war, but faced with heroin use in a mutinous unit strained by racial tension and resentful of authority in general and officers and Vietnam in particular, has to be almost superhuman to achieve the kind of success he is taught to expect and the order he has grown used to. But if surrounded by peers and superiors who cover up failures and resort (in some cases) to manipulation or deceit to obtain good reports, the new officer quickly finds it inconceivable to admit problems and very tempting to fall in line. The practice once learned becomes difficult to change.

Recent trends make this new behavior all too easy. As Colonel Samuel Hays noted, administrative pressures to achieve a prescribed statistical performance have taken their toll on integrity. As the demand for more and more reports continues there is a tendency for their accuracy to decline. Increased use of automatic data processing emphasizes the quantifiable—leaving room for manipulation and squeezing out personal reporting, which is often more sensitive. In particular Hays noted:

Progressively larger portions of the ethical rules have been converted to law or to regulation, adding to the already unreadable volume of prescription and proscription. This tendency to commit everything to writing in an attempt to leave nothing to chance carries with it unanticipated consequences. Faced with voluminous regulations, the soldier is inclined to assume that if an action is not expressly prohibited it must be authorized. He is also pushed toward a legalistic approach toward regulations in which loopholes are sought and quibbling promoted.

Increasingly centralized operations increased the opportunities for manipulative maneuvers. As Col. Nichols observed, "There were also more restraints than in previous wars on punishments and legal sanctions. As the local commander's power to reward and punish diminished, discipline became harder to maintain. Making a good record became more important than demonstrating a good performance."
This is not to imply that all actions which further careers are necessarily wrong or calculated. It is, for example, a common phenomenon for members of bureaucratic organizations to absorb quickly the entire set of attitudes endorsed by or implicit in the organization. As Brodie observes in his book, War and Politics, "The good bureaucrat is rarely in conflict with his superiors on basic policies or related principles, not simply because he is timid but because it comes naturally to him to absorb these policies and make them his own." Moreover, many of the policies or principles thus absorbed may be entirely honorable and, in a policy sense, totally valid.

The trend toward careerism among military personnel was thus not created by the Vietnam War - the war simply provided an excellent medium for its growth. The impact of careerism, however, was to be immense. The effect on an enlisted man--living in an unpleasant environment, in a situation that might be life-threatening or deadly boring or both, questioning perhaps the rationale for the war, often unable to see tangible results for his efforts, and prevented by a rotation system from establishing strong lasting friendships or commitments, of discovering hypocrisy, elitism, and/or incompetence in his superiors can well be imagined. In this context, fragmentings, though no less horrible, are hardly surprising.

Falsified accounts of achievements, inflated body counts, serious awards inflation, base-camp luxuries, corruption, and other hypocritical actions were all associated with careerism and were usually readily apparent to the average 'grunt.' Examples abound, some of which are cited in the endnotes. The repeated citings of similar occurrences by Vietnam Veterans Against the War in their book, The Winter Soldier Investigation is one indication of the connection between these events and the disillusionment of many soldiers. Soldiers less prone to political protest might vent their frustrations in different ways, such as those viewed in the previous section. Careerism, seems then, in its various manifestations to have been a significant factor furthering the decline of morale and discipline in the US Armed Forces in Vietnam.
3. **Personnel Policies**
   a. **The One-Year Tour**

   The pros and cons of the one-year tour of duty (and the six-month command tour) have received much attention. 106/ Its effect on morale and discipline has been one of the points of debate. General Gavin believed it helped morale on the whole. 107/ Westmoreland had mixed feelings. 108/ The USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting's minutes noted that though there definitely were negative side effects, the one-year tour was generally a morale booster. 109/

   Charles Moskos is more circumspect about the advantages of the one-year tour, but is quite clear about its central role:

   For the individual American soldier the paramount factor affecting combat motivation in the Vietnam War was the operation of the rotation system under which a soldier served a twelve-month tour of duty. Barring his being killed or severely wounded, every soldier knew his exact departure date from Vietnam; his whole being centered on reaching his personal DEROS (Date Expected Return Overseas). It would be hard to overstate the soldier's constant concern with how much more time -- down to the day -- he had remaining in Vietnam. 110/

   The consequences, he continues, are difficult to assess. The policy certainly hindered the development of primary-group ties and limited the contact of experienced soldiers with new arrivals. The informal acknowledgement of "short-timers fever" meant that the effective contribution period of many soldiers was shortened. On the whole, he concludes, the policy contributed to good morale during the period when the war was on the upswing but began to work against it with the start of American withdrawal. More reasons for this will be discussed below.

   Others have been stronger in their denunciation of the one-year and six-month tours, especially with regard to their negative effect on morale. Major W. Hayes Parks cites the one-year and six-month tours and their associated policies as one of the prime controllable
factors leading to the discipline breakdowns that often preceded war crimes.

Ideally a unit enters combat after months of intense training together, a well-honed fighting team. While initial deployments to the Republic of Vietnam in 1965 may have conformed with the ideal, a number of factors created an environment of personnel turbulence which precluded recurrence of anything vaguely resembling the ideal. In one case involving the summary execution of five suspected Viet Cong, it was disclosed that the battalion involved in the incident experienced a sixty percent turnover of personnel during the 48-hour period prior to their deployment to Vietnam. The company at My Lai suffered a turnover of more than fifty percent of its strength during its abbreviated predeployment training period. Once deployed, eleven enlisted men from other units were assigned to the company in order for the company to meet the Army's minimum standards of a field operating strength of 120 men. [111/]

To avoid the 'hump' that the rotation policy would otherwise cause each year, many units commenced infusion programs which further limited group cohesion. As Parks observes:

New arrivals had to be integrated into units and become familiar with their commanders and noncommissioned officers, who in many cases were in the process of getting to know their personnel as well as the operating procedures of their superiors and the unit. The small unit leader cannot be blamed for his failure to heed the leadership principle "know your men" when these men are received -- often minus their records -- brief moments before deployment or entry into combat. [112/]

Good discipline was made more difficult with the emergence of a practice associated with the one-year tour and the rotation system—the use of the rotation draft as a mechanism removing 'dead wood'. Those who required the most attention and careful handling (both for their own sake and to keep problems from multiplying) might get the least, giving the officer in charge of the unit to which such men were transferred little
chance to prepare for or prevent problems. 113/ The side effects of the policy, Parks concludes, had a direct bearing on failures in discipline, as measured by incidents of combat misconduct:

The personnel problems of C/1/20, the 11th Brigade, and the Americal Division were unique neither to those units nor to the conflict in Vietnam. Critical examination of these units is not intended to detract from their overall excellent performance despite these adversities. What is questioned is the wisdom of military personnel policies relating to unit strength and rotation insofar as they conflict with the concept of deploying combat-ready teams rather than a mob of strangers. It was the teams, not the mobs, which best accomplished their mission. And it was the mobs, not the teams, which tended to suffer from serious incidents of misconduct. 114/

Others agree that the one-year tour and six-month command tour had a direct or indirect negative effect on morale and discipline. Nichols, for example, noted that the policy led to rapid turnovers, which led to the rise of poorer quality officers, which in turn hurt morale and discipline. 115/ General Donald Bennett acknowledged the need for some limit of tour length, concluding, "I think we wreck ourselves on a six-month rotation or a year's rotation." 116/

The minutes of the USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting summarize some of the drawbacks of the policy, drawbacks which would tend to damage morale:

The Army as an institution was morally compromised at several points. The rotation of command created the simple impression that soldiers were expendable and would be used in this manner to help develop an experienced corps of officers. This practice also weakened leadership in that inexperience became a uniform characteristic of commanders. The plan also was not fair in that soldiers had more exposure to combat conditions than commanders did or than officers in non-rotating slots did. Teamwork, personal loyalties, unit cohesiveness were all sacrificed. 111/
b. Other Personnel Policies

Inequitable manpower recruitment policies which drew disproportionately from the lower socio-economic classes and minorities had ramifications that affected morale and discipline. Thus, for example, some of those who were selected resented the privileged who managed to avoid service. 118/ This resentment, often combined with other nebulous resentments or hardships, was often focused on one of the few targets available—one's officers. Linden repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the widening officer-enlisted man gulf as a factor behind the increasing frequency of fraggings. Though Dr. Robert Landeen, an Army psychiatrist, has observed that in most cases officers who were fragged were at least partly at fault, the Vietnam War created an environment which strained the talents of even the best officers. 119/ The widening gulf between officers and enlisted men was exacerbated by personnel policies that allowed the privileged to escape while wooing the marginal candidate through programs such as Project 100,000. 120/ As Linden observed:

... in World War II the draft equitably conscripted a fair cross-section of Americans but that as America came to place more emphasis on higher education it became conversely easier for the college-educated to avoid military service as common soldiers. Steinberg feels that the presence of men from all economic and educational classes at platoon level was stabilizing because there would be soldiers in the platoon who would talk out frustrations and argue against quixotic violence. Now, as Ross said, there is nobody to say, "Don't do it." 121/

This split had implications for discipline failures in general, not just for fragging. An already frustrating situation was worsened by real or perceived inequities; 122/ and good leadership, hindered by a cultural gulf which limited effective communication, was hamstrung. The problem, moreover, cannot be blamed just on inequitable personnel policies—a similar situation (in kind if not in magnitude) was perhaps inevitable when a necessarily increasingly mechanized, political, and specialized official
army meets its enlisted personnel requirements. But the inequitable manpower recruitment policies necessitated by domestic political parameters certainly aggravated the problem, and thus contributed to the military's morale and discipline problems. 123/

Manpower recruitment programs were not the only personnel policies to have some unfortunate side effects for morale and discipline. Parks notes the crucial relationship between adequate training (particularly in the laws of war) and disciplinary problems (particularly war crimes):

In every case of misconduct investigated, lack of training—whether unit, individual, enlisted, noncommissioned officer, or officer—was considered to have been a key factor in the incident which was under investigation. Units which entered the war trained generally suffered no incidents. Disciplinary problems occurred in untrained, piecemeal units, or with new personnel who arrived and were sent into combat without adequate in-country training and orientation. (Emphasis added.) 124/

Personnel shortages were encouraged by a policy calling for units to be maintained at 90 percent of full strength and "fleshed out" before deployment. In actuality they often ended up at 80 percent of full strength—contributing to occasional overextension, which resulted in physical and psychological frustrations which hurt morale and group cohesion. 125/

Personnel shortages were sometimes met by diffusing the problem: to make up for a shortage, for example, the Marines temporarily commissioned over 5,500 NCOs. Rapid promotion of younger enlisted men to fill this newly created gap meant that small-unit leadership suffered. And Vietnam was in many ways a small-unit war.

Personnel shortages were aggravated by the failure (for political reasons) to call up the Reserves—in this instance, the 4th Marine Division—despite the already clear relationship between poor
leadership and morale and discipline problems. Parks argues that the military cannot entirely avoid blame:

The blame for these shortages and the incidents which occurred lies not only with the Congress, the President, and the Selective Service, but with the Marine Corps. In learning from the errors of the past, a distinction must be made between fact and fancy. For example, if the Marine Corps must accede to peacetime man-power limitations, whether for mission accomplishment or incident avoidance perhaps it is better to fully man seven infantry regiments than partially man nine and attempt to describe them as combat ready. 126/

Another personnel policy, in this case the elaborate support effort designed primarily to boost morale, proved to be a mixed blessing. The USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting minutes conclude:

Another effort to shore up morale was the enormous, costly and ineffective effort at support. The proli- feration of PX facilities, clubs, flush toilets, air conditioning, sports programs, R and R programs, etc. were designed to help morale. Ironically, it had the opposite effect and became a cause of contention between support and combat troops, forward and the rear areas and Americans and Vietnamese. 127/

Other personnel policies certainly influenced morale and discipline 128/ but it is only possible he to mention those which are most important. It should also be noted that while the emphasis here has been on the negative effects of various policies on morale and discipline, this discussion cannot be read as a simple condemnation of these policies. Even the best policies can have at least some unfortunate side effects. Furthermore, since personnel policies reflect political as well as military requirements, it is not always clear that the military is to blame even if a given policy is an unmitigated disaster.

4. The Type of War

The special circumstances of American involvement in Vietnam were also factors in the decline of troop morale and discipline. Sources too
numerous to list have emphasized the frustrations of a limited war. Political restrictions on such things as the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong were frustrating both to military strategists and the soldiers who had to face the consequences—a stronger enemy. Restrictive rules of fighting and forced toleration of incompetence and corruption in ARVN units along with other limitations were perceived by army soldiers as putting them at an unfair disadvantage in a life-or-death situation. 129/

Lack of clear contact with the enemy could be equally frustrating. The unpredictable, sudden, and gruesome casualties resulting from booby traps and mines wreaked havoc with already frayed nerves. Parks notes the connection of disciplinary problems to this frustrating situation.

Significantly most Marine incidents occurred in the First Marine Division, where contact was sporadic. Casualties were primarily the result of mines and booby traps, and forces were dealing largely with an insurgency environment, rather than in the Third Marine Division, where the conflict more resembled a conventional war. 130/

Lack of contact with the enemy could also result in feelings of purposelessness and doubt, which, coupled with the suffering inescapable in any war, could easily be translated into growing resentments. 131/

The type of war fought in Vietnam also created long periods of boredom, perhaps inevitably, for many soldiers. And boredom brought problems. As the IG History put it, "additional free time not constructively channelled resulted in increased drug abuse, imagined problems, and a tendency by some to blame anything that went wrong on the "system." . . . 132/ The USACHCS-SSI meeting minutes agreed: "combat effectiveness increased when units went into combat, but long periods of low activity or idleness eroded morale and discipline." 133/ Not surprisingly, then, morale improved during the Tet offensive. The drawdown, however, brought increasingly limited combat opportunities, at a clear cost to morale and discipline.
Good morale and discipline were also hurt, of course, by growing doubt about the American purpose in Vietnam—which resulted from many factors, ranging from political disagreement at home to the structure (no front line, often no visible enemy, etc.) of the war itself. As Linden observed:

There is not even that intimacy of combat which allows a man to see what he had done. Our war is abstract... nobody knows who killed whom. The intimacy of murder disappears, and with that loss of intimacy, feelings of valor or shame. 134/

Strong assertive leadership is necessary to correct this problem, to the extent that it can be corrected—and good leadership was facing problems itself.

Not surprisingly, some of these frustrations took the form of undisciplined actions against Vietnamese—civilian and ARVN as well as enemy soldiers—in addition to a more general resentment of the Vietnamese people. This feeling was a constant theme in letters from servicemen. 135/

The feeling that one was risking one's life for an undeserving, unmotivated ally certainly took its toll on morale.

5. The Drawdown

As observed in the opening section of this chapter, there is a considerable amount of reliable evidence indicating that morale and discipline declined perceptibly—indeed sharply—as American withdrawal proceeded. Is it fair to conclude, then, that the drawdown itself was a cause of declining morale and increasing breaches in discipline? It is, in that the drawdown brought together or intensified many of the already existing factors that strained or damaged good morale and discipline. 136/ Moskos, it will be recalled, emphasized the central importance of the one-year rotation policy to motivation and morale. With this in mind the significance of his conclusions regarding the drawdown become more readily apparent:

As the drawdown began not only did the withdrawal of efficiency associated with short-timers fever begin to
appear earlier in the combat cycle, but the whole elan of the American Forces was undercut by the knowledge that the Vietnam war was coming to some kind of inconclusive end. Indeed, the quite rational feeling of not wanting to be the last man killed in a long war which characterized the low morale of the American ground forces after 1969 can be regarded as a kind of short-timers fever writ large. 137/

The drawdown made it more difficult for many to discover and believe in a purpose. If the communist menace was so horrible, why were Americans withdrawing? For many, earlier inflated claims of progress may also have cast doubt on current pronouncements and on authority in general. Morale, not surprisingly, suffered.

In addition, many GIs resented the claims made by President Nixon, Secretary Laird, and others in 1972 that the American ground combat role was strictly defensive. "Defense, hell," said a Pfc. at Fire Support Base Melanie, "We'll be out of combat when we're 'back in the world' [the US] and rot before." 138/ For many, the feeling that no one at home knew or cared what was going on was particularly damaging to morale. 139/ General Westmoreland provides one of the letter summaries of the role of purpose to morale and discipline and the role of the drawdown in intensifying other problems:

It was only after the start of American withdrawal in 1969 that serious morale and disciplinary problems arose. That was to be expected. Men began to doubt the American purpose. Why die when the United States was pulling out? As the withdrawal continued, men were idle; idleness is the handmaiden of discontent, and some local commanders allowed standards of appearance and discipline to become slack. Although antiwar demonstrations in the United States appeared to have little effect on morale in Vietnam before my departure, they clearly had an effect as America's purpose came into question. Only with withdrawal did serious drug problems arise . . . . Fragging in one form or another has occurred in all wars but increases when a sense of unit purpose breaks down and esprit de corps fails and when explosives and weapons are loosely controlled. Anyone familiar with problems of morale and discipline among troops waiting for transportation home after
World Wars I and II could hardly have been surprised. 140/

A description and analysis of the connections and relationships between causes of the deterioration in morale and discipline could go on interminably. Hopefully, some of the more important have been detailed above. Weighing the variables, predicting their importance in the future, and keeping the whole situation in perspective is the truly difficult, if not impossible, task that remains. The words of Eugene Linden, who spent considerable time investigating some of the uglier and more depressing facets of American involvement in Vietnam, may help with the latter:

... for all the poignant confusion that assails the GI, I was struck with his honesty, his lack of cynicism, and although it may sound strange, his bravery. The GI may be demoralized, but he is no coward and though he may be unwilling to be the last GI to die in Vietnam, he will still risk his life for a friend. 141/

D. INSIGHTS

There is a great variety of evidence available to indicate the existence of morale and discipline problems among US forces in Vietnam, problems that varied significantly depending on location, position in the Armed Forces, specific duties, leadership, and time.

The most important factors adversely affecting morale and discipline—some old, some new with Vietnam—should not be particularly surprising to anyone with an elementary knowledge of human psychology. They include factors implicit in the nature of the Vietnamese situation (such as limited direct enemy contact and the psychological stress associated with the sporadic, unpredictable booby trap-type threat, limited indications of progress and even purpose, antipathy towards the South Vietnamese, idleness and boredom, increased contact with visible privilege and other inequities); flaws or side effects of various personnel policies; the hypocrisy and frustrations associated with careerism; problems originating in society; the perceived inadequacy of civilian support; the intensification
of problems brought about by the drawdown; and, connected with many of these, the gulf or cultural gap separating leaders from followers—usually enlisted men from officers—which made good leadership particularly difficult and poor leadership particularly disastrous.

E. LESSONS

There are no easy solutions or lessons. It would be nice to be able to say, "select only superhuman individuals to be officers so that leadership will be excellent and careerism will vanish," or, "fight only in 'nice' wars that are quickly winnable and receive mass support." As the grunts in Vietnam would say, we need to return to the 'real world.' Unfortunately, many of the factors mentioned in this chapter affected morale and discipline cannot be directly controlled by the military. With these, efforts have to be made, however, to make the best out of bad situations. In other cases, such as the adverse effects of careerism among the officer corps or of rotation policies, problems can be more appropriately handled 'in-house.' In these, however, the goals are unfortunately far clearer than the methods for achieving them.
CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES


7. On the rise in Servicemen's complaints to Congress: according to remarks before a House Armed Services Committee, such complaints "have increased steadily each year to a total of 250,000 in 1971." 92nd Congress, Hearings, June 2-8 and July 7, 1971.

Despite the concern in some quarters over the rise of servicemen's antiwar groups, their impact proved to be essentially insignificant. Moskos ("The Combat Soldier in Vietnam," pp. 35-6.) summarizes the nature and impact of the two major groups:

The American Servicemen's Union (ASU) and the Movement for a Democratic Military (MDM) were the two principal organizations which had discernible yet ultimately limited consequences on fostering subversion within the ranks. The polarities of the broader antiwar movement were capsulized in the structure and ideology of these two troop dissent organizations. The ASU was heavily doctrinaire and Trotskyist-inspired, was headed by cadre that premeditatedly joined the service to organize an antiwar constituency, enjoined its members to be straight in lifestyle, and focused on broad ideological issues (e.g., US imperialism, support for Third World liberation movements). The MDM, on the other hand, was composed of a membership which was radicalized after service
entry, had little organizational centralization, was deeply involved in counterculture life styles, and found its basis largely around repressive policies of local unit commanders. At their peak strength in 1969-1971, the ASU (largely army centered) and the MDM (mostly in the marines and navy) each probably had a membership of 5,000 to 10,000 servicemen.

Most likely, however, commentators in the future will look back upon the troop dissent movement of the Vietnam era as a notable failure in social movements. Much more due to its own internal contradictions than to any effective counteraction by the military command, the troop dissent movement failed to crystallize the inchoate resentments of many of the lower ranks into a mass anti-war force.

8. Fred Gardner described the GI revolt in Vietnam as "survival politics." Subtly, and without heroics, soldiers improvised means of shirking a despised mission and engaged in their own unofficial troop withdrawals. Seldom was the stage of formal mutiny reached—much easier were such less visible forms as "search and avoid" missions, with patrols intentionally skirting potential enemy clashes or halting a few yards beyond a defense perimeter for a 3-day pot party, or other acts of intentional inefficiency on the job." See David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military Today (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1975), pp. 28-9.


11. BDM interview with Colonel Zane Finkelstein on 25 May 1979 at The US Army War College.

12. Col. Tom Ware, "The US Soldier in Vietnam at the Beginning, the Middle and the Ending" (unpublished).


16. Richard Boyle, Flower of the Dragon, p. 44.

For Heinl, what is most outrageous is not so much resistance to fighting but the widespread casualness of that resistance ("It is no big thing to refuse to go") and the helplessness of the Army before it; not so much the widespread fragging but the enthusiasm behind that fragging ("Word of the deaths of officers will bring cheers at troop movies or in bivouacs in certain units"); not so much the antiwar demonstrations within the military, the fasts, and flaunting of peace symbols, as the "booing and cursing of officers and even of hapless entertainers such as Bob Hope"; not so much the fact that 10 to 15 percent of American troops in Vietnam were estimated to be using high-grade heroin but that an Air Force major who was command pilot for Ambassador Bunker was apprehended with eight million dollars' worth of heroin in his aircraft and that "an Air Force regular colonel was court-martialed and cashiered for leading his squadron in pot parties."


23. The History is perhaps overcautious on occasion. For example the History observes:

During the normal routine of inspections, teams inquired into certain specific areas of interest to COMUSMACV. With the furor in the news media about war crimes and atrocities it was only natural that one of the specific items of interest continue to be possible violations of the Geneva Conventions. Inquiry into this area was a continuing matter as a preventive measure to provide early notification to the command. During 1970, Inspectors General found no information which indicated there were any incidents that could be considered in contravention to the Geneva Conventions. It was considered a valid negative piece of information since the forty-four provinces covered the whole of Vietnam and advisors
and other key personnel should have been the first to know of any acts or incidents involving US or Vietnamese personnel.

This would seem to be a clear refutation from a source in a position to know, of claims regarding "war crimes and atrocities." However, Major Hays Parks, USMC, an expert on the laws of war notes:

Only Article 3, common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, anticipated the then-developing problem wars of a noninternational character fought by or against unconventional forces. The resultant problem may be illustrated by the incident at My Lai where U.S. Army Forces on 16 March 1968 assembled and executed several hundred unarmed, unresisting men, women, and children. Despite the heinousness of the offense there was no violation of the Geneva Conventions inasmuch as the victims were citizens of the host country and U.S. Forces were present as an ally rather than as an occupying power.

If even the worse assessment possible of the My Lai incident could not be construed as a contravention of the Geneva Accords, the IG finding in 1970 is certainly less significant that it at first seems. To avoid misleading information, some indication of the limitations of such measures as the Accords in the assessment of atrocities could valuably be included in such a statement. This extreme reticence regarding various 'problems' in Vietnam only serves to highlight the significance of the findings that the IG does bring out. See Major W. Hays Parks, "The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention of 1949," in Naval War College Review, Fall 1978, p. 18.


25. See chapter 3 for a discussion of corruption in the context of Leadership and Ethics.


28. The M.A.C.V. I.G. History cites other reasons as well for this increase:
   a. Personnel turbulence resulting from the rapid increase in troop strengths.
   b. More frequent visits to sites by MACV IG inspection teams throughout the Corps Tactical Zones.
c. Increased capability of the Complaints Branch to accept and resolve cases received.

d. A better understanding by military and civilian personnel of the assistance which the Complaints Branch could provide in the resolution of their complaints.

29. Again, the History cites reasons other than a deterioration in performance and morale:

While the United States had made the first step in withdrawing its combat units from Vietnam, it appeared that the Inspector General effort would not diminish as a result. As a greater degree of stability returned to the Republic and governmental control was expanded over once doubtful areas, many acts began to surface that had transpired during the build-up under the guise of the expediency of war. Allegations of corruption, inefficiency, waste and atrocities required immediate attention by the Command. Many of the investigations conducted were of events that had occurred two and three years prior to the time they were reported. The Inspector General, in performance of his mission, investigated the allegations and reported the facts and circumstances to COMUSMACV. As the situation further stabilized, there was a corresponding increase in such Inspector General activities.


31. Deterioration of Discipline:

(a) The punishment for minor violations of Article 86, USMJ is usually restriction, extra duty and monetary forfeitures. Restriction is practically meaningless in this environment and extra duty is normally not enforced to any great degree. It is relatively simple for dissidents to rapidly deteriorate these type punishments into meaningless trivia by making enforcement distasteful, time consuming, and frustrating for the command element.

(b) Monetary fines are normally of small consequence to members of dissident groups. Reductions in grade have little consequence when you deal within the structure of E-1 to E-4.

(c) Complaints registered by other members of the unit against dissidents are often not acted upon. This avoids a direct confrontation with the group and the complainants normally continue to function regardless of the outcome. It is easier to cajole or placate the complainant than to confront the dissident to insure that justice is done.
(d) The NCO's soon lose their enthusiasm when they find that military discipline is ineffective or the commander fails to administer discipline when it is recommended. It is then easier for the NCO to ignore the individual than to press the issues which occur at ever-increasing frequency. This removes the last vestige of leadership and supervision so the dissident is relatively free to do as he choses.

(e) Most avowed dissidents/militants have little if any of the type of personal pride that is appealed to by military leadership and discipline. The basic principle of military leadership is to gain the willing obedience of subordinates. A complete lack of pride or motivation therefore places the military system in an unfamiliar environment.

(f) The dissidents make full utilization of the fact that most humans tend to take the path of least resistance. This enhances the position of the dissident while completely deteriorating the system.

32. The Department of Defense recognizes two definitions of "deserter", one administrative, the other legal. An absentee is dropped from the rolls (DFR) as a deserter if he has been continuously absent without leave for more than 29 days or meets other specified criteria (e.g., escapes from confinement, seeks a political asylum in a foreign country, or has access to classified materials). To be legally defined as a deserter, an absentee must have been convicted of that crime by a court-martial. Since less than 1% of administratively defined deserters are convicted of desertion, the reader may assume that the term "deserter" in this chapter is referring to the administrative definition.


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34. Hobart G. Osborn et al., A Preliminary Investigation of Delinquency in the Army, HumRRO Technical Report No. 5 (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Office, 1954), p. 5 shows that the number of days of continuous absence required in the administrative definition of desertion was reduced from 90 to 30 days during the Korean conflict. They also showed that this shift had a demonstrable effect on rates of desertion. None of the authors listed above acknowledge that this shift took place or that it would affect the kinds of comparisons they are attempting to make between various American wars.


38. Bell and Bell, p. 434. They note that:

Previous studies had shown deserters to be different from other soldiers, even when they entered the Army. They tended to be less educated, younger, less intelligent, less often white, and more often volunteers. They deserted after relatively short tours of duty, had achieved only low rank, and had been in trouble both prior to and during service. Most desertions occurred from stateside units. This was so not only because most soldiers are stationed in the United States, but also because most training occurs here, and it is physically easier to leave from a stateside unit, especially while on leave, in transit, convalescing, and so on. This fact was discovered or rediscovered during the Civil War, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam war.

For more on desertion see,


The finding that the deserter tends to have a record of preservice delinquency is not a new finding. It was

The finding that the deserter is more likely to have also been in trouble in the service prior to deserting was only reported during the Vietnam conflict. This is reported in N. Kent Boyd and Harry H. Jones, *An Analysis of Factors Related to Desertion Among FY 1968 and FY 1969 Army Accessions; Glenn Littlepage and Larry Fox, Personnel Control Facilities: An Analysis of AWOL Offenders Awaiting Disposition; and Alfred B. Fitt, "Statement."

For comparison of desertion rates with those of other wars see,

Ella Lonn, *Desertion During the Civil War* (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1966).


Hobart G. Osborn et al., *A Preliminary Investigation of Delinquency in the Army.*


39. Baskir and Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance,* p. 120.

40. Ibid., p. 121.

42. Bell and Bell, "Desertion," p. 437. They continue that:

Personal or family problems have been motivations for desertion in this and previous conflicts going back to at least the Civil War. Antiwar reasons have never been prominent. Only 7% of the men interviewed by Hartnagel indicated that their desertions had something to do with the Vietnam conflict. The comparable figure (9%) for the Presidential Clemency Board was especially surprising, since the PCB encouraged men to give antiwar reasons.


45. Ibid.

46. Military Offenders

See Appendix, Chapter 7-1, Figure 2.

Statistics from the Department of Defense (Office of Manpower and Reserve Affairs), November 15, 1976. Statistics are available only for FY-1967-73, so FY 1965-66 data is extrapolated from 1967 data. Also, Marine Corps data for FY 1967-69 is extrapolated from the average rate for the rest of the period. The exact numbers are calculated as 1,522,000 and 563,000, rounded here to reflect their inaccuracy. The latter statistic bears no direct relation to the number of less-than-Honorable discharges, which, by coincidence, is also 563,000.

This includes 541,800 General, Undesirable, Bad Conduct, or Dishonorable Discharges given from July 1, 1964, through June 30, 1974. Discharges prior to July 1, 1974, are presumed to have been Vietnam-related, as they usually involved servicemen inducted or enlisted before the end of the war. It also includes 21,600 "Chapter 10" discharges given from July 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, since the overwhelming majority of those cases involved AWOL or some other Vietnam-related behavior.

This is, at best, a rough estimate based upon the Defense Department's belief that AWOL offenders accounted for about 83,000 of the 204,000 servicemen given Undesirable, Bad Conduct, or Dishonorable Discharges within the window period of the Ford clemency program.
This figure is also a rough estimate, based on information which the Defense Department gave the Presidential Clemency Board. That agency reported that approximately one-third of the 34,000 Bad Conduct and Dishonorable Discharges were for civilian-type crimes.

Extrapolations from the Presidential Clemency Board's survey of 1,009 military applicants, described in Appendix C of the Board's final report.

This data was supplied by the clerks of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps judiciaries. The data include only court martial convictions for this offense, and do not include Air Force cases (for which no data are available).

All of these are derivative, calculated by adding or subtracting other displayed statistics to or from the appropriate base statistics.

47. Military Punishments

See Appendix, Chapter 7-1, Figure 2.

This tally includes all General, Undesirable, Bad Conduct, and Dishonorable Discharges for the period July 1, 1964, through June 30, 1974. Discharges "for the good of the service" are also included through June 30, 1975. See selected Manpower Statistics, DOD-OASD (Comptroller), May 1975.

An unpublished Defense Department analysis of MARDAC data indicates that the ratio of General Discharges to Honorable Discharges with bad "spins" is about 10:7; this suggests that about 200,000 veterans fall in the latter category.

No sampling has ever been published, but Defense Department officials involved in the Ford clemency program reported that approximately one-third of all punitive discharges were for civilian-type crimes. Almost all of the rest were for absence offenses.

These are extrapolations based on the Clemency Board's survey of 1,009 military applicants, described in Appendix C of its final report.

All of these are derivative, calculated by adding or subtracting other displayed statistics to or from the appropriate base statistics.
48. David Co'right, Soldiers In Revolt, p. 18.


51. Richard Boyle, Flower of the Dragon, p. 75. Linden notes: (See endnote 56)

Indeed this type of fragging has occurred in Vietnam, and during 1967 and 1968 in the Mekong Delta region. "bounty hunting" enjoyed a brief vogue: A pooled amount of money would be paid to the soldier who killed a marked NCO or officer, p. 12.


53. Department of Defense Statistics, see endnote 44.

54. Savage and Gabriel, "Cohesion and Disintegration," p. 16.

55. In testimony before the same subcommittee as that addressed by General Kerwin. See Endnote 52, above.

56. Eugene Linden, "Fragging and Other Withdrawal Symptoms," in Saturday Review, January 8, 1972. Linden notes another significant difference:

In World War I, World War II, Korea, the typical fragging took place in the field and for the most part during skirmishes and firefights. An inexperienced or overly zealous lieutenant would be shot by his own men while the platoon or squad was preoccupied with the enemy. The victim would be listed as Killed In Action. The killing generally followed a cold reckoning by the men in the unit that the lieutenant was a danger to them. Albeit ruthless, this type of murder at least can be understood as the result of life or death assessment...

However, at present in Vietnam many fraggings take place in rear areas where the dangers are minimal and many murder attempts occur without any visible provocation or motive at all, p. 12.
57. As the previous figure illustrates, officially acknowledged fraggings dropped dramatically in 1972. See Figure 4-5. This drop was noted in a February 14, 1972 issue of News and World Report which commented:

"Fragging" - the use of fragmentation grenades to attack a fellow American - apparently is also going out of style. NCO's say that some recent arrivals in Vietnam have not even heard of the term. According to one sergeant, "The guys finally figured out the 'fragging' wasn't accomplishing anything."

59. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. In response to an inquiry from Savage and Gabriel the Army responded, "As to so-called combat refusals, data on incidents of this nature are not maintained by the Department of the Army." From a personal communiqué, dated 26 July, 1972.
64. Richard Boyle, Flower of the Dragon, p. 235.
66. Ibid., pp. 85-6.
70. See, for a more in depth view of the military justice system: Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, Law At War 1964-1973.
71. Data from which these figures were compiled can be obtained from the source in the previous endnote or more directly from the files of the US Army Judiciary.
72. See endnote 10 above. It notes, for example, that,

Prior to the massive troop buildup that began in 1965, the U.S. military force was relatively small and consisted largely of individually screened volunteers and
selected units with a high percentage of career officers and noncommissioned officers. Most American civilians in the country at that time were dedicated career government employees. A few court-martials were held in Vietnam; all serious Army cases were sent to Okinawa for trial, and the Navy and Air Force sent their serious cases to the Philippines. Serious crime in the small U.S. civilian community was virtually nonexistent. There was no drug problem, and black market dealings and currency manipulation were insignificant compared to the levels reached in later years. See chapter 7.

73. Averette was charged with conspiracy to commit larceny and attempted larceny of 36,000 U.S. government-owned batteries. Averette was tried by general court-martial, convicted, and ultimately sentenced to confinement at hard labor for one year and fined $500. On 30 April 1970, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, the highest court in the Military system, reversed Averette's conviction and ruled that the military had no jurisdiction over civilians in Vietnam because Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was applicable only in time of a declared war. Thus, the question of whether, as a matter of policy, the military should try civilians in Vietnam was made moot. As a matter of law, the services could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over civilians in Vietnam, and no further cases were tried.

The operations of the new administrative measures is detailed as well:

Administrative Measures

Because judicial actions was ineffective in curtailing the illegal activities of U.S. civilians in Vietnam, the MACV command came to rely increasingly on the administrative sanctions which had been proposed in 1966. Military privileges were withdrawn from offending civilians, particularly U.S. contractor employees, throughout 1966, 1967, and 1968, but it was not until 1969 and 1970 that the administrative "debarment" program reached its most uniform and widespread application. (Debarment was the term used to denote withdrawal of military privileges and a determination of unfitness for employment in Vietnam.)

In addition to MACV Memorandum 190-1, which assigned responsibilities for investigation and proceedings pertaining to debarment actions, the debarment policy was further formalized in September 1969 when Defense Procurement Circular 72 was made a part of all contracts for employment of civilians in Vietnam. This clause notified all civilian employees planning to work in Vietnam under U.S. government-sponsored contracts that they would lose their military privileges and be barred from employment in Vietnam. The employing contractor agreed that he would terminate the employment of an employee barred by MACV.
In January 1970 the U.S. Embassy announced that, as a matter of U.S. policy, contractor employees whose privileges were suspended or withdrawn for cause by MACV would be considered unacceptable for continued employment under U.S. government contracts. In February MACV determined that this policy would be applied retroactively; that is, individuals whose military privileges had been revoked in the past were also unacceptable for continued employment.

As of January 1968 there were seventy-five individuals on the MACV Provost Marshal's debarment roster. By February 1970 the number had grown to 613; by April 1971 there were 943 U.S. civilians and nationals of other countries from whom military privileges had been withdrawn and who were unacceptable for employment in Vietnam under U.S. financed contracts or as U.S. government direct hire employees on nonappropriated funds. Most debarment cases, perhaps over 90 percent, involved currency manipulation, smuggling, or postal and black market violations. There were also debarments for firearms violations, larceny of government property, and serious driving offenses. Once their employment was terminated and their access to U.S. military facilities was cut off, many debarred civilians left Vietnam. Others, however, remained in Vietnam working at jobs unrelated to the U.S. government and living on the Vietnam economy.

75. See endnote 23 above.
82. Minutes of USACHS-listed meeting of Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, p. 8.

4-58
86. Ibid.
87. Army War College, Study of Military Professionalism.
89. AWC, Study of Military Professionalism.
90. Sources too numerous even to list have noted the careerism problem and its ramifications. A few examples suffice. Nichols comments:

The Army was led primarily by career officers who knew the war was but one episode in a long professional career. This meant they not only had to do their part in the war as best they could, but they also had to keep an eye on the way the nature and quality of their wartime performance would affect their subsequent careers...

Because of their status and goals, many leaders became insensitive to ethical issues in order not to jeopardize their career progression. Even those who were more sensitive to these issues were often responsive to peer pressures that led them to go along and conform.


One Veteran pilot recalls:

And as far as the damage reports that were put out by the pilots, it was a kind of a standard joke... among the officers... this was just a place to advance your career. They tried to give everyone a command of some sort. They made sure everyone pretty well got a medal... In my unit... it was a Distinguished Flying Cross.


One of the most striking aspects of careerism is notable for its absence. As Kinnard observes:

A more serious charge concerns the failure of the higher leadership to speak out. Writing in 1973, two
young officers stated: "Very few in the officers corps 'stood up to be counted' - on the body count, base camp luxuries, or other legacies of peacetime which followed to Vietnam - legacies of the hypocrisy of 'looking good.'
Even more so, many tolerated the quibbling of a reporting system conditioned to tell the commander what he wanted to hear." A lieutenant general wrote on his questionnaire: "I don't think the military did itself proud in Vietnam - why didn't the military leaders at the top speak out?"


91. Gene Ferguson, a 25-year veteran with 2 years service in Vietnam observes:

The war itself is corrupting, and I don't mean this from any esoteric political viewpoint. I mean Air Force guys can make lots of loot, extra Vietnam pay, all untaxed. Flight crews fight each other for Vietnam duty. Guys make one over-flight a month from Laos, Thailand, or a carrier and get extra pay. Loadmasters, who are absolutely crucial, balk at going to Germany because there's more in it for them personally in Asia. For those men, the rot has already entered their souls.

For others, this kind of corruption changes them in another way. If a career enlisted man doesn't come back with a Commendation Medal, or if an officer doesn't get a Bronze Star, then something's wrong with them. They dole it out like candy. Nothing much is required. Commanders report victories because that goes on their 'Officer Effectiveness Reports,' on which promotions and appointments are based.


93. Linden explains the fine line such an officer must walk:

The infantry or rear-echelon office must be acutely sensitive to both the frustrations of his men and the demands of his superiors. He is expected to make sense
of the war when his predecessors and leaders, both military and civilian, have failed. Chances are he will fail as well, and then he is left with the task of surviving his tour without being court-martialed or fragged.


94. A similar syndrome can be observed in another hierarchical organization which deals with large numbers of people: the teaching profession.


98. The sarcastic references to and nicknames for the president, Secretary of Defense and top military leaders are one indicator of the disaffection.

99. Official reports of the battle at Ap Bac in 1963 provide an example, (See Kinnard, War Managers, p. 126):

   In January 1963 there occurred an action the aftermath of which destroyed good relations between the press and the military in South Vietnam—the battle at Ap Bac in the northern Delta between an armored element of the ARVN Seventh Division and a Vietcong unit. It was a disaster for the ARVN; yet American headquarters in Saigon referred to it as a victory. The American and British correspondents who were there knew otherwise.

   Many of the soldiers knew otherwise too. The minutes of the SSI meeting of 9 December 1977 provide another example (p. 2).

   At the national level, public information was false on several occasions which bothered the soldier. The denial of the American forces' presence in Thailand at a time when a major effort was based there is an example. Another was deceptive reports of battle actions, casualty counts and locations of American forces.

100. Various examples emerge in a memorandum for the Record from the DA, Office of the Secretary of the Army, dated 27 April 1971, Subject: Resume of Hearing. Two are cited below.
Ron Bartek, USMA 66, CPT, S2, 25th Infantry Division
"... LTG Fwell ordered body count quotas for battalions and said that this pressure caused officers to inflate them and dehumanize the troops."

"Mr. Michael O'Meara, CPT, S-3, 25th Infantry Division 1969 "... "body count mania" caused grossly inflated figures to be reported and caused commanders to needlessly seek contact with the enemy in order to achieve a body count."


The very best of our divisions, the 1st Air Cavalry, was blooded in the Ia Drang that autumn, and while the official number of dead was released at around 300, I never met anyone who had been there, including officers of the Cavalry, who would settle for less than three or even four times that figure.

Jerry Samuels of the 65th Engr. Bn. 25th Infantry Division (1969) recalls:

They don't differentiate between VC or civilians. When those body counts come in—like I say, I was radio operator and I had to call in body counts—those body counts come in and everybody who was killed in a village, civilian, or otherwise, is VC body count. Men, women, and children, the whole bit. If there's an airstrike on a village and it's wiped out, if three hundred people lived in the village, it's VC body count. If there's, say, a U.S. patrol out, a company patrol, and they make contact with two snipers and they end up blowing away the whole village, it's written up in the Stars and Stripes as an engagement between a three hundred-man VC outfit and an American company with maybe one U.S. wounded and three hundred "enemy" dead.


Senator Frank Church entered another example from an anonymous source into the Congressional Record:

They said my battalion (250 men) killed or captured 175 Viet Cong. However, I have seen only two bodies and about eight prisoners in all of our actions. Even accounting for the ones dragged away after they're dead
by the Viet Cong, I think we killed only 20. However, we lost 50 of our men killed and 35 wounded and 16 captured. I personally saw and helped carry out about 25 of our own dead—but they report we lost about 12. But these false paper reports satisfy Washington. The emphasis is not on what we are accomplishing and what actual progress is being made. Rather if you put down on paper that progress is being made it is sufficient. They are living in a dream world, but I'm afraid they are fooling only themselves—and the American public: both will suffer in the long run.

Finally, the role of the body counts in the My Lai incident as described in Robert J. Lifton, Home From the War (New York: Touchstone Books, 1973) pp. 60-61, deserves consideration, and is therefore quoted at some length:

And there is a way of measuring: one counts, scores points complete with one's fellow soldiers, or collectively with another unit, for the highest score. One kills "for the record." Indeed, there is now considerable evidence confirming earlier suspicions that My Lai was largely a product of the numerical (body count) ambitions of high-level officers. That "record" could determine their promotions and profoundly affect their future careers. For instance, Colonel Oran K. Henderson, a non-West Pointer who had previously suffered a number of frustrations in his efforts to become a general, "followed the usual commander's practice of emphasizing body counts;" as did the Task Force Commander, Colonel Frank A. Barker, an unusually aggressive and ambitious officer, whose units were known for their high body counts and their capacity to "gun down a lot of people." 41/ The hunger for a high body count on the part of these two officers, and of course on the part of their superiors as well, was passed along to Medina at the earlier briefing, and so on down the line—everyone, from President of the United States on down to the lowliest GI caught up in this malignant mix of pressure and need.

There was a troublesome disparity between body count and the number of captured enemy weapons, a disparity which, if honestly evaluated, would have made it clear that bodies counted were mainly those of civilians. Instead, Colonel Henderson, during his briefing, attributed the disparity to GIs having been insufficiently aggressive in the past in "closing with the enemy," thereby permitting women and children in the area to pick up the weapons before the GIs "arrived to where they had killed.
Again illusion is more compelling than actuality. In different men and in different degrees, the illusion is sustained by genuine self-deception, conscious lying, or, probably most common, a kind of "middle knowledge" within which one both knows the truth about body counts (the reason for the disparity between bodies and weapons) and does not know—resists knowing—that truth. But the image—of women and children picking up the weapons of dead VC also contains still another informal message that killing women and children was, therefore, "okay." The body count illusion thus carries its logic full circle—the falsification of the evidence that civilians were being killed leading in turn to a further reason—and motivation—for killing still more civilians. All this happens because so much rides on the body count: the conquest of death anxiety, one's sense of skill, worth, and manhood—and for man, one's future as a professional soldier and long-range claim to the immortalizing status of warrior-hero.

The official body count that day for Task Force Barker (of which Charlie Company was a part, operating in and around My Lai, was "128 Vietcong." Nobody seemed certain just how that number was arrived at, but a discussion Calley recalled, in his testimony at his trial, between himself and Medina gives us something of a clue:

Calley: He asked me about how many—basically what my body count—how many people we had killed that day. And I told him I had no idea and for him to just go on and come up with an estimate, sir. . .

Daniel (prosecuting attorney): Just any body count? Just any body count, is that what you are saying?

Calley: Basically, yes sir.

101. As noted above, one veteran air force pilot recalls, "They made sure everyone pretty well got a medal. . . . In my unit. . . . it was a Distinguished Flying Cross." VVAW, Winter Soldier, p. 348.

The SSI report quotes one chaplain as saying "The Army passed out favor to shore up morale." This, they continue, meant that the awards lost meaning. This in turn, hurt both morale and discipline. (p. 7). Linden observes, "We will do something abhorrent and then characterize it as an act of valor and the soldier who received a medal for his act will later throw it away as worthless: There are no anchors or fixed points by which the soldier can judge his behavior and measure degrees of rightdoing or wrongdoing; consequently, standards become meaningless." "Fragging," Saturday Review, p. 55.
102. See, for example, Linden, p. 16

103. Corruption and its effects on leadership and hence on morale are dealt with in Chapter 3.

104. Mitzgang, in The New Republic, cites the cushy house arrest given to William Calley as one of the acts setting the tone of leniency and coverup which translated itself into hypocrisy for many enlisted men.

Widespread hypocrisy is implied in a letter of 2 January 1976 from Col. Richard A. McMahon, GS, Chief, Intelligence Division to Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft reporting an intelligence report of 5 July 1974 realistically citing the poor condition of ARVN. He writes: "My reason for wishing to bring this report to the attention of your committee is my conviction that many such reports have been suppressed in the past because they did not reflect the picture the country team (military or civilian) wished to present to Washington."


One exile told how his experience at a California missile base made him less reluctant to desert to avoid Vietnam:

We had a red alert, which meant war to us--there was an attack coming. After we found out the control center made a mistake, and that it was only a practice alert, we discovered that some warrant officers and noncommissioned officers and a couple of other people in prominent positions on the base had gotten into their cars and just flat left--which as far as I was concerned was desertion in the face of the enemy, since we believed we were going to be attacked. When it was realized that "x" number of personnel had fled, we were told not to say anything to anyone, or else they would "get our asses."

106. For a few of the points see Chapter 7-1.

107. In his book Gavin relates: "Morale is helped by the fact that ground combat troops are returned to the US after a specific number of days in Vietnam. Unlike their predecessors in World War II, they know they will not have to stay in combat until they are killed or wounded--or until the war is brought to an end. I have watched officers and non-coms leading the troops in the field and they are highly professional."

108. See Chapter 7-1.

109. The report states:

The twelve month tour as a policy was generally well received by soldiers. Most soldiers maintained short timer charts of various designs
and the count down of a tour was a positive factor for morale. A
spin-off problem, however, came from some organizations which rotated
some of their personnel from hot mission units to other units less
intensely involved. Here inconsistencies developed which in some
cases became morale problems.


111. Major W. Hayes Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," Marine Corps Gazette,
September 1976, p. 33. Parks cites another example:

In the 11th Brigade of the Americal Division, parent unit
of C/1/20, predeployment inspections revealed that over
1,300 men were nondeployable. The problem of their
replacement was magnified by acceleration in October
of the Brigade's deployment from the end of January
1968 to the first of December 1967. Many filler per-
sonnel were added to the Brigade to meet these personnel
shortfalls. Replacements continued to arrive up until
the date of deployment, requiring numerous adjustments
in the training program. Authorities investigating the
My Lai massacre concluded that these factors resulted in
considerable confusion within the unit. The significant
turmoil in the Brigade's personnel status was detrimental
not only to predeployment preparation but ultimately to
its combat capability and performance.

112. Ibid., p. 34.

113. The Peers Commission noted this phenomenon in its examination of the
Americal division:

In the G-3 office of the Americal Division, for example, among the field grade officers there was only one major
who was a graduate of Command and General Staff College.
Of the majors, all but two had been passed over for pro-
motion to lieutenant colonel. In summing up the Americal
Division's personnel story, the Peers Committee concluded
that the Division was "a hastily thrown together con-
glomerate of independent infantry units... far from an
elite unit."

114. Ibid., p. 34


116. Interview with General Donald V. Bennett, US Army Military History
Research Collection, Senior Officers Debriefing Program.

4-66
117. Minutes of USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting, p. 3.

118. As Nichols relates:

As the war went on, the obvious inequality of devotion to, and sacrifice for, the ill-defined goals of the war produced divisiveness in the military and in the civilian community. Those who did not sacrifice showed a mixture of guilt, indifference, and contempt toward those who did. Those who did sacrifice became angry and bitter when their sacrifices were not recognized and rewarded.


119. How many of even the best officers, for example, can deal with heroin use in a mutinous unit of individuals from different backgrounds, torn by racial dissention and still maintain an effective fighting force?

120. Nichols observes:

As the war continued, more and more enlisted personnel came from lower social classes, or minority groups, or both. The more talented and better educated avoided the draft by use of college deferments and/or enlistment in the guard and reserve. This led to a situation when there was a major gap between the goals, capabilities and motivations of those who led and those who were led. "Characteristics of the U.S. Soldier," p. 1.

121. Eugene Linden, "Fragging."

122. Savage and Gabriel note one such inequity:

Another probable factor was the excessive burden of battle placed upon draftees. Favoring of Regular Army volunteers by insulating the latter from a just share of combat further distanced the draftee from the regular establishment; hence the increasing hostility between draftee and "Lifer." The chart below illustrates the division of casualties between Volunteer "Lifer" and draftee in Vietnam. The data show that both absolutely and proportionately Army draftees in Vietnam became casualties in greater numbers than Volunteers. One of the reasons contributing to this condition was the institutional arrangement created by the Army. Volunteers usually received far more consideration in a choice of schooling, almost inevitably non-combat, p. 37.
Distribution of Casualties Between RA Volunteer and Draftee in Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Draftee % of Army in VN</th>
<th>Draftee % of Casualties</th>
<th>Volunteer % of Army in VN</th>
<th>Volunteer % of Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage Rate of Incr. or decr. 1968-1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draftee</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>+3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Congressional Record, August 21, 1970, pp. 29700-29704

123. As noted in Chapter VII-1 these manpower programs were not on the whole to be blamed on the military. Parks comments:

In the midst of the war the military--through Project 100,000--became a uniformed Job Corps. In striving to develop a professional military force to fight a complex war, the idea worked much like that of tossing water on a drowning man.

"Crimes in Hostilities," p. 35.

124. Major Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," p. 19 Nichols agrees: "Training and indoctrination were insufficient to prepare soldiers of all ranks for the type of unconventional warfare they would have to fight." "Characteristics of the U. S. Soldier," p. 13

125. For example, "On March 1, 1969, a Marine ambush patrol came upon four Vietnamese youths, one male, three females, ranging from ten to twenty years in age. Suspecting the youths had alerted area Viet Cong of their ambush position, the Marines killed the four, placed their bodies in an abandoned bunker, and collapsed the bunker with explosives. Tried by general court-martial, both the Marines and their commanding officers testified of the relentless patrol requirements forced upon them by personnel shortages. This argument was heard in every case of misconduct tried in Vietnam."

Parks, pp. 34-5.

126. Ibid. Note: The Army suffered from similar self-inflicted problems.
127. USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting, Minutes, p. 7. See Volume VI, Book 2, Chapter 10, "Logistics and Bases."

128. For example the USACHCS-SSI minutes note at least two other personnel policy issues affecting morale and discipline: what to do with the short-time veteran, and the boredom resulting from underutilized personnel. On the former they observe:

Another severe morale-discipline problem involved returned short timers who had a year or less to serve in the Army. Their poor morale and lack of discipline was tolerated by an Army which appreciated their efforts in Vietnam. The result, however, was a contamination which spread through units and installations and ruined morale and discipline there as well, p. 7. And on the latter:

Problems began quickly when a soldier or a unit had to perform missions which did not utilize these skills. Morale and combat effectiveness increased when units went into combat but long periods of low activity or idleness eroded morale and discipline. p. 9.

129. See USACHCS-hosted SII meeting, Minutes, pp. 3-4.


131. The frustrations and resentments are well-captured in a letter written by Major Theodore J. Shorack, Jr., USAF, on May 1, 1966.

... I've got to get to bed now--have to get up at 0330 in the morning for dawn takeoff to go play dirty tricks on those nasty little bastards we are at odds with. Sure wish Uncle Lyndon and Black Hearted Bob would allow this game to be played by reasonable ground rules instead of making our people operate with one hand tied behind their backs, serving as pigeons to the bad guys' gunnery practice, with guns that should never have been allowed into the area (cut 'em off at Haiphong). And those Polish trucks which Time magazine says provide transportation down "the trail" sure didn't come 9,000 miles overland. Our stupid bastards allow all this stuff in and we have to fight it under circumstances which are most difficult. Why not sink the ship bringing in a whole boatload of this stuff as it approaches Haiphong Harbor, rather than knock them o' piecemeal-if you can find them-in the jungle? Doesn't make the slightest bit of sense. Costs more than you think.

In Letters from Vietnam, p. 152.
However, most of my disillusionment comes from the sorry deleted attitude of the Vietnamese people. Especially the educated leaders of this country are so rotten, dirty, no-good thieves. They are Communist-haters but all have fat bank accounts in foreign banks.

From John Durant, USMC, in Vietnam 1967-1968. Within a month, however, I was very aware of peasants and city people, filth and poverty. It was all very superficial, of course, but it was firsthand. Those kids, raised during years of killing, they'd sell their mothers and sisters for a gang rape for enough piasters. Very soon I got the message: I would rather be dead than be a Vietnamese... I wonder why I must fight and risk death when many young Vietnamese men do not. There is no penalty for draft dodging and if a man deserts and is found by the authorities he is only scolded and returned to the Army even if it has been years. They are not so much as fined. However, we are aware of the penalty for desertion in our own Army in time of war--death.

Some observed that Southerners tended to have a special bitterness towards Vietnamese:

We are going off to get laid one time, me and this fellow from Georgia, a graduate of Georgia Tech. He really had the 'gook syndrome.' He always said they were 'lower than niggers and wops.' That syndrome is very real in Vietnam. The Americans don't want to be there, and don't know why in hell they are there. The result is, the Vietnamese become their only visible enemy, and according to the syndrome, all Vietnamese are equally bad. I've seen men bat around people, hit them on the head with rifles, act like gods, do anything they want with human beings. You looked around and all the Vietnamese you saw were whores, black marketeers, VC, ARVN not worth a damn, dirty old men and women.

See also, US News and World Report, 14 February, 1972, Richard Boyle, Flower of the Dragon, p. 44, USMACV IG History, p. 18. Major Parks has summarized this antipathy as "The mere Gook rule," observing that such an attitude affects the incidence of war crimes:

From the Vietnam conflict emerged the so-called "mere gook" rule, an alleged mentality among the military that suggested a permissive attitude regarding the killing of Vietnamese—regardless of age, sex, or combatant status—because "after all, they're only 'gooks,'" a derogatory nickname for Orientals which was carried over from the Korean War.


136. The decline in morale seems to have slowed and reversed itself in the very latest stages of the American involvement. US News and World Report observed in 1972:

For all their complaints, the soldier, sailor or airman gets the job done. Officers insist, in fact, that morale today is better than it was 12 months ago, even though problems of drugs and racial tensions still exist—on a reduced scale.


138. US News and World Report, 14 February, 1972. It continues:

Pfc. Harry R. Neudorffer, of Santa Ana, California, sums up the attitude of most J. S. infantrymen:

"A lot of guys can't help but resent being here. They feel that if the war—or combat—is over, why do they have to be here at all? Why can't they all go home?"

139. Again, a few examples suffice. As early as 1965 the feeling was apparent:

Outside of everyone's immediate family and circle of good friends, who cares? No one except the defense contractors and other profiteers, I dare say. I don't know how Johnson hopes to get out of this one, but you can bet I'm not gonna help him out of the next one!

SP5 William M. Keville, 27th Maintenance Bn. 1st Cavalry Division, September 20, 1965.
John Durant, USMC, wondered (during his 1967-1968 tour):

"Does anyone in Saigon or Washington care? We're picking up sacks of dead every day, I've been here seven months and never met a guy who knew what it was all about."

from, Polner, No Victory Parades. And from the USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting Minutes, (p. 2):

Another problem was what the soldier perceived as a lack of governmental support. When dissent began to impact politically in the late 1960's, statements and speeches opposing the effort isolated the Army as the advocate/proponent for the conflict. For many soldiers, particularly the draftee, this meant a lack of support and eroded the already low supply of rationale for his/her involvement. Anger, disappointment and frustration resulted for the soldier. The supporters appeared to be career soldiers and the "lifer" term took on a new intensity and ugliness. The nation never focused on the conflict as a primary concern. Newspapers and public attention did not spotlight the effort and soldiers resented this. The feeling was that no one really cared that they were risking life and limb in what they perceived as a duty to their country.

140. General William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 296. The same theme emerges in a message from CG USARV LBN RVN to Army Commands in July 1971:

"... discipline within the command as a whole has eroded to a serious but not critical degree commencing with the peak of the Vietnam build-up in mid-1969. A significant contributor to the difficulties in point is "winding down" of the war. Undoubtedly, a good many officers and men view this development as nullifying justification for their having been sent to Vietnam; for others it has produced a "why should I be the last man to be killed in Vietnam" syndrome. Needless to say, these factors work in one way or another to the detriment of morale, performance and discipline... Possibly the most serious contributor to erosion of discipline is weakness in the chain of command, particularly at lower unit levels... within the chain of command it is well known that communication has broken down... Personnel turbulence... takes its place as an important contributor to disciplinary concerns..."

CHAPTER 5
RACE RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

The United States military was legally desegregated in 1948 by Executive Order of President Truman. Through the 1950's and early 1960's, the military was a front-runner in achieving social integration and equal opportunity. Examples of personal or institutional racism remained, however. In the late 1960s, concurrent with the rising social awareness given official expression in the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1966, racial unrest rippled through the military and civilian communities.

This chapter will examine institutional racism within the United States Army, black-white relations, the Army's response to the race problem, and the relations between the Army and the Vietnamese people.

B. INSTITUTIONAL RACISM

Institutional racism is maintained by law, regulation, or tradition. Institutional racism may be intentional or unintentional. The legal segregation of the Army prior to 1948 was intentional institutional racism, just as the legal prohibition against women in combat is intentional sexism. A regulation that requires a GCT score of 100 for eligibility for promotion is unintentional institutional racism. It overlooks the fact that the lower socio-economic classes where minorities tend to be heavily represented, are less likely to attend or graduate from quality high schools, and that a good quality education tends to produce a better GCT score. The purpose of the regulation relating general comprehension to promotion was to assure that only reasonably intelligent soldiers would achieve promotion. The unintentional racist effect precluded many minorities from promotion eligibility, even though they met other promotion criteria. Clearly, institutional racism is a subtle, yet real problem to be grappled with.
The Army was justifiably proud of its race relations record. Unfortunately, it failed to assess the unintentionally racist effects of certain of its policies. These effects helped provoke the racial unrest that flared throughout the military beginning in the late 1960s. A number of studies were conducted to assess these effects of racism.

1. **NAACP Study**

   In 1971, the NAACP commissioned a study of racial problems in the Seventh Army in Germany. Most of the findings of this study were substantiated by the Congressional Black Caucus and the DoD Report of the Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice. Most of these findings specifically address only the black soldier.

   a. **Job Assignment**

      Blacks were more likely than whites to be assigned to low-skilled specialties. This included infantry duty. In 1971, blacks comprised about 12 percent of the US population. They comprised 16.3 percent of the combat soldiers and 19.6 percent of the service and supply positions. Conversely, only 4.9 percent of electronic specialists were black. Some infantry units in Vietnam were 50 percent black.

   b. **Promotions**

      Black soldiers were promoted less frequently than white soldiers. Even when black soldiers achieved the same eligibility criteria as white soldiers, they were less likely to be promoted; in 1971, 30 percent of black soldiers who met the promotion criteria were at pay grade E-3 or lower, while only 14 percent of white soldiers eligible had those grades. Conversely, 27 percent of the white soldiers in this group were E-5 or above, while only 20 percent of the black soldiers held those grades.

   c. **Cultural Expression**

      The dap is a cultural greeting symbol that originated within the black civilian community. It consists of a series of hand, wrist, and arm slappings and finger snappings. It can take over one minute to complete. Because dapping frequently occurred in dining facilities or PX lines, thus tending to disrupt entrance to those facilities, the Army attempted to prohibit dapping. By ignoring the cultural symbolism inherent
in dapping, by not prohibiting forms of greeting common to other social
groups, such as the handshake or salute, the Army's action was viewed as
blatantly racist by black soldiers.

Many blacks have adopted the Islamic religion and not the
unofficial American religion of Christianity. Freedom to practice the
Muslim religion was at times denied to its members.2/

Black soldiers were denied the freedom of cultural expres-
sion in other ways. Black power rings, slave bracelets, black liberation
flags and carved black fists were generally forbidden by commanders on the
grounds that these symbols could be offensive to white soldiers. However,
white symbols that were definitely offensive to blacks, such as the rebel
flag, were seldom prohibited until they caused a racial incident.

These regulations were implemented to reduce tensions and
prevent polarization. The effect of the suppression of black cultural
symbolism, however, was to force black soldiers to abide by white cultural
standards.

d. Other Minorities

The institutional effects encountered by black soldiers also
extended to other minorities. Most of the problems they encountered were
related to the use of the English language. Because military entrance
examinations and training programs are administered exclusively in English,
many Spanish-speaking servicemen are automatically considered dull and
consigned to the least desirable occupations. This results in the same
kind of promotion and job-assignment prejudices encountered by blacks. The
DoD Task Force also noted that some commanders actually forbid the use of
any language other than English. A direct attack on the heritage and
culture of Spanish-Americans, such regulations are, in the words of the
Task Force, "an expression of intentional discrimination that should not be
tolerated."3/

2. Cock County Study

Curry and Badillo conducted a comprehensive survey of the casual-
ties incurred in the Vietnam Conflict by the 101 communities of Cook
County, Illinois (this study is reported in more detail in Chapter 1,
"Socio-Economic Background," they found that two socio-economic indicators influenced the incidence of Vietnam casualties suffered by these communities. These indicators were personal education level and family income level.

A study conducted by the University of Notre Dame had indicated that high school dropouts were twice as likely to serve in the military as were college graduates. This study also indicated that lower class individuals were also more likely to serve than middle or upper class Americans. (See Figure 5-1).4/

The Cook County study substantiated these findings. Curry and Badillo found that an inverse relationship existed between education level and casualties and income level and casualties. (See Figure 5-2 and 5-3).5/

Curry and Badillo found no correlation between incidence of casualties and the racial composition of the Cook County communities. (See Figure 5-4).6/ Black casualties exceeded the black percentage of American society until the Army actively intervened to constrain this trend. (See Figure 5-5).7/ Curry and Badillo concluded that these excess casualties were not based on an intentional discrimination against black Americans. Rather, blacks tended to have less education and come from poorer families than whites. Selective Service Regulations and military assignment policies tended to select individuals with these characteristics to serve as combat soldiers in Vietnam. According to Curry and Badillo, it was social class, not race, that determined Vietnam service. Since minorities were over-represented among the lower social classes, unintentional institutional racism was produced.

3. 1968 Civil Rights Group

As a result of rising racial tension in the civilian community and within the military, the Department of Defense organized a Civil Rights Group in 1968. This group traveled worldwide in an attempt to discover the racial atmosphere and perceptions within the military.

A letter from the Department of the Army indicates some of the group's findings:
### A. By Education Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military Service</th>
<th>Vietnam Service</th>
<th>Combat Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-School Dropout</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-School Graduates</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduates</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. By Family Income Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military Service</th>
<th>Vietnam Service</th>
<th>Combat Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Income</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-1. Probability of Military Service
Figure 5-2. Casualty Incidence and Personal Education Level
Figure 5-3. Casualty Incidence and Family Income
Figure 5-4. Casualty Incidence and Race
Figure 5-5. Black Casualties in Vietnam
I see by the inclosed message that you are going to have a visit from the DOD Civil Rights Group. A few months ago this group made a similar trip to Europe, and out of it has grown a considerable amount of correspondence concerning racial discrimination or the lack of it in the administration of Article 15.... One of the things we emphasized, was that we do not maintain records with racial indicators in the military justice system.... What did develop in Europe as a result of interviews with minority group complaints was an allegation that more severe punishments are administered under Article 15 to members of minority groups than to non-minority representatives.8/

4. The Military Justice System

These allegations touched off a debate over the military justice system. Some felt, as the Civil Rights Group did, that the military justice system was not color blind.

But many in the Army did not believe there were any significant race problems in the administration of justice in Vietnam.

All narrative evaluations of the administration of military justice reveal that there is no discernible pattern of racial discrimination in cases involving the same type of offense, but of different races.... In cases where Staff Judge Advocates have reviewed Article 15 appeals founded upon allegations of racial discrimination, such allegations have been referred to the appropriate Inspector General for investigation. There have been no instances....where the Inspector General has determined that such allegations were justified.9/

The Inspector General's Office made a detailed study of "Alleged Racial Incidents" and issued its results in a series of documents, including "Racial Relations, Vietnam--1971," 10/ "Lessons Learned: Racially Oriented Incidents," 11/ and "Results of MACIG Field Inquiry into Alleged Racial Incidents."12/" The tenor of these documents is the same: as the latter puts it:
THE BDM CORPORATION

[the] field inquiry shows that designating every incident involved blacks and whites as "racial" was misleading in that in many of the incidents between blacks and whites "race" was in fact not a factor . . . . there was no evidence of inequity . . . . MAGIC's conclusion: the allegations with respect to racial tension and military justice were not substantiated . . . . it appears that only 33 out of 5,200 incidents were traced to "race" as the significant factor.13/

Whether or not there was discrimination, blacks were treated differently in the administration of military justice. On the average, black soldiers stayed in pre-trial confinement five days longer than white soldiers. In 1971, 50 percent of the soldiers held in pre-trial confinement in Europe were black. Of the courts-martial administered in 1972, 34 percent were given to black soldiers. Punitive discharges as a result of courts-martial were awarded to 23 percent of the black defendants and only 17 percent of the white. When awarded confinement at hard labor, blacks served an average of 2.9 years while whites served only 1.9 years. In 1971, blacks received 45 percent of the less-than-honorable discharges granted in Europe.14/ A study by the Personnel Research Division of the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory confirms that minorities received different treatment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice as of 1973.

Members of racial or ethnic minority groups were more likely to have received a disciplinary action than Caucasians. Among the minority groups, the American Indians seemed to have the highest disciplinary rates. Negroes tended to have the second highest in the non-punitive and nonjudicial areas, while Asian Americans had the lowest rates in all three categories. These statistics, however, may be misleading since the Military Justice Task Force Follow-on Studies found that whites are more likely than blacks to opt for administrative discharge in lieu of court-martial.15/
A USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting in December 1977 concluded that racism was a problem and was at least partially responsible for these differences. They concluded:

Once drafted, the minorities and lower socio-economic group soldiers bore the brunt of the hard combat roles, received less decorations and promotions and received more severe judicial punishments than did their more affluent companions. Racism never received enough command attention until it erupted into violence which it did with alarming frequency and horrible results.16/

C. BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS

Black-white relations remained relatively cordial throughout the Vietnam era. Most white soldiers were not blatant racists. They may have had racist attitudes, but they seldom expressed those attitudes overtly. Most black soldiers were not militant black power advocates. The well publicized incidents that did occur involved a very small minority of all service members.

There was little racial friction among combat soldiers. Even though the primary group had disintegrated, a soldier's life still depended largely on the actions of fellow soldiers. Just as combat troops strongly discouraged drug use among their fellows, amicable race relations could also be a matter of life or death.

The situation was somewhat different where life was not at stake. Among non-combat troops in Vietnam and soldiers throughout the rest of the world, polarization occurred. Blacks tended to associate with blacks and whites tended to associate with whites. This was largely a function of the rising social awareness of the black soldiers in the 1960s.17/ Blacks were beginning to develop a culture that was distinct from that of white, middle-class America. Naturally, the blacks preferred to form groups with individuals who shared similar cultural norms. White soldiers seldom understood this new black culture, felt alienated, and formed groups themselves. The perceptions of institutional discrimination contributed to the polarization.
Polarization per se did not create racial tension but it contributed to a tension-prone situation. Two or more mutually ambivalent groups formed. Each group had limited social contact with the others. Racial tensions could develop among these groups under certain circumstances including instances in which:

1. Institutional racism became blatant;
2. Personally racist behavior was exhibited by a person in power. This could be legitimate power, such as that of the company commander, or the personal power possessed by the social group leader; and
3. Black power militant agitation occurred.

Generally, racial tension developed only when at least two of these circumstances combined. When two factors were present, actions taken to correct one situation contributed to strengthen the other. A see-saw effect would develop until an incident occurred. The various General Reports confirm that some areas experienced the most racial tension. The field inquiry observed:

Further research determined that 92 or 81% of the Serious Incident Reports addressing blacks and whites are concentrated in built-up military complex areas/urban areas--Phu Bai, Da Nang, Chu Lai, Tuy Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, Long Binh, Siagon and Can Tho. Thirty-four of the 44 incidents involving groups of ten or more blacks and whites are located in five areas--Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay, Tuy Hoa, Chu Lai and Da Nang.

It should not be surprising then, that after 1969 with the lessening of the American combat role and the build up of the American support posture that racial tensions became more evident. Other factors which aggravated the morale and discipline problems also fueled racial antagonisms and vice versa. Sources vary in their assessment of the severity of the problem; it would seem fair to conclude that in some areas the situation was indeed severe, while in others it surfaced only as a minor irritant if at all. As with so many problems in the military, good leadership played a key role in minimizing the race problem.
D. BLACK-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS

Service in Vietnam presented most Australian soldiers with the first contact they had experienced with blacks of any nationality. Relations between the two groups were not good. The Australians, who had not experienced the black culture and could not relate to black sensitivity, approached the blacks in what the blacks perceived as a patronizing fashion. This reinforced the black belief in Australian racism. The blacks countered by rebuffing the Australian overtures of friendship, which alienated the Australians.

The two groups polarized very quickly. The blacks considered the Australians to be racist. The Australians viewed the blacks (and sometimes other Americans) as non-professional soldiers who did not deserve their respect as soldiers.

E. THE ARMY AND VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

Race relations between the Vietnamese people and American service members were often troubled and tense. Some soldiers felt that all Vietnamese were the enemy. There were extensive cultural differences that were never overcome.

To the US soldier, the Vietnamese did not seem to hold up their fair share of the conflict.

It makes me very angry to see my friends killed and wounded here and put my own life on the line daily when you see the Vietnamese themselves are not trying and don't give a damn for your efforts and sacrifices. I see Vietnamese guys and their wives laughing and having a good time together. I see many young men not in the Vietnamese military. And I ask myself why I must be on the other side of the world from my wife, and I wonder why I must fight and risk death when many young Vietnamese men do not.

The soldiers also resented the Vietnamese with whom they were most likely to come in contact.
The people are all right for awhile until they get to know you and then they'll try to take advantage of the friendship and make a sucker out of you. You're good for a free handout, high prices on anything you want to buy, and someone to blame for any misfortune that may happen to befall them. This is a majority of the people here, as the ordinary GI doesn't have anyone to deal with except the lower class of illiterates, bar girls, farmers, souvenir salesmen, and all the other assorted persons who make their money from the troops who may be in the country at the moment. There are some of them who are third and fourth generation sons and daughters of families who did the same to the French, Japanese, and the Chinese before that. The GI has only one year if he lives through it to beat them. I had one woman who tried to charge me twice the price she asked of the Vietnamese soldiers and when I became angry she explained that I was an American and had more money. She knew it wasn't a fair price but she thought that I would pay up and forget it.24/

Eventually, the American servicemen began taking their frustrations out on the Vietnamese people.

The Americans don't want to be there, and don't know why in hell they are there. The result is, the Vietnamese become their only visible enemy, and according to the syndrome, all Vietnamese are equally bad. I've seen men bat around people, hit them on the head with rifles, act like gods, do anything they want with human beings. You looked around and all the Vietnamese you saw were whores, black marketers, VC, ARVN's not worth a damn, dirty old men and women.25/

This syndrome was a significant contributory factor to incidents like My Lai.

Some of what the Americans objected to was culturally acceptable to the Vietnamese people. After a thousand years of foreign domination, some Vietnamese males seemed to question their own adequacy. Placed in competition with the Americans, they had found that to a large degree

...the Caucasian is basically stupid when it comes to dealing with people. Success through cunning and intrigue, whether in petty financial dealings or major
subversion, has provided an important method for the Vietnamese to regain his faith in his own capability. The ability to outwit the foreigner, whether practiced by a taxi driver or a member of the government, permits the Vietnamese to believe that he is, despite all else, intellectually superior and this has increasingly taken root as a way for the Vietnamese male to maintain his self-respect.26/

F. ARMY ACTIONS TO IMPROVE RACE RELATIONS

The Army became increasingly aware of the racial unrest occurring in the military. It also became increasingly sensitive to civilian and congressional charges that minorities, particularly black Americans, suffered casualty rates in Vietnam out of proportion to their numbers. The Army instituted a variety of measures to alleviate these situations. Some of these actions had a truly positive effect upon race relations. Other actions, while preventing immediate racial flare-ups, increased the underlying racial tensions.

1. Positive Actions

Since 1948, the Army had officially adopted the philosophy of "color-blindness." There was to be no such thing as a white soldier, black soldier or brown soldier. There were only "O.D. Green" soldiers. In the late 1960s, the Army began to realize that there were, in fact, differences between these soldiers. One of the first actions was to identify the magnitude of the differences.

The Army began preparing statistical data on race in the late 1960s. By 1972, the mechanism was universal throughout the Army. While it has undergone format changes, this procedure is still in use today.

The statistical data allow commanders and researchers at all levels of the military hierarchy to identify real, not perceived, differences in the treatment of various races or ethnic groups. Data are maintained on military discipline, types of discharge, promotions, awards and decorations, and leadership positions. The data are not used to condemn a commander whose report shows an inequity in any of these categories. Rather, the information is used as a tool to indicate areas that may
require examination. An inequity may indicate a phenomenon that is perfectly rational and explainable. For example, an increase in disciplinary action against a particular racial or ethnic group may have been the result of a barroom brawl at a club primarily frequented by members of that group. The data may also indicate the subtle influence of personal or institutional racism directed against the members of that group. The racial statistical data raise the command awareness of the racial influences within the unit.

The Army instituted a Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Program. It was designed to raise command awareness of racial differences and to reduce racial tension by developing a cultural understanding of different races and ethnic backgrounds. Initially, the program was not well received within the military. Individuals were required to attend short, but frequent seminars. These were almost invariably conducted by untrained volunteers. They tended to be black. White soldiers resented the seminars because they focused almost exclusively on black problems. No attempt was made to explain the white point of view to black soldiers. Black soldiers resented the program because they knew that their problem was not with the white soldiers; their problem was with the commanders, who seldom attended the seminars. They saw the seminars as doing nothing to correct the problems. Other soldiers resented the program because problems of their ethnic groups were seldom addressed. Commanders resented the program because they did not like to be told they had a problem. They also resented the time taken from other unit functions for seminar attendance.

In 1971 the Department of Defense established the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI). This is an eight-week school. Its function is to train Race Relations Specialists in the cultural differences of each race and ethnic group represented in the military. The students received instruction and practical experience with seminar-leading procedures, complaint investigation and data interpretation.

The Army continued to rely upon motivated volunteers to manage its race relations programs. The majority of these volunteers were black, and even though an increasing percentage of the race relations specialists
were graduates of DRRI, they continued to concentrate on black problems when they returned to their units. Consequently, the program's credibility did not improve.

In 1976, the Army instituted a non-voluntary Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Officer program. Officers were selected by the Department of the Army to attend DRRI and serve one-year tours as a Brigade or higher race relations officer. While the officers who were involuntarily selected universally resented their selection, the credibility of the program began to increase.

Following the compilation of the statistical data on race, the Army was prepared to implement an Affirmative Action Program (AAP). The merits of the AAPs are still being debated. They have been the basis of two recent landmark Supreme Court decisions and have also instigated numerous corporate suits against the Federal Government. The intent of an AAP is to counter the effects of past and present institutional racism. Properly developed and implemented, they are successful. When handled carelessly, they serve only to increase racial friction.

The Army AAP has been modified annually. Its goals are continuously changed to reflect the realities of the changing environment. While the AAP has not been received with open arms, as a component of the total Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Program it has been successful.

The draft served to provide the military with a disproportionate number of high school dropouts. The Army increased its support of on-duty civilian schooling to allow more soldiers to obtain a high school diploma or General Education Development (GED) equivalent. This benefited many soldiers including minorities, who were otherwise ineligible for promotion or certain job assignments. While not intentionally implemented to support the AAP, this education commitment was an excellent complement to it.

2. Negative Actions

As the frequency and intensity of racial friction spread throughout the military, the Army introduced several reactive measures that
reduced the immediate friction but increased the underlying racial tensions. For more on the causes of these changes see Chapters 1, 3 and 4 of this volume. Four actions in particular were needed to cope with the change. First, command awareness of the problem was necessary. This included personal attention, better recreation facilities, immediate action on evidence of congregation. Second, action was needed to preclude assignment of blacks and white soldiers in unusual proportions to a particular unit -- in keeping the racial ratio proportional in all units. Third, more rapid elimination of unsuitable and unfit personnel was required (AR 635-212). Fourth, both disciplinary means and preventive law needed to be used.29/

A prohibition against congregation violates the Constitutional guarantee of Freedom of Assembly. It presumes that if three or more people showing a particular characteristic congregate, they are conspiring to commit an illegal action. The prohibition was generally selectively enforced against black soldiers. Military police seldom disturbed white or other ethnic congregations. This created resentments.

The statistical data on race supported the black claim that separations under Army Regulation 635-212, as well as disciplinary actions under the UCMJ, were disproportionately administered to blacks.30/ White commanders tended to blame racial friction on black offenders, sometimes undeservedly.31/ Frequently, the black offender was eliminated as a troublemaker, while the white offender received minor punishment.

These policies did quell the racial friction. By ignoring the cultural and behavioral differences unique to various groups, however, they increased the underlying tension. Blacks saw the Army behaving in a discriminatory manner and refused to believe the Army's stated attitude of racial equality. The credibility of the entire Race Relations Program was jeopardized.
G. **INSIGHTS**

The following useful insights are derived from the foregoing discussion of race relations in the military during the Vietnam era:

- Race problems remain in the military today. The interaction of factors causing or aggravating racial tensions is so complex that it is next-to-impossible to determine with any certainty the impact of racial tensions alone on the conduct of the war and the implications of that impact for the post-Vietnam military. A few things can perhaps safely be said. Racial tensions were one factor contributing to the general decline of morale and discipline that became evident with the drawdown of US forces. Such tensions were rarely overt on combat missions and thus had only a limited impact on combat effectiveness overall. In rear areas, where troop concentrations and boredom sometimes coincided, problems erupted in which racial tensions sometimes played a role, even if not always a dominant one. The military, which was usually not responsible for generating the racist feelings, did not, however, always handle the problem well, though as noted above, there were significant exceptions to this generalization. Good leadership when present, minimized this and other problems.

- American troop feelings about and interaction with the Vietnamese people left room for improvement. Race seemed to be one factor—the defining factor if nothing else—in the general resentment that developed. The problem was no different in any significant way from that experienced by other armies in other foreign countries.

H. **LESSONS**

Though the military cannot control racism in society, it has various avenues of recourse within its jurisdiction. Effective programs must be,
and must be perceived as being, fair, consistent, and as having sufficient "teeth" to achieve their objectives. The development of good leadership should be the sine qua non of such programs.
CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES

1. All statistics in this section are taken from David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1975), pp. 201-219. Cortright quotes heavily from The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, The Search for Military Justice, 1971; the Congressional Black Caucus Report, 1971; and Department of Defense, Report of the Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice, 1972. The narrative portions of this section are based on the personal experiences of a BDM analyst who was a 1975 graduate of the Defense Race Relations Institute and spent one year as a Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Officer.


3. Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt, pp. 206-207


6. Figure 5-4, Ibid.


9. Department of the Army, Fact Sheet, Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army Vietnam, dated 3 October 1968, Subject: "Civil Rights and Industrial Relations."


13. Ibid., p. 3.


16. USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting, Minutes, 9 December 1977, p. 4.

17. The USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting concluded that while the military cannot be blamed for starting racial tensions, it is culpable for some of the problems it faced:

In part, the seriousness of the problem resulted from a steady stream of incoming personnel who had been part of the drug culture or various civil rights activities. In this sense, the Army did not bear responsibility for all the problems. On the other hand, the Army did not handle these problem areas effectively and actually contributed significantly to them.


19. USACHCS-hosted SSI meeting, minutes, p. 8.

20. See Chapter 4.


22. More on this subject appears in Chapter 4, Morale and Discipline.


24. SSG John Norwood, Jr., 11th RRU, 1st Infantry Division, in a letter to his parents dated August 13, 1966, in Adler, p. 54.


26. Peter Bourne, Men, Stress, and Vietnam.

27. BDM staff member who was one of the three officers who were initially selected by Department of the Army to attend DRRI on a non-voluntary basis. The material contained in Section F of this chapter is based on his experience as a Race Relations officer in Korea and the instruction presented to him while he was a student at DRRI.
28. This is in comparison to the pre-Vietnam period. The average educational level of the Army is actually lower today with the All Volunteer Army than it was at any time during the Vietnam War.

29. Department of the Army, Disposition Form, from Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army Vietnam (Col. John Jay Douglass), to Deputy Chief of Staff (P&A), dated 19 April 1969, Subject: "Racial Tension and Unrest."


31. Many black commanders actually judge black offenders more harshly than do their white counterparts.

32. Figure 5-6, included here, illustrates the rising black percentage of enlisted personnel in the armed forces. The problems related to race will certainly continue to demand attention. Figure from Department of Defense, *Annual Report*, FY 1980, p. 299.

**BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED END STRENGTHS**

![Graph showing the percentage of black enlisted personnel in the active duty forces from 1964 to 1978.](image)

Figure 5-6. Blacks as a Percentage of Active Duty Enlisted End Strengths
A group [of veterans] in American society as large as the entire 1st Army population of 57,000 is drug dependent. At a minimum the number of veteran drug abusers is at least three times the number of known addicts in Washington, D.C.

Quite simply, as unreliable as drug abuse statistics can be, they nonetheless indicate a problem of magnitude for both the Army and the VA.

John E. Flaherty
Army Drug Abuse Program, A Future Model

A. INTRODUCTION

Before the 1960's, illegal drug use in the United States was fairly uncommon and generally only a problem seen in the lower orders of society and among a few people in the entertainment professions. The majority of the population tended to prefer legal drugs, such as alcohol, caffeine, nicotine and prescription amphetamines and barbiturates. Beginning in the 1960's, however, illegal drug use became more widespread among the young, largely white, middle-class population. This young affluent group could afford to postpone its entrance into the mainstream work force and to experiment with alternative lifestyles. A spirit of rebelliousness and disillusionment emerged which manifested itself, among other things, in drug use and experimentation. This interest in drugs was furthered by the advertising media, which tended to give the impression that reaching for a pill, tablet, or capsule was a means to cure all ills. The use of marijuana became widespread. LSD and other hallucinogens were experimented with, and heroin use became more prevalent among blacks and whites of all classes.

The following pages assess the unfolding of the drug environment in Vietnam from its origins to the final withdrawal of American forces. The major topics discussed include: the illicit drug traffic in Vietnam;
individual drug use; attitudes and opinions regarding drug use; the effectiveness of various drug control programs, and the resultant effects of drug use on individual and group/unit combat performance and readiness.

B. THE ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFIC IN VIETNAM

1. Origins of the Drug Traffic

The infestation of drugs in Asia is traceable to antiquity. By the time the British advanced into the Indian sub-continent in the 17th century, drugs, namely opium, were a major domestic commodity and an important source of income for those participating in their production and distribution. Eventually the British East India Company monopolized the opium trade which constituted a large portion of its revenue. By the early 19th century, the British and Portuguese introduced opium from their Indian possessions to Imperial China despite resistance from the Manchu leaders. The Portuguese colony of Macao became the primary entry point for opium into China by 1830.

Within a decade, opium trade with China assumed a large share of Britain's total export revenue. In 1839 Britain and China fought the "Opium War" over attempts by the Imperial Chinese government to halt the trade. The British victory won them the exclusive right to ship opium into China, resulting in the widespread distribution of opium and its derivatives in eastern and southeastern Asia. Thus, more than a hundred years before American troops became embroiled in combat in Vietnam, the people of that region were accustomed to the full drugs cycle -- planting, harvesting, processing, transporting, and marketing.

The great influx of US forces in Vietnam beginning in 1965 provided a ready market for drugs. The US Military Assistance command, Vietnam (MACV) investigated 100 drug cases between July 1965 and June 1966; 96 cases involved the use of marijuana. This and other evidence suggests that initially marijuana was preferred by Americans. In September 1966, MACV made a survey of the availability of drugs in the Saigon area. The
survey showed that there were 29 fixed outlets and that drugs were distributed and sold through virtually every commercial enterprise in the city. 4/ Similar situations prevailed in all urban areas where large numbers of US personnel were concentrated.

2. The Problem Grows

Early in 1968, reports of the increasing use of marijuana by US troops in Vietnam became alarming. So severe had the problem become that the US Army and South Vietnamese authorities undertook concerted efforts to eliminate both smokers and suppliers. 5/ At the same time, Thai troops from the Queen's Cobra Regiment, newly committed in RVN, were found to be using and dealing in "Red Rock," an inferior grade of heroin (3-4% pure), heavily adulterated with fillers. These Thai troops then underwent an orientation period with the US 9th Division before being assigned a security mission east of Saigon. 6/ This is the first documented evidence of heroin being made available to US forces in Vietnam. The impact of the Thai drug conduit was such that after Thai forces were withdrawn, heroin again became a scarce commodity. 7/

US and South Vietnamese government agents found that additional large quantities of heroin were brought into Vietnam by US troops returning from R & R in Bangkok, with further significant amounts arriving via military and commercial air transport.

It was difficult to determine the true nature of the drug traffic. Many American officials believed that high-ranking South Vietnamese officials were either conducting the illicit trade or protecting, under duress or reward, those who were. 8/ For example, on 17 March 1971, Phan Chi Thien, a Deputy in the South Vietnamese National Assembly's lower house, was apprehended at Tan Son Nhut airport in Saigon carrying 10 pounds of pure heroin and a quarter pound of opium that had been purchased in Vientiane, Laos. Earlier, an Air Vietnam stewardess returning from Vientiane was caught carrying over 20 pounds of heroin worth over $300,000 on the streets of Saigon. During interrogation, she admitted being a courier for Vietnamese Deputy Vo Van Mau. (It may be noted, Vo Van Mau was not brought to trial). 9/
In late 1970, heroin, as much as 96% pure, became a common commodity in Saigon. It was felt by many authorities that this was largely due to the Army's crack down on marijuana smoking and trafficking. A Senate Staff Report assessed the impact of the crack down in these terms:

The upshot was that GIs who had been smoking only 'grass' turned to smoking and 'snorting' heroin, which was initially passed off to them as non-addictive cocaine. 10/

By 1971 "smoking and snorting" of heroin had come to be fairly common among US troop drug users.

3. Drug Supply Routes and Traffickers

The major portion of white heroin found in combat areas after 1970 came from opium poppies grown in mountainous border regions of Laos, Burma, and Thailand, the region known as the "Golden Triangle," (Map 6-1). In most cases the raw opium was transported from the mountains into Thailand through Chiang Rai, where it was initially refined and processed. Former members of the Chinese Nationalist Army served as guards for the opium shipments into Thailand. After processing, the opium was secretly moved to Bangkok and there loaded on air and sea transports to Vietnam under the care of Thai troops or air crew personnel. An alternative route was suspected, one in which the heroin was airlifted to Vietnam by various members of the Royal Laotian Air Force by way of Vientiane. 11/

The CIA identified at least 21 opium refineries in the "Golden Triangle" region. 12/ Those facilities provided a constant flow of high grade heroin to US forces in South Vietnam. That region normally produces about 700 tons of opium annually, or about half of the world's supply. It was estimated that the 1971 production reached 1,000 tons, an unprecedented amount. Northeastern Burma, in the Tachilick area flanking the Thai and Laotian borders, was identified as the largest producer with its 14 refineries accounting for well over 50 percent of the "Golden Triangle's" yield. 14/

There is considerable evidence that the movement and distribution of drugs from the "Golden Triangle" would not have been possible without
Map 6-1. The "Golden Triangle" and Major Opiate Traffic Routes to South Vietnam
the cooperation and complicity of both local and even American officials. The previously cited staff report of the Senate Subcommittee on Drug Abuse noted that:

It would appear self-evident to the staff that the large-scale transportation of opiates would be utterly impossible without the complicity of high Army or government officials in the countries involved. 14/

An article in the Far Eastern Review claimed that American T-28 bomber crews flying out of Lon Chen, Thailand were well aware of raw opium being sold in the market place for $52/kilo. The author accused CIA agents in the region of being aware of and tolerating the situation at Lon Chen. 15/

Another serious charge concerning US officials' complicity in the drug traffic was made by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate student investigating the international drug traffic. In his testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Drug Abuse, he claimed that the US Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtie Godley, kept US drug agents from entering Laos and further, that senior US advisors and CIA personnel were trafficking in heroin. 16/ It is, however, important to note that these charges were not sufficiently substantiated to warrant the Justice Department or the military establishment to press charges against those involved.

There has been sufficient evidence to conclude that most of the heroin in South Vietnam originated at the same source. The New York Times reported that the uniformity of the packaging indicates a uniform source: the plastic vials containing the heroin were virtually identical throughout South Vietnam. 17/ That report also notes that American officials were concerned over their inability to uncover many leaders in the dope smuggling and distribution racket in South Vietnam because high-ranking Saigon officials were either conducting the trafficking or protecting those who were.

4. The Introduction of Drugs into Vietnam

The variety of drug usage, dates of introduction, degree of prevalence and changing patterns are difficult to catalog accurately. As
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indicated earlier, some low-frequency drug usage by American troops was noted in 1965. Beginning in 1967 questionnaires submitted to "outprocessing" enlisted personnel at the 22d and 90th Replacement Battalions at Cam Rahn Bay provided more reliable data on drug usage.

Available statistics indicate that the frequent use of marijuana increased, peaking in 1970 when almost 60% of the servicemen outprocessing acknowledged the use of marijuana. 18/ In a statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency (October 1970), J. Steinberg reported that up to 70% of patients who were referred to psychiatric evaluation in Vietnam reported their use of illicit drugs. 19/

Another study states that during the summer of 1970 the pattern of illicit drug use changed perceptibly towards the more frequent use of "harder" drugs, especially heroin. This was reflected in the increased number of heroin deaths due to overdose reported in theater hospitals and the frequent use reported by 15% of the enlisted personnel by the fall of 1970. 20/

In his non-technical but highly descriptive account of the appearance of illicit drugs in Vietnam, Boyle states that binocital was the precursor to heroin which "had not yet appeared in South Vietnam in 1969." 21/ He further goes on to state that "grass," i.e., marijuana, was already in wide use by the late 50s and that the Army, realizing the existence of a drug problem, already had established a drug treatment program at the 98th Medical Detachment, located in Nha Trang.

The operation of a heroin smuggling ring as early as 1965 and subsequent reports to the Pentagon in 1967 of the complicity and direct involvement by high officials of the South Vietnamese government is described by Critchfield's decidedly anti-Ky regime narrative. 22/ Critchfield's account is useful, however, in that it ties together the origin of the drug problem in Vietnam with the arrival of substantial numbers of American troops.

By January 1968 marijuana use was an established part of the Vietnamese combat environment. In recognition of the problem, special marijuana and narcotics investigation teams were put in operation. 23/ On
January 31, 1968, a Criminal Investigation Laboratory was opened. The earliest official action taken against marijuana use by the US government is cited in a report by Roffman and Sapel showing that a Department of Defense Task Force had been created in 1967 to report on drug abuse in the Armed Forces. 24/ However, the author noted that in June of 1967 the MACV Provost Marshal requested that a study be made of marijuana users in the Army stockade at Long Binh. 25/ Sanders also confirms the fact that early 1968 marks the official awareness of an acute marijuana problem among American forces in Vietnam. 26/

C. INDIVIDUAL DRUG USE IN VIETNAM

1. Drug Availability and Prevalence

Throughout the war, both alcohol and illicit drugs were easily available in Vietnam; their respective use depended mainly on whether the consumer was willing to pay prevailing rates or accept the risks associated with drug use. As is the case in the civil sector of the American society, alcohol is legal and socially acceptable in moderation; illicit drugs, on the other hand, are not. The situation in Vietnam reflected American social customs. Alcohol was made available to US military and civilian personnel through PX and commissary liquor dispensaries. Quantities were limited only by liquor ration cards; beer was available in unlimited quantities. Eye witness accounts tell of combat troops occasionally having such large amounts of beer that cases of it were used instead of sand bags to provide blast protection on M113 armored personnel carriers. 27/ Virtually every military post or facility had its PX, officers’ club, or enlisted men’s club with a bar operating at high volume.

Since alcohol is legal, socially acceptable, and universally consumed in various forms and degrees from the lowest enlisted grade to ranking officers, precise data of its abuse in Vietnam in particular is lacking. Perhaps a valid approximation can be made from a 1971 DOD survey which showed that 88 percent of the military population (Army-wide) used alcohol where only 33 percent used or had used illicit drugs. 28/
same study also indicated that 5.3 percent of the military were identified as "needing help with a drinking problem" as compared to 1.7 percent with a drug problem. The latter percentages may be subject to question because of the inexactness in defining alcohol/drug "problems." At best, the data give some indication of the relative severities of the alcohol and drug problems in a selected sample of Army personnel.

Though drug use was absolutely forbidden by civil and military authorities, its availability to the purchaser was hardly a problem in Vietnam. An interview with a former Brigade Drug Abuse Officer illustrates the drug availability in Vietnam:

Illegal drugs were also easy to obtain. When a man is in Vietnam, he can be sure that no matter where he is, who he is with or talking to, there are probably drugs within 25 feet of him. . . 29/

In 1971, following the US Army's crackdown on marijuana use, a type of heroin known as "number four" became readily available throughout Vietnam. In his book on the illicit drug traffic in South Vietnam, McCoy notes that

Fourteen year-old girls were selling heroin at roadside stands on the main highway from Saigon to the US Army base at Long-Binh; Saigon street peddlers stuffed plastic vials of 95% pure heroin into the pockets of G.I.'s as they strolled through downtown Saigon; and "mama-sans" or Vietnamese barracks maids started carrying a few vials to work for sale to on-duty G.I.'s. 30/

Southeast Asian marijuana was far more potent than varieties grown in the United States and Mexico. The Southeast Asian "number four" type heroin was 90-100 percent pure; the American and Mexican heroin averaged only 3-12 percent pure. 31/ In addition to being easily available, drugs were also cheap and of highest quality, an optimal set of conditions for rapid and extensive proliferation. At its lowest rate, a heroin habit could be supported for as little as two dollars per day; marijuana cigarettes were only ten cents each. Besides the readily available illicit drugs, the Army supplied the tranquilizer phenothiazine
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to the troops to assist them in reducing stress and combat fatigue. Although phenothiazine is not a barbiturate, its effects are very similar and many of the soldiers used it to produce "lows," even though many of these users were not subject to combat stress or hazardous duty. 32/ Another report states that marijuana cigarettes were selling for twenty cents each in Saigon and one dollar each in Da Nang; opium was one dollar per injection and morphine, five dollars per vial. 33/ These price levels were subject to simple supply and demand economics and increased precipitously in proportion to increased demand.

The most certain statement that can be made regarding drug prevalence in Vietnam is that if such depressants and stimulants as alcohol, nicotine and caffeine are also included together with illicit and prescribed drugs, virtually the entire US military population used one or more drugs at some time.

Beyond that, firm statistics are hard to come by. Most estimates are based on the numbers of those apprehended or requesting treatment, or on small study samples. There have been no adequate studies on alcohol, nicotine or caffeine abuse in Vietnam, all of which could have deleterious effects on combat performance. However, some general trends can be observed with fair certainty, and even though conservatively stated they are alarming enough. As one source notes,

To take the lowest estimate of identified drug users - that is, 2 percent of one million men - then approximately 20,000 soldiers at this date have some degree of psychological or physiological drug dependency. Twenty thousand soldiers equals the base population of Ft. Belvoir. It is equivalent to the number of addicts reported today in Washington, D.C. It is a little less than one-half the number of men killed during the 10-year involvement in Indochina. The figure does not include men released from the army prior to June 1971, those who served when drug use was increasing two-, three-, and four-fold each year. 34/

VA estimates of drug abuse etch an even deeper picture. The 50,000 to 140,000 range estimated earlier suggests that a group in American
society as large as the entire First Army population of 57,000 is drug dependent. 35/

As mentioned previously, MACV had made a survey of drug availability in 1966. By 1967, cases involving opium and morphine had been uncovered. More than 8,000 personnel were arrested on drug charges in 1969. The number of arrests escalated in 1970 to 11,058 of which 1,146 involved hard drugs. By 1971, heroin and other hard drugs alone accounted for 7,026 cases - and that at a time of decreasing troop strength. 36/

The most comprehensive official statistics for illegal drug use were gathered by the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) in 1971. 37/ Their figures are presented in Table 6-1. These results are derived from limited and to some extent faulty data bases, i.e., they do not necessarily account for the totality of drugs used. At best, these data serve as estimates with undefined margins of error, hopefully less than ten percent. The one figure in the HumRRO study that is widely supported is that 28% of all troops in Vietnam used one or more of the opiates, primarily heroin. Drug Abuse Suppression Officers cite figures of heroin addiction in the range of 25-30%, with statistics sometimes quoted as high as 50%. 38/

Another means for estimating drug usage although subject to similar faults as the data from sample interviews, is to examine data from the Army's criminal justice system. These records show that in 1967 there were 1,391 investigations involving 1,688 persons for the use of marijuana. 39/ This represented .25 per 1,000 troops, which the source claims was still lower than the Army-wide average of .30 per 1,000 troops. Out of these investigations, there resulted 427 courts-martial for marijuana and hard-narcotics use. In June 1968 the marijuana-use rate, based on reported incidents, was 1.3 per 1,000 troops (194 cases); by December it had increased to 4.23 per 1,000 (523 cases). Likewise, the opium rate rose from .003 per 1,000 in June to .068 by December 1968. This source further indicates that there was a continuous rise in the drug use rate in 1969, with 8,440 apprehensions, and another increase to 11,058 arrests (of which 1,146 involved hard drugs) in 1970. Despite MACV's concerted programs in
### Table 6-1. Percentage of United States Army Using Drugs in the Last Twelve Months (1971) by Place of Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Marijuana %</th>
<th>Psychedelic Drugs %</th>
<th>Stimulants %</th>
<th>Depressants %</th>
<th>Narcotic Drugs %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continental U.S.</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other S.E. Asia</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Army Average</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
drug education and suppression in 1971, the number of offenders involved with hard drugs, mostly heroin, had increased seven-fold to 7,026. This increase was particularly significant since it coincided with the planned decreasing troop strength in Vietnam. The drug problem continued at a high level of intensity until late 1972 when troop strength began to drop to the level of 1964 and the earlier years.

John E. Flaherty, a senior member of the President's Council on Drug Abuse notes that the Department of the Army, recognizing the unreliability of the current data, talked instead of a "variable percentage" of known drug abusers ranging from two to five percent of active duty personnel. This study shows that reports from staff members of installation teams also agree that between two to five percent of personnel on their respective bases have either psychological or physiological dependencies on drugs other than marijuana. Flaherty concludes by making the observation that: "On the basis of extensive interviews and research, the (DOD) Task Force feels this 'ball park' figure is as reasonably accurate as any." 40/ Given the estimate of 2.5 million men cumulatively serving in Vietnam during a period of nearly 15 years, the 2-5 percent drug abuse estimate means that between 50,000 to 125,000 drug dependents were the legacy of the US involvement in the Vietnam War.

2. Characteristics of the Drug User

The decision to use drugs was, for the great majority of cases, an individual one. Even so, characteristic user patterns can be discerned. The most obvious generalization that can be drawn concerns the different forms of drug and alcohol abuse prevalent amongst officers, noncommissioned officers, and lower grade enlisted personnel.

Alcohol was by far the most common drug choice of officers and NCO's, though, indeed, alcoholism was the most serious drug problem in the military as a whole. 41/ It has been observed that officers had more at stake than enlisted men, and were thus less willing to indulge in illegal behavior. In addition, officers tended to be from social classes where drinking alcohol was accepted and drug use was not. Officers were more able to afford alcohol and were more apt to be involved in activities which
brought meaning to their daily lives. Officers were less in need of escape as they were more likely to hear and support arguments for the legitimacy of the war. This however, does not imply that officers and NCO's did not seek some escape from boredom the stresses associated with combat, and the routines of life in an alien and hostile environment. For these purposes, alcohol did indeed serve as a sociably acceptable and effective means for escape within physically tolerable limits and with minimal impact or job performance.

With reference to alcoholism and the characteristic users, one authority noted that "alcoholism still affects the upper echelons of the military hierarchy--alcohol use exists throughout military life and alcohol problems are seldom publicized as a chronic military affliction."

The numerous demographic studies regarding drug usage in Vietnam concur on several salient points. The most readily apparent finding was that drug use among the lower enlisted ranks was a "ubiquitous phenomenon." In an extensive survey of over 17,000 enlisted personnel in CONUS, Germany, and Korea, 40 percent reported using marijuana at least once in the month before the interview. Likewise, 55 percent reported the use of other illicit substances including hallucinogens, amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, and opiates. A report on the preliminary findings from the 1971 Department of Defense Survey on drug use also concludes that "nontherapeutic drug use (throughout the military) was mainly a phenomenon of the younger enlisted men in the lower pay grades."

The Vietnamese conflict environment naturally produced its own drug users' society with unique argot, mores, social distinctions and status. Even though drugs were endemic to the entire armed forces, both CONUS-based and on foreign soil, Vietnam was different in that an actual war was in progress with all of its attendant stresses and risks of casualty. In Vietnam, drug and alcohol preference ultimately defined the two major social groups--"heads" and "juicers." The heads were those who used illicit drugs and the juicers were those whose primary preference was alcohol. In some instances, "heads" were distinguished from "freaks," the
latter being those who indulged in injecting themselves with heroin, i.e., "mainlining," "shooting skag," etc. Sanders in his detailed description of the drug environment of Vietnam notes that the "heads" and "juicers" are mainly divided by grade; the heads usually below the grade of E-5 and the juicers predominantly the NCOs and officers. They were also characterized by their attitudes towards the war and by their commitment and involvement with the military establishment. As might be surmised, the "heads" for the most part were not careerists and tended to manifest antiwar sentiments. In contrast, "juicers" although not necessarily professing strong pro-war sentiments, in the majority were military careerists or adhered to proscriptions against drug usage.

Another in-depth study of drug abuse patterns in Vietnam corroborates the above-discussed findings and others by noting that officers and NCOs were not drug abusers in the commonly accepted sense of the term. Addiction to opiates and other substances other than alcohol was found generally to be among the younger age group of non-career enlisted personnel (two-year service by draft) with the grade of E-5 or lower. Citing a personal communication with an Army psychiatrist experienced in the Vietnam drug environment, this study concludes, "There is a clear division between the [lower] enlisted ranks, NCOs, and officers with regard to the abused drug of choice." By far, heroin was the most prevalent and most harmful of the drugs used in Vietnam. One study on heroin use in Vietnam was based on interviews of 1,100 enlisted men in the 23d Artillery Group. Of these, over 20% had used heroin at one time or another. All identified users, except for three individuals, were E-5 or lower; few had used any other drug than marijuana before trying heroin in Vietnam. The heroin users invariably used diazepam and barbiturates in an attempt to control the physical discomfiture of withdrawal. The study also noted that heroin users were primarily in the 18 to 20-year age group and were predominantly Caucasian by a ratio of 2:1. It should be noted, however, that this ratio is at great variance with the overall white to black ratio of enlisted personnel in Vietnam, estimated at about 5:1. Thus this sample suggests
that a substantially greater percentage of black personnel used heroin. The study did not find significant distinctions within occupational groupings except in the fire direction centers, where heroin use was rare. The data showed that over half the heroin users lacked a high school diploma or its equivalent and scored 90 or lower on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). 49/ In their clinical evaluation the authors characterized the heroin user as"... immature, impulsive, had excessive dependent needs, and had a poor self-image." The user was described as wanting magical solutions to real and imagined difficulties and had little, if any, experience with any formal system of ethical or religious thought; he was amoral by default. As the education and AFQT results seem to imply, the typical heroin user "had difficulty in verbalization which made it increasingly difficult for him to operate effectively in a hierarchical system." 50/ The consequence of his alienation to the system was his membership in peer and subgroups of heroin users with their like-values and accepted means of reinforcement and communication.

A study using a much smaller sample size of 78 returnees from Vietnam who were confirmed heroin users, found results similar to the above discussed study. 51/ In sum, the average age of the user was less than 21 years with the largest percentage group in the less-than-high-school category. The findings on racial mix showed that whites predominated over blacks at a ratio of nearly 3-1 (as compared to 2-1 in Alonso's study). Again, the white/black ratio is difficult to interpret since it may not actually reflect the estimated 14 percent overall black military population, but instead the estimated 30 percent black population in many units in Vietnam.

Another study by Lloyd and associates of 81 heroin addicts returned from Vietnam shows similar demographic results. 52/ The significant majority of addicts were single, 22.6 years in age, and Caucasian by a ratio of over 4 to 1. Likewise, as in the previously cited studies, 56 of the sample of 81 addicts did not complete high school, attaining a level of education of only 10.2 years. As to prior use, slightly over half indicated that their first use of heroin was in Vietnam, a finding consistent with other studies.
In a study commissioned by the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse in June 1971, over 450 Vietnam drug users were sampled to determine predictors of Vietnam drug use. Two major themes predicting drug use surfaced: 1) that earlier use of both drugs and alcohol was important, and 2) that the set of behaviors that led to enlisting in the service before the man was of draft age also was important. More specifically, the strongest predictor of drug use in Vietnam was marijuana use before Vietnam. Another important predictor was a first-term enlistee with earlier experience with narcotics or amphetamines. A history of arrest, truancy, and joblessness at the time of induction correlated significantly with drug use in Vietnam. Most interesting, but not surprising in view of findings from other studies, the variable which best predicted heroin avoidance in Vietnam was age—being over the age of 24 upon arrival in the combat environment.

Even though the foregoing discussion focused on observable characteristics of heroin users, a detailed study on the characteristics of marijuana smokers yields similar findings. Roffman found that "heavy" marijuana smoking (21 or more occasions) was no more extensive in the specific military population studied than at many college campuses or in the similar age group of San Francisco. As in the case of heroin users, marijuana smokers tended significantly to be young, of lower enlisted grade and were likely to have smoked marijuana prior to coming to Vietnam and indeed, prior to entry into the service. The heavy smoker was also likely to be using other drugs illicitly and to have incurred minor disciplinary actions.

3. Reasons for Using Drugs

The reasons for drug use are many and varied and are mainly functions of the user's environment, the type of drug, and personal background and experience. A comprehensive study of 17,000 enlisted personnel by the Army Research Institute (ARI) concerning drug and alcohol abuse in selected CONUS Army installations found that drug abuse was "significantly associated with low morale, boredom and dissatisfaction with job. officers,
and the Army." Results of the study also indicated that such value-attitude profiles among enlisted personnel as rejection of authority and standard American culture are an antiwork ethic associated with drug users. These drug users were also found typically to view their commanders more negatively than non-users in the same units. With respect to alcohol consumption, the study found no correlation between the amount of alcohol consumed and the above-discussed social-organizational or value-attitude profile factors.

Although these findings were based on a sample of CONUS-based Army personnel, it provides relevant insight into the casual reasons and psychological factors of individual drug and alcohol use in Vietnam.

In a comprehensive study on drug use in northern Vietnam, Stanton agrees with Bey and Zecchinelli that marijuana was principally used for its "pleasurable, soporific, tranquilizing and escape functions." For other drugs, including opiates, Stanton adds these reasons for extensive usage: "(1) curiosity and experimentation; (2) rebellion, (3) a social function - a group communion and (4) in the case of amphetamines, a possible antifatigue factor arising from prolonged stress."

Sanders sees rebellion symbolized by the use of illicit drugs, as the prime factor for general drug use. Rebellion is followed in order by peer pressure, the desire to escape, to separate one's self from mental and physical pain, and a means for easing frustrations of the routine of the military environment. Sanders concludes by stating that "drugs are employed as a means of coping with the various pains encountered by the enlisted man in Vietnam." Niedersche, in his interviews with returnee addicts from Vietnam, supports the notion that the need to withdraw from the "pressures and frustrations" of Vietnam was the prime motivating factor for the use of heroin.

That rebellion against established authority was a principal factor in drug use is perhaps evidenced in the 1971 Department of Defense survey of drug use, which found that most drug users harbored negative attitudes toward their supervisors and perceived them as being completely against the use of illegal drugs. The findings of Robins in his
important study notes that drug users realized the danger inherent in the frequent use, but used them nevertheless for their effect of euphoria (41% responding). The next most frequent reason was that drugs improved tolerance of Army life and discipline, reducing homesickness and loneliness. To a slightly lesser degree, relief of boredom, depression, insomnia, and making time pass quickly were additional reasons given for drug use. Interestingly, peer and social pressure and fear were reasons given significantly less frequently than those mentioned above (3-6% responding).

Bentel, Crim and Smith look to deeper personal psychological factors to explain the use of mind altering drugs (namely heroin). They claim that use of these drugs to achieve "total anesthesia" and withdrawal was not their purpose, but rather as a strong sedative to "block out the psychic pain of awareness of personal inadequancy and alienation." Bentel, et al., see this as similar to the reasons young people in the United States turn to drugs as a means for coping with "inadequate selves" or an "unendurable reality."

That fear of combat was not a primary factor in marijuana and "hard" drug use was substantiated by Alonso's interviews with 230 users in combat units. Two tendencies were discerned from the interviews: (1) soldiers changed from marijuana to heroin to minimize detection because of marijuana's characteristically odor and (2) the use of marijuana no longer provided an appropriate reaction or "high." Again, corroborating other findings, Alonso found no instance where fear of the war was regarded as a reason for using drugs.

In a similar study, Ingraham found in most of his interview/questionnaire responses, that initiation into heroin use was in the company of friends under non-combat conditions. Ingraham concludes, therefore, that "combat stress may be a contributing factor to heroin use in some cases, but certainly cannot be considered the factor for its initiation and continued use for the majority." Ingraham further notes that given all the recreational facilities and athletic programs readily available to rear-area personnel, "boredom" as a reason for drug use must be questioned.
Likewise, neither could manifest antiwar feelings and the "revulsion against war" be considered a valid reason for drugs since Ingraham found the great majority of drug users expressing hostile views towards the enemy and showing little pacifist sentiment.

Several other studies shed additional insights into the personalities and motives for drug use. Lloyd and associates found that a high proportion of heroin addicts came from broken homes. This finding suggests that perhaps individual feelings of inadequacy and poor self-image, also found in the study by Bentel and associates, may be a principal factor in explaining the relationship between drug addiction and the outward manifestation of "broken homes." Roffman's study specifically relating to a sample of 584 marijuana smokers finds in its selective demographic characteristics the following affirmative: (1) "satisfaction with duties" - 72%; (2) "ever sought help for emotional problems" - 13%; and (3) "peer use of marijuana/close friends use of marijuana" - 83%. These findings suggest that marijuana use was not directly a result of stress or the rigors of the military environment, but rather as a means for social interaction and group/peer identification. If this assumption is correct, then it clearly supports the contention by many authorities that drug users, both in Vietnam and the United States, civilian and military, chose their drugs according to perceived gratification and social needs as well as deep seated emotional needs.

Looking at the four major factors bearing on drug usage in Vietnam, stress reduction, peer pressure, previous experience, and self-image, the following brief general observations and impressions are noted.

a. Stress Reduction

A human being's mind and body can react to stress in a variety of ways: the production of adrenaline acts to protect; the sensation of pain acts as a warning; drowsiness, prolonged sleep or withdrawal from a situation serve as avoidance mechanisms to name but a few. Indeed, human beings command an impressive arsenal of mental and physical equipment to combat stress. Inadequate protection from or handling of stress can lead to extreme anguish, depression, a shortening of life-expectancy, and a
hust of psychosomatic disorders, some of which are very serious and/or painful. It is no wonder, then, that induced stress reduction is a normal and necessary reaction to stress.

In Vietnam, soldiers were thrown into a new and often exceedingly stressful environment. Reactions varied between individuals as well as between groups. Often lacking some of the more common outlets for stress or finding them inadequate, some found that turning to drugs was an easy and often pleasant means to cope. 67/ As noted earlier, drug use was becoming more acceptable in the United States, and the use of certain drugs, e.g., caffeine, nicotine and alcohol, was already commonplace. Some drugs were provided in a soldier's rations; others were easily obtainable. 68/

b. Peer Pressure

Drug use and abuse does not result solely from attempted physical and/or psychological stress reduction. Social companionship has long been known to be one of man's basic needs, providing protection, strength, comfort, reassurance, meaning and identity. The saying, "United we stand, divided we fall," can be taken in a socio-political as well as a military sense. The strength of the desire to belong is demonstrated by the great lengths people will go to be accepted by or identify with various groups. The desire is often stronger among those thrust into a foreign environment. In Vietnam, while many soldiers may have become grouped together because of a common interest, such as drugs, others took up the interest to become members of the group. 69/ Just as a teenager might take up smoking to belong, many soldiers turned to drinking or other drug use to be "one of the guys."

c. Previous Experience

Many soldiers were by no means unfamiliar with drugs when they arrived in Vietnam, and the strangeness of the environment, the stress, the ready availability of drugs and other factors tended to encourage their continued or expanded use. As one report illustrates:

The soldier gets a little drunk and his head is pretty high, but only for a little while. He starts getting
sloppy, obstinate and eventually sick. Hungover the next day and tired the next night. However, he notices his buddy . . . is wide awake and quite happy the next day after smoking marijuana the night before... Thinking about it, hashing it over in his mind, he realizes the only way he will know what it is if he tries it . . . Two nights later, he . . . blows a few joints. Wow, he can't believe it, it somewhat felt like that nice high he had at the club but only for a few minutes while drinking alcohol, and now he feels similar to that only ten times better for hours . . . He can't understand why anyone would want to spend four or five dollars to get drunk. It cost him approximately 10¢ on one joint. 70/

While this cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the conclusion that the use or abuse of marijuana or other similar drugs leads inevitably to heroin addiction, there is evidence to indicate that Vietnam provided ideal conditions for continued and experimental use of numerous drugs.

d. Self-esteem/Self-worth

By the late '60s many of the soldiers who served in Vietnam were draftees, non-"lifers" who viewed service as characterized by duress and involuntary duty. Given the prevailing conditions of the draft, with its attendant conditions and provisions for deferment and exemption from military service, many of those who were drafted and sent to Vietnam were seen by themselves and others as "suckers" and "dumb," and thus deserved everything they got.

This negative self and external value judgment, in addition to the reality that many of these non-volunteers did indeed come from the lower socio-economic orders generally characterized by limited education, racial/ethnic handicaps, economic and social deprivation, and less than ideal family situations, was one of the prime root causes for heroin use. Bentel and his associates are unique in their findings that perceptions of low self-esteem and self-worth are major contributors to heroin use. 71/

Several other investigators/authors describe the overtly manifested behavior of this group of drug (namely heroin) users. 72/ In general, this
behavior, both verbal and physical, can be described as exaggerated, impulsive, unpredictable, antisocial, self-piteous, lacking in ethical values, and, perhaps most important, lacking in true perception of self. Because of the disappointments and discouragements experienced in their prior military backgrounds, many of these addicts exhibit lack of hope, despair, lack of meaningful life goals, and extreme envy and contempt for those who have achieved. The obvious answer to their life condition is drugs—drugs such as heroin, which will make them oblivious to all these pains of perceived self-worthiness and failure. As some have said, these "junkies" and "freaks" have set in motion their "self-destruct" mechanism in most cases without conscious awareness.

D. ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS ABOUT DRUG USE IN VIETNAM

General William Westmoreland was quoted in May 1971 as saying that the use of drugs is a major problem of modern military life, a result of the "unpopularity of the war in Vietnam" combined with the tasks of ending the direct American involvement while supporting the South Vietnamese war effort. His comments perhaps reflect a viewpoint seen at the very highest echelons of the military establishment, but do not necessarily express the concerns of those in the field, who are charged with the responsibility of doing something about it.

Zinberg, in his critique on heroin use in Vietnam and in the United States observes that "the Army's foremost concerns are to clean up the troops as fast as possible and to prevent the problem from spreading to the United States with returning veterans." Zinberg further states that the Army "perceives heroin as an enemy which must be completely and quickly destroyed." This attitude, Zinberg comments, precludes the requisite time-consuming effort to determine the real causes and human/social benefits and costs involved in its suppression. The results of the campaign against marijuana which led to increased heroin use in the early 70's is cited as an example of a poorly thought out drug suppression effort yielding disastrous results.
At the height of the "drug epidemic" in Vietnam, field commanders were very much aware of the problem but often could do very little to halt drug use or take punitive actions against flagrant users. By taking action many officers and NCOs faced the threat of "fragging" and other physical harm. A U.S. News and World Report article of February 1972 reported that the US Command in Saigon had finally gotten the drug problem "under control." 75/ Many of the officers interviewed felt that the drug problem had peaked in January 1971 and was now declining. Subsequent studies were to prove them correct, even though much of the decline can be explained as the result of the high rate of withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam during this period.

The attitudes of both officers and NCOs regarding drug use within their jurisdictions were mainly functions of type and extent of drug usage and manifest impact on combat effectiveness and survival of the unit in combat. For the most part, unit leaders would grudgingly tolerate marijuana smoking providing it was discrete and did not impair job performance; use of hard drugs, especially heroin was universally unacceptable. Even friends and peers of heroin users would not permit "stoned" users to join them on patrol or other actions against the enemy.

The universal rejection by officers and NCOs of hard drug usage was tempered by the pervasive threat of bodily harm (namely "fragging") which they would encounter if they took repressive action against drug users. Much of the failure to suppress hard drug usage can be attributed to this fear. Gental and Smith, 76/ conclude that the majority of "fraggings" occurred "not because of racial strife or orders to move into combat, but because some 'gung ho' officer or NCO is 'hashing' (i.e., harassing) drug users."

The use of illicit drugs in Vietnam cannot be considered an aberration of the conflict environment, but rather, it would be seen, as reflecting those drug usage patterns current in the civilian population of the United States. Indeed, observers of the contemporary American drug scene have described the United States of the 60s as a "drug society," 77/ that has placed its faith in the magic of technology and "quick medical relief,"
namely the vast array of pills that depress and stimulate, insure wakefulness and sleep, and of course, prevent pain. This faith in technology and the "wonders of medicine" have led Americans (and perhaps other citizens of advanced technological societies) to believe that drugs "are an available and effective tool whereby the pain, pressure and the inertia of our daily lives can be overcome." 78/ The net result of these domestic attitudes and practices with regard to drugs contributed significantly to an actual and potential military drug population. Numerous demographic studies cited previously in this chapter indicate that a significantly large proportion of soldiers in Vietnam had used illegal drugs prior to entry into the service.

Perhaps the utmost irony relating to drug use in Vietnam and American domestic attitudes is the movement to legalize marijuana by local or state-wide ballot. The New York Times of May 11, 1971 reported that 27 states had already relaxed marijuana laws while nine other states were actively considering such measures. 79/ It is difficult to assess the impact of this action on the military personnel in Vietnam. At a minimum, it was likely to have produced a confounding of "rightness" or "wrongness" for those individuals still in doubt as to the propriety of drug use.

That the Congress of the United States and the Executive Office of the President were fully aware of the extent of the drug problem by 1970 is borne out by the extensive hearings before the Senate subcommittee on drug abuse in the military 80/ and President Nixon's speech in 1971 on the seriousness of drug abuse in the military. 81/ The immediate effect of President Nixon's speech was the creation by executive order of the Special Action office for Drug Abuse Prevention headed by Dr. Jerome H. Jaffee. The major outcome of the Senate hearings was the enactment of bill S.2139 which authorized" a treatment and rehabilitation program for drug dependent members of the Armed Forces."

At a hearing in early 1973 before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on the Defense Department's defense appropriations for 1974, Rep. Joseph Addabbo of New York noted that there was a serious drug problem in Vietnam. 82/ He cited reports which showed that 35 percent of the Army
enlisted men in Vietnam had tried heroin, and that 20 percent reported becoming addicted to the drug at one time or another during their tour in Vietnam. The main thrust of the hearing, however, was to ascertain from General Abrams whether the Army was continuing its effort at identifying drug users and pursuing treatment and rehabilitation programs.

It is interesting to note that two years earlier, Representative Robert H. Steele of Connecticut said that a good portion of the blame for the growth of the drug traffic in Southeast Asia was due to the lack of a firm and consistent US policy aimed at heroin suppression. He adds, however, that recently (i.e., c.1970-71) the United States has directed its efforts at intercepting the drugs at the "Saigon end of the line" rather than "stamping out production at the source." It should be pointed out in retrospect that this policy was most likely the result of international political considerations (e.g., involving Burma, Thailand, and Laos) and the efficacy and ease of catching traffickers and dealers in a more concentrated area such as Saigon.

As has been the case through all facets of the American involvement in Vietnam, the role of the Vietnamese and American governments in their endeavors to suppress illicit drug traffic are bound up in controversy and disputed claims. No clear picture emerges. Journalists and other writers harboring particular viewpoints as to the American presence and conduct of the war paint a picture of a vast illicit drug operation in which the highest South Vietnamese and American officials were involved. Not surprisingly, official US government sources claim massive efforts were made to control the illicit drug traffic with the support of US civilian and military drug control experts. This research effort suggests that the truth lies somewhere between the extremes.

Critchfield, a critic of Marshal Ky and his Dai Viet supporters, charges that the murder in December 1965 of Tu Chung, a well known journalist of the Saigon press community, was due to his attempts in the previous spring to expose the involvement of the Dai Viets in a massive opium smuggling operation from Thailand and Laos to Saigon. Critchfield furthermore claims this information was "learned" from "an official with
White House and Pentagon connections" and that the US government had conclusive evidence of the involvement of high South Vietnamese government officials in the Tu Chung murder.

Critchfield claims subsequent American efforts to investigate the dope smuggling led to the murders in 1967 of three US army counterintelligence officers. 85/ The Ky government's Chief of National Police, Loan, claimed the Americans were victims of Viet Cong assassination teams.

Frances Fitzgerald, claims that the South Vietnamese government of President Thieu and Premier Khiem in early 1971 permitted the illicit drugs to enter the country unimpaired. 86/ In fact, Fitzgerald notes, the "two key customs posts were held by the brothers of Premier Kheim, a fact uncovered by American customs advisors as reported in. The Boston Globe of June 4, 1971. The South Vietnamese government said it would not prosecute these customs officials since heroin was "an American problem."

The New York Times in August 1971 reported the failure of South Vietnamese and US efforts to reduce significantly the illicit drug flow into South Vietnam. 87/ It cited two major reasons for the failure: "The enormous difficulty for even a highly determined and efficient administration to prevent the illicit entry of so concentrated a substance such as heroin." and secondly, "doubts about the South Vietnamese administration's determination to stop the traffic" even if it were more efficient. The article further notes that under the pressure of then Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, the government of President Thieu had issued orders to intensify antidrug enforcement and control procedures and to replace a number of officials suspected of involvement in smuggling and profiteering from the drug traffic. However, the article continues, "The American and Vietnamese officials suggested that most of the charges were little more than gestures in response to American urging and unlikely to bring about substantial improvement." Events were to prove this prediction true as the price of heroin continued at its street price of $3.63 a packet while maintaining its purity level of 96 percent. The low price/high purity levels were one of the best indicators of the continual ready availability of heroin (and other drugs) in the Saigon region until the departure of the main force elements in 1972.
It took almost another year for concerted Vietnamese and US anti-drug efforts to manifest themselves. In October 1968 the South Vietnamese government publicly condemned the trafficking and use of marijuana and heroin. It issued instructions to provincial chiefs to forbid the growing of marijuana crops. The Vietnamese Narcotics Bureau was established and expanded and the US government sent an agent from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to provide assistance to the Vietnamese. The immediate results of this initial antidrug enforcement phase was the use of aircraft to locate the marijuana crops and the use of Vietnamese Army to destroy them. Despite these efforts, as reported elsewhere in this chapter, drug use continued to increase, due in part to continuing government corruption and inefficiency in drug enforcement and control efforts.

In August 1970 the Drug Abuse Task Force was formed to seek new solutions to the problem and make recommendations to General Westmoreland. The Task Force contained members from all US agencies and military organizations involved in drug enforcement and control. Its notable effort was the production of a comprehensive report on the drug situation, the findings and conclusions of which were to be included in the MACV Directive 190-4 of December 1970. The stated objectives of this directive were to: 1) eradicate the source of drugs; 2) strengthen postal and customs procedures; 3) improve detection facilities; 4) coordinate the various drug abuse programs; 5) integrate law enforcement programs; 6) improve statistical reporting, and 7) rehabilitate drug abusers.

The results of these basically US efforts at drug suppression and control among its forces and education and rehabilitation of abusers will be addressed in the following section.

E. THE US DRUG PROGRAMS IN VIETNAM

Until 1970 the Army's rather modest efforts at drug control and prevention focused on education and law enforcement. The great upsurge of drug abuse in 1969 and the early '70s forced US military authorities to take more significant actions aimed at drug suppression and the identification, treatment, and rehabilitation of drug abusers. This section includes
a survey of the various US drug programs put into effect during the years 1966 through 1972. The first notable effort at curbing drug abuse was taken in November 1967 when the Secretary of Defense established a task force to study drug abuse in the military. Later, this task force became the Department of Defense Drug Abuse Control Committee with representatives from all the services.

The first significant drug policy statement of the Army was a Department of the Army letter of April 1968 stating that its official policy was the prevention and elimination of drug abuse. This policy letter directed unit commanders to develop troop orientation information and education programs focusing on the dangers and illegality of drug use and trafficking. The letter also directed unit commanders to undertake means for preventing the shipment and distribution of illicit drugs within areas of their respective jurisdictions. The year 1969 marked the beginning of concerted efforts to implement the various drug control and abuse programs identified in the aforementioned Department of Army letter of April 1968. These efforts were directed at investigating the feasibility of drug education, law enforcement and abuser amnesty programs. The discussion below includes greater detail regarding the implementation and results of these and other drug-related programs which were subsequently undertaken by US authorities in Vietnam.

1. Education, Orientation, Information Programs

The basis for a drug education program derives from a Department of Army Letter of 1 July 1969. Specifically, commanders were directed to implement education/information programs which would include dissemination of drug information material and the development of orientation and training programs and attendant scheduled-instructional periods in their regular training and duty cycles. The Army's Chaplain Corps undertook drug abuse training workshops and developed character guidance programs with particular reference to the use of marijuana.

On 23 September 1970, the Department of the Army issued Army Regulation 600-32, Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, based on the recommendations of the DOD Task Group on Drug Abuse Policy established several
years earlier. With respect to drug education programs, this regulation required that all personnel be given basic training in all aspects of drug abuse upon arrival and departure from the theater. A subsequent Army letter of 1 December 1970, Alcohol and Drug Dependency Intervention Counselors (ADDIC), directed major Army commanders to establish ADDICs and offered recommendations for implementing this program. The primary purpose of the ADDIC program was to "involve the total Army community in the drug problem and to improve communications at the higher level of command." 92/

Sanders severely criticizes the Army's drug education program. 93/ He claims that "what is called education is usually a badly designed attempt by those who are least qualified to disseminate questionable and outdated facts." He feels that the attempt to induce fear of punishment and threat of physical and psychological damage is ineffective since, as indicated by many interviews, "these threats were ludicrously toothless given the realities of their situation."

Another critic of the education program points out that drug information which is not relevant to the potential or actual user and is perceived by them as coming from an "illegitimate" source will be either disregarded or even increase the curiosity of that yet non-user. 94/

Whatever efforts were made at a drug education program obviously did not succeed. This result is not surprising in the light of a later Army study. 95/ In this definitive study, published in 1975, the Army found that drug education programs were consistently ineffective in preventing or eliminating drug abuse. The study further found background and situation factors to be considerably more significant in determining changes in drug use than any of the products of the drug education program. These results are consistent with other findings related to drug usage in Vietnam.

2. Legal Enforcement Programs

Just as drug abuse in Vietnam was an escalating phenomenon, so was the military's response to it. At first there existed an unofficial hands-off attitude, especially amongst those junior officers and NCO's who
were responsible for enforcing drug regulations. It was felt that the problem was neither particularly severe nor extensive enough to warrant strict enforcement.

The effort to crackdown on drug abuse, marijuana in particular, was in evidence, however, by January 1968. By this time, the surge in marijuana use throughout Vietnam was approaching epidemic proportions and the Army, aware of this situation, put into operation special marijuana and narcotics investigation teams. The teams had two primary objectives: the investigation of trafficking and distribution of drugs within the US military community and the instruction of commanders and key unit personnel on methods of marijuana identification and detection. In addition to the establishment of special teams, the Army put into operation on 31 January 1968 a Criminal Investigation Laboratory dedicated primarily to investigating drug and related legal and criminal matters. By April 1968, selected members of the special investigation teams began attending joint instructions and courses given by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

In 1969, the Army established a pilot program to explore the feasibility of utilizing Army-trained dogs for marijuana detection. In addition, that year saw the implementation by Headquarters, US Army Vietnam (USARV) of marijuana/narcotics suppression committees at various command levels designed to focus on drug abuse problems and to make recommendations for solutions. 96/

Gradually, enforcement measures were intensified. Nevertheless, in November 1970, the CBS Evening News televised American soldiers in Vietnam smoking marijuana through the barrel of a rifle. A series of reports and programs followed in the media indicating an alarming rise in drug abuse in Vietnam. The army dramatically increased its efforts to curtail marijuana use, and by February 1971, it could be reported that:

... marijuana has become almost non-existent at this time. Crackdowns on pushers have made the acquisition of marijuana difficult, if not impossible... because of the effectiveness of military police control measures. 97/
The control of marijuana had two undesired effects. First, the incidence of "fragging" increased as the junior officers and NCOs began enforcing drug regulations. Second, many soldiers replaced marijuana with heroin. Zinberg supports the above contention by noting that efforts to suppress the widespread use of marijuana "brought about a switch to heroin as a result." Nevertheless, disciplinary actions against drug traffickers, distributors, and abusers did result in various forms of disciplinary actions. Table 6-2 presents the results of a study on disciplinary actions by the Staff judge Advocate of II Field Force, Vietnam. The data presented reflect only that obtained for the II Field Force and as such represent only a portion of the disciplinary actions taken throughout the theater. Furthermore, the data reflect the difficulty in assessing the net results of disciplinary actions since a condition of steady troop withdrawal from 1969 onwards was a matter of national policy. Contributing to the difficulty of evaluating disciplinary data is the recognized fact that illicit drug use was so widespread that "it was quite impossible for the military drug enforcement teams to identify, apprehend, and discipline anyone but the most obvious offenders." Sanders concludes his observations on the efficiency of the Army's drug enforcement program by citing the following comments from a politically active Marine and former drug user:

We talked about dope all the time. We were constantly stoned. It was a rebellious action. We knew that they wouldn't do anything about it because it was so big. There were lieutenants that were doing it. The Man knew that we knew and that we would raise all kinds of if there were any busts. We coined the term, "You can do anything you want as long as you don't talk political." Major General George S. Prugh also notes that the Army's punitive actions against drug users was largely ineffective and inefficient. He observes that "it became increasingly clear that trial by court-martial was an awkward, ineffective, and expensive means of attempting to cope with a large-scale problem."
TABLE 6-2. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS INVOLVING NARCOTICS, DANGEROUS DRUGS OR MARIJUANA IN THE II FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS</th>
<th>ALL OF 1970</th>
<th>JANUARY, 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTICLE 15 PUNISHMENT</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UNFITNESS AND UNSUITABILITY)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Direct comparison of trends 1970/1971 is not practical. Troop strength varied considerably and the drawdown in II Field Force increased in late 1971. It is interesting to speculate, however, that the January 1971 statistics suggested a disciplinary rate for 1971 more than double that for 1970.

SOURCE: Based on report from The Judge Advocate II Field Force, 9 February 1971.

The epidemic of drug abuse in the military, especially among US forces in Vietnam, compelled President Nixon on June 17, 1971 to identify drug abuse as "America's public enemy number one." He followed through with a directive to the Secretary of Defense which included a four-point drug control program for immediate implementation in the Armed Forces. The four-point program included: 1) identification of drug-addicted military personnel in Vietnam; 2) institution of a detoxification program for addicts before return to the United States; 3) expansion of treatment programs in the United States; and 4) the development of a world-wide program of identification and treatment. Concomitant with his directive to the Secretary of Defense, President Nixon requested that Congress initiate legislation authorizing the Armed Forces to keep drug-dependent personnel on active duty after their regular tours of duty for completion of detoxification and rehabilitation programs.

Following the President's directive, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum, also dated 17 June 1971, to the Secretaries of the Armed Forces and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff detailing DoD policy on identification, treatment, and rehabilitation of drug users.

The ultimate effect of President Nixon's antidrug initiative was a series of drug treatment and control programs which were immediately implemented in Vietnam. Thus the first fruits of the Secretary of Defense's memorandum was a Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Plan released by the Secretary of the Army on 3 September 1971. This plan provided for an increased effort in all current Army programs, and for new and expanded initiatives in the identification, treatment, and rehabilitation of military drug abusers.

Within the President's own executive office, Dr. Jerome Jaffee, former head of the Illinois Drug Rehabilitation System, was appointed as the President's Advisor on Drug Problems and Director, Special Action Officer for Drug Abuse Prevention.

The New York Times on June 15 1971 gave the major reasons for President Nixon's initiative as due to the growing evidence of widespread drug abuse and its impact on national security.
addiction among servicemen in Vietnam and veterans returning from the
theater of conflict. The article noted that both the President and
Congress were "galvanized" into action on all the nation's narcotics
problems. The eagerness of the Congress in supporting the President's drug
control and treatment efforts with legislation and funds was the key factor
in the immediacy of program implementation and high-priority status.

4. Identification of Drug Users

The most intriguing and vexing problem for the military authori-
ties striving to respond to the President's "drug counter-offensive" was
the unambiguous positive identification of drug abusers and confirmed
addicts. Two principal methods to reach some standard of identification
were utilized, the questionnaire and various types of urinalysis. Each of
these methods was to prove marginally effective at best.

a. Questionnaires

Perhaps the most extensive questionnaire program adminis-
tered to drug users was that conducted by Douglas A. Ramsey of the US Army
Research Institute for The Behavioral and Social Sciences. Over
17,000 enlisted personnel in the United States, Germany and Korea were
administered anonymous, self-reporting questionnaires on many aspects of
drug usage. The questionnaire, though yielding important information on
drug abuse patterns, by the nature of the anonymity of its responders, was
not useful in identifying drug abusers to military authorities.

Another extensive questionnaire procedure to determine drug
patterns of confirmed Vietnam-theater drug users was initiated in September
1971 by L. N. Robins for various US government agency sponsors. Although the drug users were identified by means of urinalysis, the
questionnaire produced significant demographic patterns, results of which
have been discussed elsewhere in this chapter. This study and those
similar to it made use of known identified users through other means,
namely urine tests, criminal records, and self-confessions. The question-
naires themselves did not identify the drug user but rather were instru-
ments for determining the wide variety of characteristics and patterns
peculiar to drug users in Vietnam.
For the most part, drug users were reluctant to identify themselves through questionnaires because of fear of punishment and hostility from peer groups. However, once drug users were identified through other means, they tended to be cooperative in answering surveys, questionnaires and interviews. Robins has observed that "the high completion rates for interviews and urine analysis in these large and carefully selected random samples, plus the willingness of the subjects (i.e., identified drug users) to talk freely about their drug experiences, gives us some confidence that the results reported here accurately reflect the experience of the [total] population studied." 108/ With reference to interviews to identify drug users, Robins found that 97% of a sample of servicemen who had been identified as positive at DEROS (Date Expected Return from Overseas), just prior to departure from Vietnam, admitted using narcotics in Vietnam to an interviewer who was ignorant of the subject's drug history. This suggests at least some degree of validity for the interview technique but is not conclusive. The fact that one confesses to prior deviant behavior which has already been discovered does not mean that he will confess to current deviant behavior which has gone undiscovered. While the same study found that admitted current use was higher than detected by urinalysis at the time of the interview, the finding is less a validation of the interview method than it is an indication of the limitations of non-random urinalysis.

b. Urinalysis

On 18 June 1971, the day after the President's announcement and the directive from the Secretary of Defense, urinalysis screening for heroin use began in Vietnam. Initially only those personnel scheduled for return from overseas (DEROS) were tested. Subsequently, all commands instituted this involuntary screening, which was expanded to test for amphetamines and barbiturates in addition to heroin. The screening was also expanded in Vietnam to include the testing of other categories of personnel, i.e., those requesting extension of overseas tour, taking special leave, departing for rest and recuperation, and participating in rehabilitation programs. Unannounced unit testing was also used. 109/
Because of the different and complex physiological and biochemical reactions experienced by the user, three different urinalysis tests are used for screening particular drugs. Not surprisingly, each of these tests varies as to reliability and accuracy as specific drug-identifier instruments. The three urinalysis tests are (1) the Free Radical Assay Technique (FRAT), which is extremely sensitive, tests only for heroin and is known to produce false positives if codein or possibly other substances are in the urine sample; (2) a Thin Layer Chromatography (TLC), which is less sensitive than the FRAT but detects amphetamines and barbiturates as well as opiates; and (3) urine specimens that produce positive results in either the FRAT or TLC test undergo a third test for confirmation, using a Gas Liquid Chromatography (GLC) process. These tests will normally identify the drug user for about three days after his last usage. 110/

Very little time was wasted in setting up laboratory and treatment facilities because of the extreme pressure of the extent of heroin use in Vietnam. On June 22, 1971, the Free Radical Assay Technique (FRAT) urine testing program went into effect. It became policy that no military personnel could leave the country unless they showed negative results on the FRAT Test. Zinberg comments that verification of heroin use by the GLC process is considered "extremely accurate" by its users. 111/

As a consequence of this initial testing program, it was determined that 2.5 percent of Army personnel leaving Vietnam in June 1971 had positive traces of opiates in their urine. Table 6-3 shows the results of nine months of urinalysis testing. The relatively lower percentage figures for scheduled testing reflect the fact that many soldiers quickly perceived the consequences of their being identified as a heroin user/addict and thus devised means to avoid detection. It was fairly easy for a drug user to substitute a negative urine sample from a friend, in place of his own, and pass the test. Many addicts voluntarily abstained from heroin use for a week prior to a scheduled test, since the analysis only detected opiates within four to five days after use. Army nurses saw addicts in the midst of agonizing withdrawal pass the test. 112/
### TABLE 6-3. URINALYSIS TESTING FOR PERSONNEL DEPARTING VIETNAM 1971-1972

#### COMPARATIVE TESTING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### UNANNOUNCED TESTING: % POSITIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-3 also shows the higher percentage of positive urine tests when unannounced testing was initiated in October 1971, confirming the suspicion that spurious results were obtained from scheduled testing.

Hurst, Cook, and Ramsey, in their assessment of drug prevalence, found that percentages of positive urinalysis tests were about one third of the percentages statistically predicted from interviews, self reports, and questionnaires. Urinalyses consistently show a lower percentage for opiates as well as other drugs. The authors conclude that urinalysis findings may be either chemical lab positive (i.e., false positive) or confirmed positive, which may eliminate as many as 50 percent of actual drug users. False positives may be caused by prescription use and errors in laboratory technique. The study further notes that the percentage of users in a given period will be greater than the percentage of chemical positives for the period. This is because the sporadic user will not test positive for the time that the drug is not being used. In other words, urinalysis will not reliably detect the sporadic drug user. 113/ This suggests that the frequent use of surprise, unannounced, and random urine tests should be utilized to prevent use of illicitly obtained negative urine samples and to increase the chances for detecting the sporadic user.

c. Reaching a Consensus on Drug Prevalence

The previously cited studies relating to drug usage patterns and means for identifying drug users all have the major shortcoming of presenting prevalence subject to varying degrees of uncertainty and error. As has been shown, urinalysis data tend to be underestimates of the actual extent of drug usage, though highly reliable in the detection of a specific drug when present in the system.

The use of interviews and questionnaires which identify the user is perhaps the least effective means for ascertaining drug prevalence because most users fear that the information will be used against them. This fact was brought out in an insightful article related to addict discharge policies and procedures in Vietnam. 114/
Hurst, Cook, and Ramsey conclude this assessment of drug prevalence studies in the Army by observing, "The use of a brief, anonymous, confidential self-report form provides rates which are most probably nearer the actual rates of illicit use, mainly because the self-report has less potential for error and because it permits drug use patterns to be estimated over a longer period." 115/

5. Drug Abuse

The study by Douglas A. Ramsey for the Army Research Institute contains the most significant findings relating to various factors which affect the incidence of drug abuse. 116/ The investigation examined the roles of leadership, social-organizational forces, and physical/mental activities which may influence the course of drug abuse.

A study of social-organizational influences on drug abuse was significantly associated with low morale, boredom, and dissatisfaction with job, officers, and the institution of the Army in general.

With respect to unit leadership and drug use, the analysts found that drug use within squads did not appear to be associated with enlisted men's perceptions of their squad leader's behavior, but was related to perceived leadership behavior for all other major levels, i.e., platoon leaders, sergeants, first sergeants, and company commanders. A significant finding was that the degree to which various leaders helped members of the squad achieve their work goals correlated positively with low drug use in the squad. In addition it was found that the frequency of meetings involving unit leaders and subordinates over work-related problems also corresponded positively with lower frequencies of unit drug usage.

Indications showed that when alternative programs for the development of self-esteem, such as karate lessons, were carried over a long period of time there was potential for a significant decline in drug usage. Similarly, when transcendental meditation (TM) lessons were carried over a long period of time, the participants tended to show "changes in mood and outlook with attendant significant decrease in drug involvement." 117/
6. The Amnesty Program

The amnesty program instituted by the Army was perhaps a most unique and imaginative initiative aimed at treatment and rehabilitation of abusers. As early as March 1969, the 4th Infantry Division began the first amnesty and rehabilitation program in Vietnam. Subsequently, USARV began officially to encourage commanders to institute an amnesty and rehabilitation program. The Army followed this initial encouragement with formal action and published a letter in October 1969 giving added higher command emphasis to the marijuana and drug suppression and rehabilitation programs.

During this period, both the public and military authorities began seeing the abusers and addicts more as persons needing treatment and rehabilitation rather than criminal prosecution. Moreover, drug affected military personnel were encouraged to seek help and avail themselves of the existing, albeit limited, amnesty programs which became available in 1970. 113/

A significant milestone in the amnesty program occurred on 27 April 1971 when the Army directed that drug abusers/addicts be considered for separation from the Army under honorable conditions according to the provisions of Army Regulation (AR) 632-212. This regulation provides for the honorable separation of affected individuals provided they have been officially enrolled and have successfully participated in the available drug amnesty programs. Implicit in the Army message is that AR 635-212 be applied when it has been determined that the individual can no longer effectively assume his military duties and is beyond the required rehabilitation which could restore him to unimpaired duty. In essence, the regulation provided for amnesty and limited rehabilitation; it later provided for exemption from prosecution in simple cases of drug possession or use of drugs provided the soldier turned himself in to authorities. The key to this provision is that the soldier in this case must have officially requested medical assistance prior to his possession or use of the drug. 119/

This policy at first appeared to be a solid step in the right direction but failed to judge the social consequences the individual would
be forced to bear. Security clearances were confiscated or denied, and the individual was tabbed for life as a drug addict, thus preventing him from pursuing such professions as medicine and law. In effect, full amnesty and anonymity were not part of this program.

Amnesty participants were given only one chance to withdraw from heroin use, and this proved one of the program's major disadvantages. It assumed that a soldier was able to give up drugs completely the first time the effort was made. The man who could give up his drug habit in one attempt was a person whose drug habit was already under control. Some soldiers who were casual users used the program to avoid punishment for drug use. 120/

Further, the program encouraged a feeling of helplessness among the user soldiers by looking upon them as patients or deviants; and yet a positive, not a weak, self-image was necessary for a soldier trying to break the habit. Compounding the problem, the program did not distinguish between different types of users - for example, between social users, addicts with motivation to quit, and addicts content with the habit - and thus was individual and less effective in its treatment.

Commenting on the amnesty program, Sanders has observed that with the amnesty as well as other programs soldiers, "simply do not believe that the medical records are confidential" and feel that they will be returned to their units labeled as deviants. Sanders cites the point of view of a soldier: "90 percent of the guys don't trust the lenience thing. You go someplace to get straight and then they send you back to your unit and the lifers get on your ass. They know where you been and they give you shit details and take your weekends." 121/

7. Treatment and Rehabilitation Programs

The drug epidemic, peaking in 1970, and President Nixon's "drug counter-offensive" message of June 1971, provided the necessary impetus for an intensive drug treatment and rehabilitation program. Prior to the Nixon message, the Surgeon General submitted in February 1971 a Program Change Request to provide funding and manpower authorization for drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation teams at designated Army hospitals. A major
detoxification center was opened at Madigen General Hospital in the State of Washington in March 1971.

In response to the President's message of June 1971, the previously mentioned Department of the Army Alcohol and Drug Prevention and Control Plan was published in September 1971. Specifically, the plan required that drug abusers/addicts be given a five to seven day detoxification treatment. This period was to be used also to determine if the patient needed further treatment and rehabilitation. As a result of this plan, 34 hospitals in CONUS were designated to accept patients for detoxification and short-term in-patient treatment. Those patients requiring rehabilitation were assigned to specially designated military units with rehabilitation furnished by "halfway houses" and "rap centers." Those personnel separated from the Army under amnesty and separation procedures were sent to Veteran's Administration hospitals for further treatment and rehabilitation. Those personnel not cooperating with the program within a 60-day time period were given administrative discharges, and those soldiers who had unresolved court-martial charges pending against them for drug offenses and opted for leaving the service were allowed to do so for the "good of the Army." Charges resulting from criminal narcotics trafficking and distribution were not included in this program.

By May 1972, the Army had established rehabilitation and treatment centers in Vietnam. Those centers included medical, psychological and penal programs.

Even though the Army's attempts at drug treatment and rehabilitation did not for the most part result in punitive actions, many of the veterans thought otherwise after their treatment. According to Sanders, many of the veterans felt that the Army's treatment and rehabilitation programs were designed to "save face." They further elaborated that the programs were "punitive, inadequate, badly run, ineffective, and based on an overly simplistic view of drug use." Many also doubted the military's commitment to controlling drug use.

In turn, when those veterans were asked how they would design and operate the Army's treatment and rehabilitation programs based on their
Vietnam experiences, they emphasized: "a) voluntary rather than compulsory involvement, b) staffing by ex-servicemen with personal drug experience in Vietnam, c) the necessity of providing vocational training and placement along with treatment, and d) treatment programs be organized and financed by the military but 'patients' be discharged from the military prior to their involvement." 127/

F. Conclusion: A Retrospective Look at the US Response to the Vietnam Drug Environment

Initially, the military responded to the drug epidemic with a heavier emphasis placed on punishment than on rehabilitation. Because of the reliance on punishment, drug cases clogged the military justice system. When the rehabilitation and detoxification centers were established, soldiers deemed unfit for service because of habitual use of drugs were administratively discharged under Army Regulation 635-212. In December, 1971, it was estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers were being discharged each month after having twice been certified as heroin users on the basis of urinalysis. Their commanding officers asserted that they had not made an effort to break the habit and were of "negligible value to the United States Army." 128/

The administrative discharge mechanism was favored by the soldier and the officer because it expedited the user's departure with least paperwork and with minimal unfavorable impact on unit statistics. Those with the greatest need for treatment - the heroin addicts - were least aware of the existence of treatment facilities and least convinced that treatment would be worthwhile.

The drug education program was not particularly effective either. It tended to emphasize physical and psychological damage and strict military discipline. One soldier described this predicament in these terms:

Most of what they told you was about how many kinds of ways they could bust you. They relied on the threat of strict military disciplinary action to deter you from
doing anything but work. People would say, "Well, you're trying to kill me anyway so what else can you do to me?" 129/

The military erroneously assumed ignorance on the part of the soldier and used exaggerated facts and even false information to inspire a fear of drugs. A credibility problem developed. A non-commissioned officer commented:

We kept telling them how dangerous (marijuana) was. They tried it, probably tried it at home first, and knew they weren't dying. We tell them how dangerous smoking skag (heroin) is and they don't believe it. 130/

Indeed the drug education program may have increased the curiosity of some soldiers to try drugs.

... references in the antidrug propaganda to the white heroin in Vietnam as 96 percent 'pure' makes it sound so good, that you can hardly wait to try it. Proctor and Gamble made a fortune using this kind of line to sell a brand of soap. 131/

Some units tried other methods than those of antidrug propaganda, but these units were statistically no more successful than those using the antidrug material. 132/

Some observers feel that drug abuse in Vietnam often served a valid purpose, and they were thus less willing to combat it:

It is interesting that military psychiatrists are finding a lower rate of hospitalization for mental disorders of GI's in Vietnam than in any war from World War I through Korea. 133/

Seen in this light as self-administered therapy, drug abuse appeared not as an unmitigated evil, but as a blessing in disguise. 134/ Those holding this view would naturally be less inclined to support the Army's treatment plans, especially as they were then constituted.
The drug abuse programs failed for many reasons. They failed to include all drugs, e.g., alcohol and thus, not only left part of the problem unsolved, but produced a credibility gap as well.

There is little doubt in the drug-user and drug-treatment communities that "hard" drugs, namely the opiates, cocaine, LSD and the amphetamines, are indeed dangerous by the nature of their physical and psychological effects on the individual abuser. Not clear, however, is the effect of these drugs on both individual and unit combat readiness and effectiveness in the Vietnam combat arena. Indeed, there is an extreme paucity of information regarding drugs and the various indices of across-the-services job performance and combat missions.

In recent hearings before the House Subcommittee on Narcotics Abuse and Control (Drug Abuse in the Military), and as reported in the press, the consensus of military authorities was "inconclusive and even contradictory" with respect to drug abuse impact on combat effectiveness. At this hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Duncan stated: "We do not have any evidence that drug use has generally impaired fighting readiness." 135/

A contradictory point of view was given by Dr. Robert Smith, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, who asserted that any use of drugs and alcohol "is too much and has an adverse impact on personal and unit effectiveness." Dr. Smith also added:

The effects could range from none to inability to muster, to mistakes leading to personal death or injury or to critical tactical-decision mistakes that could hazard entire units. . . . We may not find out the real answers to combat effectiveness until it is too late in a literal trial by fire. 136/

As to the Vietnam experience in particular, little data and direct evidence relevant to drug use and its impact on combat performance exist. A reasonable explanation is that most of the troops had a certain amount of "drug sense." It was recognized that alertness and reaction time were critical for survival. There was also considerable peer pressure placed on soldiers not to use drugs in combat situations. Those that did "were taken
care of." 137/ Where jobs were more routine, such as many at base camps where drug use was more extensive, the effects of such use on overall-combat effectiveness can only be estimated. Most military professionals would probably agree with the value judgment that had a base camp in which drug usage abounded been subjected to a major attack the results would have been disastrous.

Sanders notes that drugs were very rarely used by those people who went on combat patrol, although when they reverted to a non-combat status some usage occurred since they could get "high" in relative safety. 138/ In contrast, Bentei and Smith found that there was a moderate use of marijuana and heroin by troops while on patrol. Those users claimed the drugs helped them to "decrease tension and make the combatant more alert." 139/ For those duties which were not combat related, it was found that many of the personnel assigned those tasks were commonly high while on duty. Most of those duty assignments were in rear areas, distant and relatively safe from enemy action. 140/ Sanders concludes by stating that most jobs that were performed by men "stoned" were routine and undemanding and could be done easily by the user given his experience on the job. It is significant to add that in none of those jobs did the user perceive his life in danger from the assigned task or enemy action. 141/

G. SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS

The following insights were derived from the information presented in this chapter:

- The pattern and incidence of drug abuse in Vietnam was not markedly different than that encountered by American soldiers worldwide during that same period.

- Changing mores and societal attitudes made drug use generally acceptable among the younger generation at a time that coincided with increased force commitments to Vietnam where high-quality drugs were readily available at very low cost. This combination largely accounts for the incidence of drug abuse in Vietnam; the drug problem should have been foreseeable.
Fear of battle or of becoming a casualty was not the major reason for drug use as had been assumed by many; boredom, routine tedium, the desire to "kill time," peer pressure, and coping with an unfamiliar physical and military environment are cited as major reasons for drug use in Vietnam.

Generally, members of units with lower drug usage reflected higher esteem for their unit leaders; these non-users felt their leaders to be interested in their personal welfare and helpful to them in fulfilling their duty assignments.

There is at least circumstantial evidence that very few soldiers who were actively engaged in combat were under the influence of drugs; rather, they showed "drug sense" and avoided its use when exposed to combat situations. As a result, there is very little evidence of the effects of drugs on combat readiness and performance of combat troops in the field or in exposed fire bases. There was, however, substantial evidence of dangerous levels of drug use in rear areas and base camps, particularly after 1970, to a degree that would seriously have impaired combat efficiency had those locales been subjected to strong enemy attacks. In part, the composite organizational structure of major installations in rear areas, with its diversity of commands and relaxed discipline, contributed to the incidence of disciplinary problems, including drug abuse.

US officials did not anticipate the nature and extent of the drug abuse problem, especially its increasing rate after 1968. Initiatives at drug education/orientation had little effect because of failure to understand the basic causes for drug usage in Vietnam. Treatment and rehabilitation programs had some success, however, at great financial and manpower costs. But like the amnesty program, the programs did succeed in ridding the services of unrehabilitatives and undesirables. As a consequence of its failure to anticipate the drug abuse problem, the Army initially had no effective activity/work programs to divert potential users.
from drugs, and the subsequent response to the drug epidemic in many cases was "too little, too late." The Army and the other services still have a drug problem and have failed to resolve it satisfactorily.

- The Army and other services did not have effective pre-deployment screening procedures to eliminate from overseas assignment personnel with high risk potential. The current drug situation in Europe (December 1979) shows that such screening procedures may not be highly effective.

H. LESSONS

The following lessons were drawn from this chapter:

- Good leaders have notably lower drug incidence in their units than in those units where leaders do not command the respect of their troops.

- To cope with drug abuse problems, leaders of all ages and grades need to understand the causal nature of the drug problem. Leaders should not have to learn these skills by on-the-job training but rather should be schooled in the fundamentals of drug abuse and the means for preventing, detecting, and handling drug problems.

- Troops tend to be "battle wise" and "drug wise," avoiding drug usage in circumstances that clearly endanger their lives while in the performance of their duties; addicts, however, lack that judgment ability.

- The principal inducement for drug use is boredom, and boredom can be prevented by intelligent, professional leaders who know and understand the problem and who provide meaningful and satisfying work/activities, opportunities, and rewards to their troops.

- A variety of drug abuse detection measures have been developed, but they have generally been subject to manipulation by clever drug users. Surprise inspection and testing has proven to be the
best way to uncover users. Preventing drug use in the first place is however, the best tactic and requires knowledge about the problem and leadership in dealing with it.

- Beating the drug problem cannot be accomplished solely by the military services; extensive cooperation between many government agencies is needed at the top level, and that cooperation must extend down to the lower operating levels.
CHAPTER 6 ENDNOTES


9. Ibid.

10. The validity of the "crackdown" theory, i.e., that stringent Army measures drove US GIs to use heroin in place of marijuana, has been questioned by some authorities on drug abuse in Vietnam, specifically Lt. Col. Arthur M. Harris, Alcohol and Drug Policy Office. He contends that heroin was used primarily owing to its low cost, availability, and undetectability (at least prior to urinalysis testing). Both sides of the argument appear plausible. Colonel Harris's comments were provided he reviewed a draft of this chapter.


13. Ibid.

15. C. Sanders, p. 70
17. Iver Petersen.
22. R. Critchfield, p. 393.
25. Ibid.
26. C. Sanders, p. 69

32. McCoy, p. 19. McCoy makes several allegations against ranking SVN officials but unfortunately does not document his case sufficiently.


35. J. Flaherty.


40. J. Flaherty, p. 3.


46. C. Sanders, p. 68.


49. An AFQT score of 90 - 110 is considered average.


54. R. A. Roffman, p. 35.


57. C. Sanders, pp. 67-68.


60. L. N. Robins, p. 31.

61. D. Bentel, p. 25.


63. L. Ingraham, pp. 212-213.

64. S. J. Lloyd, p. 299.
Cigarettes (nicotine) and coffee (caffeine) are routinely packaged in field rations. While not technically part of the rations, beer, and occasionally liquor, were also provided in the field and were readily available in base camp clubs in Vietnam.


Richard A. Tieden and Donald O. St. Denis, Pioneer House Report, (Plantation Post, Staff Surgeon, HQ, II Field Force, Vietnam, February 1971, pp. 7-12). Tieden and Denis were the directors of Pioneer House, a drug rehabilitation center in Vietnam.

D. Bentel, p. 25.

See Zinberg; Boyle; Fitzgerald; Sanders; and Paul M. Roman, Spirits and Demons at Work: Alcohol and Other Drugs on the Job (New York: Cornell University, 1972).


N. Zinberg, p. 487.

"For GI's, It's a Different War - But Still Dangerous," p. 64.


C. Sanders, p. 66.


Hearings before the Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in the Military, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, February 1972.


83. Felix Belair, p. 2.

84. R. Critchfield, p. 393.

85. Ibid.

86. F. Fitzgerald, p. 422.


89. Ibid.


92. Ibid, p. 10.

93. Sanders, p. 73.


97. Tieden and Denis, pp. 7-12.

98. Zinberg, p. 487.

99. Sanders, p. 73.

100. Ibid.


104. A detailed account of the President's program on drug abuse prevention and supporting congressional legislation is found in Dr. Jaffee's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in the Military. March 1, 1972, Ref. 35, p. 165.

105. Dana Schmidt.

106. Ramsey.

107. Robins.

108. Ibid., p. 23.


111. Zinberg, p. 487.

112. McCoy, p. 219.

113. Hurst, Cook and Ramsay, p. 1.


115. Hurst, p. 28.

116. Ramsey.

117. Ibid., p. 10.

118. Prugh, p. 108.


120. Zinberg, p. 487.

121. Sanders, p. 75.

122. Holt, p. 15.

125. For a detailed and comprehensive technical discussion of the various treatment programs and facilities, see Zinberg, pp. 487-488.

126. Sanders, p. 75.

127. Ibid.


129. Ibid.


131. Sanders, p. 74.


133. Sanders, p. 75.


136. Ibid., p. 19.

137. Interview with K. Rowley, op. cit.


139. Bentel, p. 27.

140. Senate Subcommittee on Drug Abuse, p. 7.

141. Sanders, p. 72.
Psychiatric casualties in the U.S. Army in Vietnam differ from those in previous wars in two major respects. First and foremost, the rates of such casualties have been considerably lower than in either the Korean War or World War II. Second, the syndrome of combat fatigue or exhaustion, often prevalent in earlier wars, has been observed infrequently.

William S. Allerton, M.D.

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Stress
Stress—a specific response to a perceived damaging or potentially damaging situation—is a generally normal, highly individual, and much-discussed phenomenon. War—a situation in which the potential may be very real and the damage very great—not surprisingly has a tendency to produce severe stress. Indeed, it would be almost abnormal for an individual participant in a war not to feel some sort of tension, stress, or culture shock. In Vietnam, for example, the stark contrast between the hot, enemy-infested jungles (or the tensions and frustrations of base-camp life) and the previous life of the average serviceman can well be imagined.1/ The development of depression or anxieties when separated from friends and familiar surroundings and the fear of death or dismemberment are normal and to be expected.2/ Further, as Dr. H. S. Bloch concluded, "these symptoms of dysforia or anxiety need not be ominous. For some people in Vietnam [they are] a growing and maturing experience."3/

Frequently, however, individuals experiencing war-related stress are unable to make the necessary psychological adjustments. Their methods of coping might prove inadequate, or the methods chosen might be unacceptable to society or the situation. The sufferer may be "struck dumb" as was often observed by one doctor in World War II, or "bug out" as delinquent behavior was termed during the Korean War, or "drop out" or become a drug
or disciplinary casualty as so often happened in Vietnam.4/ That there is
a fine line separating manageable tension from intolerable stress is clear;
what causes an individual to cross this line is not, despite the important
contributions which numerous studies have made to our understanding of the
problem.5/

One facet of the issue involves methods of coping--why do some
people cope with stress more effectively than others, and what mechanisms
do they use?

2. Coping

Dr. F. Elmadjian has observed that soldiers who successfully cope
with stress use a great variety of methods.6/ Some soldiers are strongly
religious. Some find similar reassurance in lucky charms, rituals, or
superstitions--as did the unit that became notorious for refusing to eat
apricots after a member died following a meal of the fruit. These feelings
can be very powerful--indeed they need to be if they are to serve their
function--as is illustrated by the usually calm, brave, and effective
soldier who always volunteered to be point man on search missions, always
wore his lucky hat, but told an officer on base who ordered the hat removed
that he would shoot him on the spot if he touched it.

Stouffer et al. observed the stress-reducing effects of humor
and various forms of denial of reality.7/ Tischler identified three
general patterns of behavior that soldiers employed to facilitate coping
with the threatening environment: "fusion with the group," searching for
an authority figure, and a flight into work.8/ More attention will be paid
to these later. Dr. Bloch listed some of the mechanisms observed in
Vietnam:

In Vietnam, behavioral ways include a spectrum running
from such direct pacifiers of dysphoric and anxiety as
drinking and eating more, to slightly more sophisti-
cated ways of accomplishing the same thing, such as
buying things (camera and stereo equipment, radios,
tape recorders, native trinkets and art work). Among
the most functionally adaptive mechanisms for non-com-
batant soldiers and particularly professional people is
becoming engrossed in one's work if the opportunity arises. On the more cognitively-oriented and sublimating side are such diversification tactics as reading, maintaining extensive correspondences, and making tape recordings and photography (the latter two probably being analogous to the child's use of toys).\textsuperscript{9/}

A fatalistic outlook helped protect others' mental health: the feeling that 'what will be will be' removes individual responsibility and worry. A few calculated their statistical chance of being killed on any given day and found reassurance in the smallness of the percentage. And of course an individual was not limited to any one means of coping.

However, since different wars have demonstrated dramatically different rates of "psychiatric casualty," it is clear that factors other than just human responses must be studied if a useful prediction and control system is to be arrived at. For as Dr. Bloch observed, "Although many people use similar coping mechanisms, the variables make it impossible to group everyone's experiences into specific stages." It is therefore necessary to look briefly at how stress was handled in several recent wars in order to view the Vietnam situation in the context of the general human response to war.

B. STRESS IN RECENT WARS

The American Civil War saw the first attempt to define and treat combat stress. Dr. William Hammond, Surgeon General of the Union Army, found that three percent of the troops were discharged for what he called "nostalgia, paralysis, or insanity."\textsuperscript{10/} His prescribed treatment was for soldiers demonstrating these symptoms to stay with their units, but to be assigned non-stressful jobs until they recovered. This met with some success.\textsuperscript{11/}

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, a war which produced many of the generally acknowledged stress-producing combat situations,\textsuperscript{12/} was the first to use psychiatrists to treat combat-stress patients. The staff, however, proved too small and most stress casualties were turned over to the Red
Cross. Other conflicts of this period—the Franco-Prussian, Spanish-American, and Boer Wars—had few combat-stress casualties and thus did not generate the same demand for psychiatric assistance as did the Russo-Japanese War.

By the First World War all major armies had psychiatric services as part of their medical corps. Commonly observed stress symptoms included:

...clear manifestations of terror, being tremulous and over responsive to the slightest stimulation. Others were in confused states, often having been found aimlessly wandering around the battlefront oblivious to the dangers of the environment. Still others present with paralysis or sensory disturbances and some were inexplicably comatose.

Observers divided these patients into two categories: those who exhibited these symptoms as a result of front-line duty and those whose breakdown could not be linked directly to combat. The first category was considered to be suffering from an organic disease.

In a war characterized by relentless and heavy bombardment of both sides, the reasonable assumption was made that a soldier's brain became chronically concussed by his proximity to exploding shells, with multiple petecial hemorrhages occurring in the cerebrum. This subsequent emotional breakdown was justifiable labeled "shell shock."

Patients in the second category were at first considered to be cowards, but as the war drew to a close, psychiatrists became increasingly aware that this was not the case—that psychic stress alone could cause symptoms as mild or as severe as any observed on the front lines. Indeed, the organic theory itself was generally discarded in favor of more psychologically oriented factors.

Despite knowledge of combat stress gained from analysis of American troops in the Civil War and World War I, the US Army entered the second World War poorly prepared to handle psychiatric casualties. Over 500,000 troops were discharged for psychiatric reasons during World War II and, at one point, psychiatric casualties were leaving the military faster than...
troops were being drafted. Psychiatric-casualty rates varied from a low of 28 per 1,000 per year in the Ninth Army in Europe to a high of 101 per thousand per year in the First Army in Europe. Overall, 13.8 troops per 1,000 per year were actually evacuated.

The percentage of combat-stress casualties declined somewhat in the Korean War. Between July 1950 and July 1952, 37 troops per 1,000 per year were classed as psychiatric casualties; these were evacuated at a rate of 2.6 per 1,000 per year.

With the expanded data base provided by World War II and Korea and the increased sophistication of psychiatry as an area of medical study and treatment, the Army entered the Vietnam conflict better prepared to diagnose and treat psychiatric casualties. Perhaps as a result of this, at least in part, psychiatric casualty rates in Vietnam were startlingly low when compared with the rates of earlier wars and, more surprisingly, even with the rates for the American civilie population as a whole. The following statistics from the Surgeon General's Office illustrate this phenomenon (all figures are per 1,000 troops per year):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>US Society</th>
<th>WWII (low)</th>
<th>Korea (average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(through June)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average:</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would appear from these figures, then, that the American soldier in Vietnam was distinctly psychologically healthier than his counterpart in previous wars. Can this be true, and if so, what has caused it? Has mankind become braver, or less concerned with death? Were there simply
fewer stress-producing situations in Vietnam? Did advances in treatment and facilities bolster mental health? Or were different definitions of "psychiatric casualties" the cause of different figures?

Not unexpectedly, there is considerable disagreement about the data and what they imply. Thus, for example, a professor of psychiatry at Yale concluded after serving in Vietnam:

I am not convinced that psychiatric casualties in Vietnam really differ from those in other wars. While there has been a marked diminution in incidence and evacuation rates, it is unclear that the basic psychopathologic configurations noted in Vietnam differ materially from those observed previously....I hypothesize....that it is the nature of the combat experience that has changed, not the nature of the psychiatric casualties.22/

The Chief of the Neuropsychiatry Services of the US Naval Hospital in Philadelphia disagrees:

Numerous observers have stated that psychiatric problems in the Vietnam war are quantitatively and qualitatively different from those in previous wars, and the author's experience with Marine and Navy patients in both the combat zone and in a large stateside evacuation hospital has been consistent with this observation.23/

Dr. Jack Anderson agrees that there was a change in the nature of psychiatric casualties in Vietnam, and suggests a possible reason why:

Why the change in the nature of psychiatric casualties? Why the shift from intrapersonal to interpersonal or social conflict?...the most important [reason] seems to be the continuing shift of the American population from sparsely populated rural areas to densely populated urban areas and the associated weakening of family structure and function.24/

And finally, another psychiatrist raised questions about how much of the story is actually told by the psychiatric-casualty statistics:
There are many so-called psychiatric casualties in Vietnam who are never processed through medical channels. These are the hundreds of soldiers who become administrative or disciplinary casualties. When their behavior becomes overly deviant or disruptive--being AWOL, showing disrespect and disobedience, acting aggressively or violently, or taking drugs--they are removed from their units [and put in the stockade or discharged].

The initial step towards sorting out the truth and/or implications of these various observations is to look carefully, if briefly, at various factors which influenced the psychological stability of American servicemen in Vietnam.

C. FACTORS AFFECTING PSYCHIATRIC CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

1. Group Cohesion and the One-Year Tour

Much has been written about the importance of the primary group to the psychological well being of soldiers. Studies following World War II and the Korean War identified the primary group as "...the critical social structure in the maintenance of morale and motivation." It has been pointed out that a primary group can assist in the meeting of goals, as well as satisfying social and emotional needs. General William Dean, winner of the Medal of Honor, admitted that he told his Korean captors too much because of his need for companionship and the desire to talk to someone. Heroic actions are often performed for the good of the primary group, rather than because of loyalty to a nation or cause. After being recommended for the Medal of Honor, 2LT Joseph Marm said, "What would the fellows have thought of me if I had been afraid to do it?"

The primary group in World War II--generally a squad of 8 to 12 men or a platoon of 25 to 40--was reduced by the end of the Korean War to the two-man buddy system (or four-man fire team in the Marine Corps). By the middle of the Vietnam War, however, even this small unit was rarely maintained over an entire year's tour; the one-year tour, six-month command tour, and the rotation and other policies made unit cohesion very difficult.
to achieve. This disintegration of the primary group appears to have been one of the prime factors contributing to the deteriorating condition of the military.30/

Moskos acknowledges the importance of the primary group as a motivator, but is careful not to overstate the strength of group commitments, which tend to be emotional and personal, noting that they are a pragmatic response to a situation and, surprisingly, are seldomly maintained after the group has been split up.31/ All other things being equal, however, the existence of a cohesive primary group does seem to be an important asset in the prevention of psychiatric casualties, a statement as true in civilian life as it is in the military.

It would seem, then, that the dislocations and turmoil so often associated with the one-year tour of duty would, by hurting group cohesion, have a significant negative effect on the mental health of servicemen. For some soldiers such a process undoubtedly did take its toll. At the same time, though, there is a body of opinion that holds that the one-year tour was one of the main factors responsible for the decrease in psychiatric casualties in Vietnam as compared to World War II and the Korean War. Observers who have mentioned the beneficial effects of the one-year tour on soldiers' mental health include Dr. William Allerton, Dr. Peter Bourne, Edward Colbach and Matthew Parrish, Dr. David Forrest, and Cdr. R. E. Strange.32/ The one-year tour, in giving each soldier a specific DEROS, or date for returning from overseas, helped prevent the psychological problems associated with extended stays in a combat zone—a phenomenon observed and studied in World War II and Korea. J. W. Appel documented, for example, that the psychological ill-effects of privation increase over time and, with A. J. Glass, provided data demonstrating a correlation between the number of days in combat or of combat exposure and psychological breakdown.33/

One frequently noted psychological effect of the one-year tour is that soldiers tend to pass through distinct phases as their tours progress. J. J. Dowling described three general phases: apprehensive enthusiasm, resignation to the situation, and anxious apprehension.34/ Moskos cites a similar series of changes:
During his one-year tour in Vietnam, the combat soldier underwent definite changes in attitude toward his situation. Although such attitudes varied depending on individual personality and combat exposure, they followed a typical course. Upon arrival to his unit and for several weeks following, the soldier was excited to be in the war zone and may even have looked forward in engaging the enemy. After the first serious encounter, however, he lost his enthusiasm for combat. From about the second through the eighth month of his tour, he operated on a kind of plateau of moderate or dutiful commitment to the combat role.

Toward the ninth and tenth months, the soldier came to regard himself as an "old soldier." Usually at this point the soldier was generally most combat effective. As he approached the end of his tour in Vietnam, however, he began noticeably to withdraw his efficiency, and became reluctant to engage in offensive combat operations. Stories were repeated of the men killed the day they were to rotate back to the United States. "Short-timer's fever" was implicitly recognized by the others and demands on short-timers were informally reduced. The final disengagement period of the combat soldier was considered a kind of earned prerogative which those earlier in the rotation cycle hoped eventually to enjoy. In other words, short-timer's fever is a tacitly approved way of cutting short the soldier's exposure to combat dangers.35/

The overall effect of the one-year tour of duty is difficult to assess. Clearly it had both positive and negative consequences for mental health which varied from time to time and from individual to individual. For some, the turbulence preventing the development of strong primary group ties may have been much more psychologically damaging than the beneficial effects of the individual "light at the end of the tunnel." For others, the guaranteed limit may have been the prime psychological support throughout the period. Moskos has observed that the policy tended to be beneficial to morale—and hence to mental health—when the war was on the upswing, but was damaging from then onwards.36/ The approaching end of a tour could be either uplifting or nerve-racking, or a combination of the two. One of the most perceptive observations on the psychological effects of the one-year tour was made by Dr. Slouch, who observed the tradeoff of advantages and disadvantages:
With the expectation of returning home in one year, individuals in Vietnam probably remain more caught between the war zone and homes compared to their World War II counterparts. And this probably makes them more subject to such phenomenon as frustration over not receiving a letter every day. One result is that a person in Vietnam may receive less stability and security from the cohesiveness of his group than did his counterpart in World War II. So that the price paid for more hope is a persistently higher level of frustration which must be coped with. And people differ very markedly in their ability to tolerate frustration.37/

2. Nature of the Vietnam War

Exposure to combat is the single most important variable affecting wartime psychological casualty rates, as data from World War II indicate. Appel, for example, documented that in 1977 military-wide hospitalization in Europe for neuropsychiatric disorders was 47.0 per 1,000-man troop strength, while hospitalization for combat divisions was 250 per 1,000.38/ Using the number of wounded in action as a measure of combat intensity, Glass and Appel even showed a direct correlation between the intensity of combat and the psychiatric attrition rate.39/ And similarly, V. H. Tompkins demonstrated a significant relationship between actual danger and the incidence of neurosis among World War II combat fliers.40/

The actual amount of combat in Vietnam was fairly small compared to that in the two World Wars, a fact which accounts for the small number of combat-related psychiatric casualties in Vietnam. As Colbach and Parrish noted:

It is important to realize that actual prolonged contact with the enemy has been the exception in Vietnam. Large battles have been rare in comparison to Korea and World War II. Therefore, combat itself has generated only a small number of psychiatric casualties.41/

Vietnam also involved few instances of static positions being maintained under extreme pressure, with the obvious extreme example of such prolonged and static exposure to combat stress being the trench warfare of World War I. Studies have shown that such static situations, particularly
when they involve constant danger, are extremely detrimental to a soldier's psychological well being, even, some have shown, more so than actual retreat or defeat.42/

However, a different type of static situation did develop in Vietnam with the growth of the base-camp and fire-base network; and this resulted in many psychiatric casualties, with soldiers feeling bored and/or powerless to retaliate against a frequently invisible enemy. In particular base camps created an environment peculiarly ill-suited to the effective handling of stress. Thus, for example, base camps made it very difficult to cope with stress in the three ways noted by Tischler: personnel policies made "fusion with the group" difficult; these same policies, coupled with officer-enlisted man tensions and several other factors, made identification with an authority figure difficult; and the idleness frequently associated with base-camp life made it difficult to drown one's frustrations in work. Of these, it seems that idleness and boredom, which Menninger cites as one of the non-combat factors most damaging to mental health,43/ was in fact the greatest psychological evil, though officers who tried to keep men busy often met resistance if tasks were considered "Mickey Mouse."

A second specific problem associated with base-camp life was the difficulty of maintaining good officer-enlisted men relations. Stouffer, et al., documented that cohesion between officers and enlisted men was much stronger under combat conditions than when troops were in support positions; the relationship between good officer-enlisted men relations and psychological well being has also been clearly established. Ironically, then, it was in base camps, where morale and mental health problems were most severe, that officers were least able to use their authority to minimize them.

It seems, in fact, that base camps bred and intensified psychological tensions which were very rare on combat missions. As American involvement in the war drew to an end, with troops increasingly concentrated in base camps and having little combat exposure, these psychiatric problems, which were tied very closely to the general breakdown in morale and discipline, became serious indeed.44/
Certain other aspects of the war and the American involvement in it, mentioned earlier as factors contributing to poor morale and discipline, also contributed to the psychological stress in the combat zone.

The general inability of the American Army to find, fix, and fight the enemy was peculiar to the Vietnam conflict. That circumstance included two stress-creating mechanisms: the inability to determine who was the enemy and the inability to bring that enemy to battle, except, generally speaking, on his own terms. It was often virtually impossible for Americans to differentiate between friendly and hostile Vietnamese. Nor was it easy to distinguish between enemy soldiers and civilians. Any Vietnamese was a potential enemy.

We were walking down a road, and coming from the opposite direction was a woman and a little baby in her arms. The Sergeant told us to watch out for a trap, because the V.C. use women all the time. . . . the next thing I knew the Sergeant shot the hell out of the both of them. She had a grenade under the baby's blanket which was noticeable. . . . the Sergeant said it's a dirty war, but it's kill or be killed.45/

The psychological shock of discovering a presumed friend to be an enemy is clear in this letter from a medic in the 197th light infantry brigade.

I met this girl in a village store. . . . she was about seventeen or eighteen, sort of pretty, and very shy. I guess she was the only Vietnamese I ever got close to. By then I spoke a little of their language and I found out she was studying English and math. I said I could help her. . . . one day we were on this patrol . . . we were caught in this ambush. . . . we hit them hard and then called in the gunships for support. . . . the, maybe thirty minutes after, the firing stopped and we moved out to look for the wounded and to take a body count. . . . there were a bunch of bodies all around, all VC, and all women. They looked like peasants and all had weapons on them. One of them was my little girl friend, now dead. . . . she was a VC. Who the hell were our friends? Who were our enemies? I never felt more confused than at that moment.46/
The inability consistently to tell friend from foe contributed to one well known cause of anxiety—the feeling of not having an appropriate response or plans for dealing with anticipated harm. This anxiety is compounded if the threat is vague but pervasive. If the threat cannot be resolved, coping mechanisms must be resorted to. When, as in Vietnam, there was generally no way for a combat soldier to remove the external threat,

The individual begins to direct his attention to the internal sensations of anxiety at the cost of dealing rationally with the source of the anxiety. This may lead to alcoholism, drugs, excessive absenteeism (AWOL), or a host of other forms of escapism. Since such responses do temporarily alleviate emotional stress, they are reinforcing and can become chronic habits. 47/

Just as it was difficult to identify the enemy, it was difficult to bring the enemy to battle. The tactics employed by the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong were implemented to overcome their weaknesses while exploiting American weaknesses. "Lacking the strength and fire power to survive an extended major battle, they relied primarily on operations which permitted them to mass, attack, and withdraw before U.S. forces could react." 48/ After an engagement they were able to fade into the jungle or the surrounding villages and hamlets, becoming indistinguishable from the other inhabitants.

The preferred tactics of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were also damaging to morale and mental health. Extensive use of ambushes, snipers, mines, and boobytraps created a situation in which danger was pervasive but in which there were few opportunities to strike back. This situation could produce intolerable frustrations.

Unable to attack the cause of this frustration, soldiers could be tempted to vent their aggression elsewhere. 49/ In some situations, particularly in base camps, a soldier might attack his superior officers or noncommissioned officers. Under more immediate combat stress a frustrated soldier was liable to vent his rage on anyone even suspected of being an enemy. In this respect the My Lai incident is illuminating:

7-13
...the men behaved in many ways as if they were in a combat situation. They kneeled and crouched while shooting. If you're actually thinking in terms of a massacre of murder, going in and shooting a bunch of defenseless people, why crouch? Why get down? Why do any of this? You must have something else on your mind. You must be thinking there's a possibility that you're going to get it yourself. That they pose some kind of a threat to you. Because your judgment is all screwed up. They actually look like the enemy, or what you think is the enemy. American soldiers at My Lai... [had] the illusion, however brief, that in gunning down old men, women, and babies, they had finally engaged the enemy -- had finally got him to stand up and fight.

The frustration at being unable to distinguish and fight the enemy did not always manifest itself in aggression; apathy, withdrawal, and depression would also develop; the depressed individual was a prime candidate for being a non-combat psychiatric casualty. The rules of engagement made the already difficult combat situation even more stressful. The rules of engagement were a natural cutgrowth of the inability to tell friend from foe, and simply put, state "Don't fire unless fired upon." While, on calm reflection, the reasons for the rules seemed rational enough, in the combat situation they could cause severe frustration; appearing to be a "Catch 22" of "don't shoot back unless you've been shot." Regulations limiting bombing targets, particularly those protecting Hanoi and Haiphong harbor, contributed to his frustration. This confusion and anger often led to abuse of the rules.

The way that we distinguished between civilians and VC, VC had weapons and civilians didn't and anybody that was dead was considered a VC. If you killed someone they said, "How do you know he's a VC?" and the general reply would be "He's dead." and that was sufficient.

It can be seen then, that while the combat in Vietnam was more limited than in most other American wars, certain factors made that combat particularly conducive to psychiatric casualties.
Other non-combat factors also influenced the psychiatric casualty rate. Some of the more important are discussed below.

3. Problems at Home--Problems 'In Country'

Two psychiatrists who served in Vietnam single out changes in US society as important variables affecting the nature and incidence of psychiatric casualties. Dr. Jack Anderson, who served in various psychiatric capacities in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, perceived a shift from intrapersonal problems during World War II and Korea--manifested in dramatic psychosomatic symptoms--to the interpersonal or social problems of the Vietnam era. Both are serious, though the treatment for these different problems naturally differs. Anderson sees the reason for this shift as complex, but has determined one important variable:

Obviously, any such change depends upon multiple determinants. However, of those casually related phenomena that we identify, the most important seem to be the continuing shift of the American population from sparsely populated rural areas to densely populated urban areas and the associated weakening of family structure and function. He sees racial tension as a prime example of this changing situation.

Dr. William Hausman also cites a changed American society as a factor affecting psychiatric casualties in Vietnam, a variable he sees as particularly important to the increased drug usage amongst American soldiers in Vietnam. As will be discussed shortly, the situation in Vietnam affected this problem as well.

The effect of the national social milieu on the psychological state of the average soldier is difficult to define and next-to-impossible to measure. The validity of such a concept is certainly open to question. But it is perhaps not unreasonable to assume that factors which affect the life and form the character of soldiers will have some--perhaps a very significant--bearing on the ways those soldiers behave in and cope with a war.

Drug and alcohol abuse in Vietnam, both causes and effects of psychiatric problems, could in many cases be traced to previous abuse in
the US, but the abundance of inexpensive, relatively pure marijuana and various opiates—particularly heroin—tended to make abuse easier and more tempting, with more powerful effects. Cheap and widely available alcohol through the PX network created a similar situation conducive to alcohol abuse. Alcohol abuse was not a new problem in Vietnam, but there are those who believe it was worse than in other recent wars. Dr. John A. Talbott concluded, "One condition that seems to be as high if not higher in Vietnam is alcoholism. The number of senior NCO’s and officers with serious drinking problems, the number of auto accidents involving intoxicated soldiers, and the number of persons with delirium tremens is appallingly high."55/ Dr. Forrest concludes that drugs presented the larger problem in Vietnam, though not necessarily a greater problem than a similar abuse of alcohol: "What emerges in my mind as the most likely difference in the patients seen by psychiatrists in this war is the vast morbidity from drug abuse, but even here I do not know whether the level of alcoholism was compensatorily greater in other wars."56/ Some have argued that a low level of drug use, particularly marijuana smoking or moderate alcohol intake actually reduced psychiatric casualties by reducing stress, while having a very minimal impact on combat effectiveness.57/ Drug abuse is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 6 of this volume.

4. Training

Troop training is an important component of the soldier's reaction to a stressful situation. Whether or not the soldier is well trained is often less important as far as mental health is concerned than his perception that he is. A soldier who thinks he is well trained has more confidence in his ability to survive a war. This reduces anxiety.58/

One of the best ways to assure this feeling is, of course, to provide good training. Peter Karsten discusses the correlation between good training and a reduced incidence of war crimes.59/ Numerous observers have pointed to the importance of good training—training as a unit before deployment—as an important factor affecting the maintenance of good morale, discipline, combat effectiveness, and mental health.60/ The increasing abandonment of this training practice is credibly cited as one
5. Leadership

The role of effective leadership in the prevention of psychiatric casualties can hardly be overemphasized. It is repeatedly cited by authorities and brought out in studies. Dr. Bloch states,

In cases in which a man's capacity to cope with these fears of death or injury is relatively tenuous, the quality of his relationship with his peer group can often be the determining factor in whether he "makes it" (functions effectively) or doesn't. The quality of this group allegiance and alliance, generally termed morale, is in turn largely a function of the quality of leadership of the men and to a lesser degree influenced by the vicissitudes of the particular group's circumstances and experiences. (Emphasis added.)

A. O. Ludwig concluded that good leadership was of prime importance to the mental health of a group of infantry troops, a fact confirmed by Grinker and Spiegel in a study of combat aviator crews in World War II. While there are no guaranteed formulas for assuring good leadership and while the quality of leadership will inevitably vary from place to place and time to time, certain channels are open to military leaders for improving the quality of its leadership and alleviating its more serious shortcomings. A discussion of the possibilities appears in Chapter 3 of this volume, Leadership and Ethics. The effect of good leadership on mental health is clear:

For the most part, the same range of descriptive diagnoses has been demonstrated in Vietnam as might be expected for a similar group of young men in the United States. The impact of such precipitating factors as boredom, loneliness and interpersonal conflicts has been somewhat intensified due to the stresses of living a regimented group life in a hot foreign land where there has been a constant threat of bodily harm. When leadership has been good, however, these stresses have been minimized. Most often specific problems
arisen as a result of poor leadership and a subsequent decline in morale. (Emphasis added.)

6. **Age**

An interesting if somewhat minor point regarding the mental health of soldiers has been raised by Dr. Bloch. He observes that human beings tend to pass through somewhat predictable, alternative phases of separation and attachment. The strong attachment of the child to its parents is replaced by the desires for independence and adventure of the teenager, in turn replaced by the desire to consolidate and form attachments—usually marriage and family—in the 20s and early 30s. Bloch follows this undulating pattern further through the life span, but these are the periods most relevant here. He concludes:

> It may be that separations for war present less [sic] emotional difficulties for a normal 18-year-old who is in phase with separating than for someone in his mid 20s or 30s who is beginning a career and family and is out of phase with separation from important object relationships. In this regard, a followup study of patients with war neuroses in World War II is relevant. Brill and Beebe's study suggests that war neuroses occurred more frequently in older, married, (and uneducated) men than in younger, single, (and educated) ones.

Tradeoffs are inevitable—as Bloch notes, education has a positive effect on lessening psychiatric casualties, and the induction of young men necessarily limits the amount of education they will have received. However, the observation is of interest, and age must be considered as a factor affecting the incidence of psychiatric casualties. The relatively young combat soldier in Vietnam as compared to his World War II counterpart does seem to have suffered from fewer psychological problems, though, as this chapter has tried to show, a whole series of factors must be taken into account in explaining this change.

7. **Better Psychiatric and Medical Facilities**

Perhaps the most frequently cited reason behind the relatively dramatic drop in psychiatric casualty rates from a high of 101 per thousand
per year in World War II to an average of about 11 in Vietnam has been the improvement in psychiatric and medical facilities and treatment, and the parallel improvement in the awareness of, and management by commanders of psychiatric problems.

With the small number of Americans present in Vietnam before 1965 there was only a limited need for psychiatric support. Until mid-1965 therefore, the only mental health facilities in Vietnam were located in Saigon at the Naval Hospital. With the build up, there was need for a greater staff, and expansion began. On average, over the entire period of American involvement in Vietnam there were for every 50,000 Army troops, 3 psychiatrists, 2 psychiatric social workers, and 12 enlisted specialists. In addition there were usually 2 Ph.D. clinical psychologists in the country. Generally speaking, however, the medical officer was the first line of defense against psychiatric casualties, and it was at this level that a great many problems were dealt with.

In Vietnam there were 3 levels of mental health care. Most problems would first be handled by the division health services. Initial consultation was generally handled by an enlisted technician, with assistance, if necessary, from the general medical officer. The most difficult cases would be passed on to the division psychiatrist or social worker. Basic personality disorders could be recommended for administrative separation under the provisions of Army Regulation 635-212, or recommendation could be made for evacuation to a hospital for serious but more treatable psychiatric problems. Emphasis at the division level has been on prevention.

The second level of Army mental health services consisted of a network of large 200-400 bed hospitals. Here a maximum of 10 days in treatment was available.

If satisfactory results could not be achieved in this period the case was referred to the third level: one of two neuropsychiatric specialty teams, called KO teams. Each of these teams has had from 3 to 7
psychiatrists, 2 to 4 social workers, a clinical psychologist, a neurologist, one or two psychiatric nurses and as many as 25 enlisted technicians. In addition to the regular psychiatric services, these teams managed alcohol and drug abuse treatment groups.

Much success has been claimed for these services. Four psychiatrists who served in Vietnam praise the effects of the system:

Dr. William Allerton lists 4 factors which help explain the low rates, the last two being:

Improved techniques which have created the best equipped and trained soldiers the United States has ever placed in combat. Last, but perhaps no less important than the foregoing, is the improvement over the last two decades in military psychiatry, which has evolved preventive and therapeutic measures directed toward maximizing function and minimizing disability.

Dr. David Forrest observes,

As reasons for the higher morale and lower rate of psychiatric casualties in Vietnam, I would suggest . . . the psychological sophistication of command techniques and psychiatric support that have resulted in increasingly humane conditions for soldiers.

Cdr. Strange remarks on the crucial role of the general medical officer and his effect on the psychiatric casualty figures:

Classical combat fatigue has been reported less often in Vietnam than in previous wars. It is important to note, however, that combat fatigue, which undoubtedly has occurred more often than has been reported, has been effectively treated by general medical officers who are more psychiatrically sophisticated than their predecessors in previous wars.

And finally, Dr. John Talbott lauds the effects of the system:

It is my impression that there are far fewer psychiatric casualties in this conflict than heretofore. The
official Army line attributes this to a 12-month rotation basis, superb medical care, and better educated and trained soldiers. However, it is my opinion that the factor frequently not mentioned, that may be of the most importance, is that psychiatrists and general medical officers are better trained to diagnose and treat traumatic neurosis today than they were 20 years ago.71/

These men are not alone—the praise has been general. Peter Bourne concludes that while many of the methods in Vietnam were not new—indeed were based on principles developed during World War I—Vietnam was different in that treatment was available from the very beginning of the war, helping to prevent a buildup of problems.72/ Bourne also observes that the presence of a significant number of trained psychiatric specialists heightened the command awareness of stress. This led to combat fatigue training for line officers. It became possible for company commanders to recognize troops that might be experiencing the effects of combat stress. Those commanders then had at their disposal the psychiatric services of battalion and division doctors. Many soldiers were identified as potential stress casualties and treated before an emotional breakdown or dysfunctional behavior occurred.73/

Further, improved medical facilities, particularly the use of the Medivac helicopter, helped cut down (though of course did not alleviate by any means) the soldier's fear of becoming a casualty. During the Vietnam conflict only one in 88 men wounded in action died after receiving treatment.74/ Prompt and efficient handling of medical casualties helped prevent psychiatric casualties.

8. Interaction of Factors

As with any war the Vietnam situation caused or brought together a great variety of factors that influenced the incidence of psychiatric casualties. There are undoubtedly a great many more than those listed here, the importance of which clearly varied from individual to individual. We must be careful, as Dr. Bloch cautioned, not to generalize too closely, for the variables and the coping mechanisms are too diverse and complex. It should be remembered, however, that the greatly decreased psychiatric
casualty rate in Vietnam must be analyzed in light of such variables as the relatively limited scale of combat, the increased use of administrative discharges for disorders which were essentially psychiatric but were classified otherwise, and the extensive treatment of essentially psychiatric disorders by general medical officers—again meaning that these casualties would not appear on the psychiatric lists. It has been pointed out that psychiatric casualty rates for officers are exceptionally disproportionately low as officers would be more cautious about admitting problems that might affect their career—medical help or alcohol abuse etc., might then be substituted for psychiatric help. Comparison of different historical events is always difficult—these factors, and the necessary nebulousness of the terms involved make psychiatric-casualty-rate comparison particularly so. A cautious commendation of the mental health system as operated in Vietnam, however, seems in order.

D. THE AVERAGE PSYCHIATRIC CASUALTY

If the Vietnam experience is to have any predictive value for preventative psychiatric work in future situations, one of the most crucial questions to be asked is, who was most apt to be a psychiatric casualty? Can any prototype be generalized?

As discussed above, Brill and Beebe discovered in World War II that psychiatric casualties tended to be older and less educated than the average soldier, and married.75/ Bourne observes that there is conflicting evidence regarding the relevance of pre-existing psychological conditions as a contributing factor to psychological attrition in a combat zone.

Hastings reported that in his survey of fliers who failed under minimal stress there was no evidence of predisposing neurotic illness. On the other hand, Brill and Beebe found that men with pre-existing neuroses had 7 to 8 times the probability of developing overt symptomology and behavioral disorders as compared with previously well-integrated individuals. In studying a series of 150 men who successfully completed their tour in the combat zone Grinker and Spiegel found
that one-half had a previous life pattern of emotional instability.76/1

Perhaps the most detailed study of the type of person most likely to become a psychiatric casualty was undertaken by Tischler. The results deserve quoting at some length:

Approximately one-half of the men referred for evaluation had been in Viet Nam for less than four months. The number of referrals dropped markedly after the third month and remained at a consistent but diminished level from the fourth to the ninth months. During the last three months a second progressive decrease occurred, with only two percent of the patients being seen in the last month of their tour. The men referred during the first three months of their tours were characteristically between the ages of 17 and 20, and came from nuclear families that were intact; their relationships with their parents were positive. More than half had completed high school and most were single. In addition they tended to have less than three years' service, to be of the rank of private first class, and to have service records significantly better than men referred later in their tours.

Patients seen between the fourth and ninth months appeared to come from a different population. They were older (mostly over 21), single, and white. Like the previous group they tended to be from intact families, to have positive relationships with their parents. However unlike the first group they had generally achieved the rank of E-3 or higher, and their military records were significantly poorer, with higher incidences of absences without leave, Article Fifteens, and court martial.

The final group are those who were seen during the last three months of their tour. As a group they again appeared to be drawn from a distinct segment of the military population in Viet Nam. They could be characterized as coming from disrupted nuclear families, as having negative relationships with their parents, and while the majority were married, 57 percent had not received letters from home during their tour. Thirty-six percent had not graduated from high school, and although they were older and had achieved the rank of E-4 or higher, they had service records that were extremely poor, with 36 percent having been absent.
without leave, 60 percent having had Article Fifteens, and 40 percent having been court martialed at least once.77/

Hopefully, as more of such information is gathered and analyzed, the fine tuning of the various cause and effect relationships governing the incidents of psychiatric casualties in combat will be better understood and more easily controlled.

E. INSIGHTS

The following useful insights are derived from the foregoing discussion of psychological effects of the Vietnam conflict:

- A variety of factors affected the incidence of psychiatric casualties among soldiers serving during the Vietnam War. Some of the factors were not new to Vietnam—indeed some are very old. The most important of these is exposure to combat. Others include: the workings and cohesiveness of the primary group, the quality of leadership, the age and background of the combatants, including their pre-existing psychological problems, the nature of society, and the quality of training. Other factors affecting mental health which were unique to or especially significant in Vietnam include: the operation and effects of the one-year and six-month tours of duty and related policies, the nature of the combat (the tactics, the confusion of enemy and allied personnel and civilians, the rules of engagement, the nature of the support system, and so on), the quality of the medical and psychiatric support systems, and the ready availability of drugs, to name some of the more important. Contrary to the beliefs of many, the impact of the antiwar movement, while not negligible, seems to have played only a minor stress-provoking role. See Chapter 4.

- A variety of coping mechanisms were observed in Vietnam as in other wars. These included religious faith, rituals, superstitions, various forms of escapism, excessive sleep, spending
sprees, identification with an authority figure, fusion with the group, escape into work, drug or alcohol abuse, humor, reading, and overeating, to name only a few. Those who failed to develop effective coping mechanisms or whose mechanisms were unacceptable were those most likely to need psychiatric assistance.

F. LESSONS

Proper management of psychological stress in wartime necessitates a close understanding of both individual and group psychology and the operation of factors effecting mental health in general, and more specifically in wartime.
CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p. II-6.


13. R. S. Anderson, Neuropsychiatry in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Zone of the Interior, Office of the Surgeon General, 1966) Vol. 1. A rate of 2.5 combat stress casualties per 1,000 personnel is cited for each of these three wars. Three reasons can be given for such a low casualty incidence: psychiatric diagnosis was crude; short periods of combat were separated by prolonged maneuvering; and all three wars were relatively short.

14. Ibid.


16. A similar division was used later by R. E. Streng in his analysis of psychiatric casualties on a hospital ship. Strange noted that there was a relatively small group suffering genuine combat fatigue, a relatively large group suffering from pseudo-combat fatigue (same symptoms, but produced without actual combat exposure). He added a third category: combat neurosis for those suffering from problems whose origins clearly preceded the war, and whose symptoms may or may not have been aggravated by it. See R. E. Strange and R. J. Arthur, "Hospital Ship Psychiatry in a War Zone," American Journal of Psychiatry, 124, 1967.

17. Peter Bourne, Men, Stress, and Vietnam, p. 11.


20. Ibid.

21. Combat stress casualties were divided into five major symptomatic categories. Approximately 6,000 men suffered the most serious form of combat stress: psychosis. Those patients were almost exclusively schizophrenic. An equal number of patients demonstrated neurotic symptoms. The majority of those men displayed an anxiety reaction. Character and behavior disorders were the largest producers of
Psychiatric casualties: over 1,100 men. The majority tended to be men who were immature or emotionally unstable before entering the service. That category also included patients hospitalized for alcohol or drug abuse. The approximately 1,800 men suffering from combat exhaustion were mentally or physically depleted; they were incapable of further activity. They remained, however, emotionally stable individuals. The final category included 4,500 men who were admitted for neuropsychiatric observation. They displayed mild forms of the symptoms. They were treated and released before they were classified into any of the other four categories.


Put most concisely, I concluded that combat motivation arises out of the linkages between individual self-concern, primary-group processes, and the shared beliefs of soldiers. In particular, I sought to document and to demonstrate how important modifications and rethinking were required in those social science viewpoints which deemphasized the salience of ideological considerations and which stressed instead the determination value of primary relations in combat groups.
In concrete terms, the research revealed that the intense primary-group ties so often reported in combat units are best viewed as mandatory necessities arising from immediate life and death exigencies. Although the American soldier has a general aversion to overt ideological symbols and patriotic appeals, this should not obscure those salient ideological factors which serve as preconditions supporting the soldier in dangerous situations. Individual behavior and small-group processes occurring in combat squads operate within a widespread attitudinal context of underlying value commitments; most notably, an antipolitical outlook coupled with a belief—evident at least during the early years of the war—in the worthwhileness of American society. Correspondingly, when changes in these value commitments occurred in the later years of the war, this had indirect but important consequences on military cohesion (Helmer, 1973). These values—the latent ideology—must therefore be taken into account in explaining the combat performance of American soldiers.

32. Some of these observers also note the drawbacks of the policy as well, of course. For references, see relevant endnotes above.


35. Charles C. Moskos, "American Combat Soldier in Vietnam," p. 31. CPT Jordan Phelps, MD, divided the one-year tour into four psychological stages. Initially there was:

"...the period of apprehensive enthusiasm." Then in some three-months time "enthusiasm vanished." Some of the troops underwent an initial trauma to remove any military-missionary zeal. Death was "suddenly a very real item...." [This was followed by]... "resignation" which on closer scrutiny he [Phelps] discovered to be "a chronically depressed state." And then, as his date of departure approaches, the soldier undergoes "anxious apprehension" where "irritability" and "euphoria" co-exist with sudden and unexpected result.

Phelps in Murray Pclner, No Victory Parades (New York: Holt, 1971), p. 147. Jordan Phelps was a psychiatrist with the 1st Cavalry
Division for 9 months during 1967. He then spent three months with the Seventeenth Field Hospital in Saigon. In 1970, he became an activist in the antiwar movement. To avoid conflict of interest, he used his given name during antiwar activities; his medical research was reported under the pseudonym Jordan Phelps. The data given were originally presented at a Military Mental Health Conference in Vietnam in 1967.


37. H. S. Bloch, "Psychological Adjustment of Normal People During a Year's Tour in Vietnam," p. III-3. The problems associated with short-timer's fever emphasize this: emotional investment is withdrawn from the combat situation before new support is obtained elsewhere. The short-timer can thus be very volatile, tense, confused and anxious.


42. For remarks on the effects of static warfare or prolonged exposure to combat, see, inter alia, Dr. David V. Forrest, "Psychiatric Casualties in Vietnam," p. 28; Dr. William Allerton, Ibid.; and Dr. Peter Bourne, Men, Stress, and Vietnam, p. 75.


44. See Chapter 4, "Morale and Discipline."


46. Fred Schoenwald, quoted in Murray Polner, No Victory Parades, pp. 102-3.


49. See Hamner and Organ, Organizational Behavior, pp. 195-201.

50. An anonymous soldier who was at My Lai, in Murray Polner, No Victory Parades, p. 50. See also the Peers Report, pp. 5-13 to 5-15 and pp. 6-2 and 6-17.


53. See Chapter 5, "Racial Relations."


57. This was not true of course, for more serious abuse, which remained an important concern. Dr. John K. Imahara summarized some of the potential psychiatric problems arising from drug abuse: (in "Psychiatric Casualties in Vietnam," p. 28)

   Not infrequently explosive situations arising from the combination of drugs, available weapons, and stress necessitated confinement of the passive resistive marihuana smoker, the paranoid methamphetamine injector, the hyperactive amphetamine user, the AWOL emaciated opium injector, and the moody individual who takes barbiturates. The use of drugs in combination was common.

58. Peter Bourne, Men, Stress, and Vietnam, p. 76.


60. See, for example, Colbach and Parish, "Army Mental Health," p. III-39.


66. In connection with this, see the statement by Eugene Linden in Chapter 4, Morale and Discipline regarding the effect of the presence of older, more educated men on the incidence of fragging in Vietnam. While combat soldiers are traditionally young, the difference in average age between World War II servicemen and those in Vietnam, and its effects on discipline cannot be overlooked.


73. Peter Bourne, Men, Stress, and Vietnam, pp. 18-19.


75. Brill and Beebe, "A Followup Study."

76. Peter Bourne, "Military Psychiatry and the Vietnam Experience." See also relevant sources cited above.

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PANEL DISCUSSIONS

The following persons participated in the BDM Senior Review Panel meeting on September 7 and 8, 1979 at The BPM Westbranch Conference Center. Members of the panel provided a critique of the original drafts for portions of this volume and offered detailed comments during the panel discussions.


Colby, William E., LLB Former Ambassador and Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, and former Director of Central Intelligence.

Davis, Vincent, Dr., Professor and Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, The University of Kentucky.

Greene, Fred, Dr., Professor, Williams College. Former Director, Office of Research for East Asian Affairs, Department of State.

Hallowell, John H., Dr., James B. Duke Professor of Political Science, Duke University.

Hughes, Thomas L., LL.D., President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Former Director for Intelligence and Research, US Department of State with rank of Assistant Secretary of State.


Sapin, Burton M., Dr., Dean, School of Public and International Affairs, The George Washington University. Former Foreign Service Officer.

Thompson, Kenneth W., Dr., Director, White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia.

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The following interviews, conducted by BDM members of the study team, provided important information for this volume:


Lemnitzer, Lyman L., General, US Army (Ret). Former Army Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Interviewed in the Pentagon on 15 June 1979.

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