



SPECIAL REPORT

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ABOUT THE REPORT

Drawing on fieldwork and interviews conducted in January and February 2018, a few months after US economic sanctions on Sudan were permanently lifted, this report examines the perceptions and hopes of Sudanese citizens for future relations between Sudan and the United States. Research for this report was supported by the Middle East and Africa Center at the United States Institute of Peace.

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CONTENTS

Introduction	2
The End of Sanctions	2
Human Rights and Religious Freedom	4
Democracy and Elections	5
Counterterrorism	6
Next Steps	7
Conclusion and Recommendations	7

Aly Verjee

Sudan after Sanctions Sudanese Views of Relations with the United States

Summary

- Twenty years of comprehensive US economic sanctions on Sudan were permanently revoked in October 2017, after the US government deemed Sudan to have made progress in five key areas. The United States continues to designate Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, preventing a broader normalization of relations.
- While the lifting of sanctions was welcomed by most Sudanese interviewed for this report, the deteriorating economy, government repression, and failure to resolve Sudan’s multiple conflicts have overshadowed the US overture.
- Furthermore, Sudan’s economic crisis has led to skepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions relief. Most interviewees feel the process that led to the lifting of sanctions lacked transparency and did not sufficiently involve or inform Sudanese outside the government-connected elite.
- Many respondents feel disappointed by the limited US action in response to recent government repression and lack confidence that the United States will hold Sudanese authorities accountable for violations of human rights and the rule of law, maintaining presidential term limits in the constitution, and holding credible elections in 2020.
- Given the US interest in counterterrorism and countering violent extremism, some respondents believe the government of Sudan exaggerates its knowledge of terrorist activities as a means of proving its usefulness to the United States.
- Overall, Sudanese perceptions of the goals of the United States in its relations with Sudan diverge from the intentions expressed by the US government. This indicates a significant communications and public diplomacy deficit, which detracts from US objectives and limits the ability of Sudanese citizens to hold their own government to account.

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Introduction

The decision to lift most US economic sanctions on Sudan was controversial. Arguing that sanctions were unfair, unmerited, and disproportionate, the government of Sudan lobbied for years for the restrictions to be lifted. Meanwhile, some Sudanese argued that the removal of sanctions would reward a regime responsible for gross human rights violations, led by a president wanted by the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes in Darfur. In the United States, human rights organizations and some members of Congress invoked similar arguments to oppose any move to ease sanctions.

The sanctions—which included a broad-based trade embargo, freezing of government assets, and limits on Sudan’s ability to transact in US dollars—were first imposed in 1997 by the Clinton administration for Sudan’s “continued support for international terrorism; ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring governments; and the prevalence of human rights violations.”¹ In January 2017, the Obama administration determined that Sudan had demonstrated progress sufficient to relax sanctions but left to the Trump administration the decision to make sanctions relief permanent.² The Trump administration delayed an initial decision on lifting the sanctions to permit “additional fact-finding and a more comprehensive analysis of the government of Sudan’s actions.”³ In October, the US government deemed Sudan to have made sufficient progress on the so-called five tracks—a mix of domestic and regional priorities, including the suspension of military offensives in Darfur and other conflict areas, and refraining from military involvement in the civil war in South Sudan—and revoked sanctions permanently.⁴ The United States continues to consider Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism (SST), a designation first made in 1993. Remaining on the SST list restricts the types of US foreign assistance for which Sudan is eligible.⁵

This report does not intend to discuss the merits of sanctions relief, which have been amply argued elsewhere.⁶ Instead, its goal is to explore the perceptions and hopes of Sudanese respondents for the future of their country’s relations with the United States on the key issues of human rights, religious freedom, democracy, elections, and counterterrorism. These are issues on which it is essential to make progress if Sudan is to be more peaceful, inclusive, and better governed, and if broader US interests are to be served.

Semi-structured and group discussions with approximately fifty respondents were conducted in Khartoum in January and February 2018. This relatively small sample of respondents is not representative of all forty million Sudanese. But among the students, laborers, small and large business owners, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, engineers, academics, activists, and ordinary citizens from a variety of ethnic groups and regions, most of whom are not involved in government or politics, a range of perspectives emerged, demonstrating both the diversity and commonality of views among the Sudanese.

The End of Sanctions

Most Sudanese respondents welcomed the end of twenty years of comprehensive US sanctions. Irrespective of whether sanctions were historically justified, several interviewees noted that the lifting of sanctions removed a common excuse for government failure. “The government used to say that US sanctions were responsible for all that was wrong in our country,” one person explained. “They can’t hide behind that excuse anymore.”

Another interviewee pointed out that “sanctions did not punish the government....Sanctions protected regime-linked companies from competition. It was better they be lifted.” Said another, “It is better to have sanctions target individuals, not everyone.”

But the end of sanctions was not welcomed by all. Some respondents felt that lifting sanctions was a reward for an unreformed, nepotistic government led by the same elite that had overseen years of war, mismanagement, corruption, and widespread hardship. One man from Darfur noted his worry that “lifting sanctions could mean more people killed because more money to the government means they can spend more on the security sector.”

For almost all respondents, however, the lack of resolution of the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, together with the rapid deterioration of the economy after sanctions were lifted, has overshadowed any merits of the US action. Since the sanctions decision, the government has reduced subsidies on wheat, ostensibly on IMF advice, and dramatically devalued the Sudanese pound.⁷ As a result, inflation has spiked, led by the cost of food imports. One economist recently calculated an annualized inflation rate of more than 120 percent, at least twice the official figure.⁸

Demand for hard currency—in the form of US dollars—has surged, crippling the value of the Sudanese pound and eroding the purchasing power of most ordinary Sudanese. Paradoxically, perhaps, the removal of economic sanctions may have made it easier to move money abroad, contributing to the increased demand for foreign currency and accelerating a cycle of capital flight. However, though there may be no definitive causal link between the ending of sanctions and worsening economic conditions, perceptions vary. As one interviewee commented bitterly, “If this is what sanctions relief has brought, we were better off with sanctions.” Daily increases in the prices of basic goods have prompted street protests and the ironic joke that “the strongest leader of the opposition is the dollar.”

The street protests have been met by a government crackdown, arrests, and the arbitrary detention of demonstrators, as well as the confiscation of entire print runs of newspapers and other actions to intimidate journalists (including some arrests).⁹ One Sudanese government official attempted to justify the action of the security forces to arrest protesters as “preventative,” stating that the intent was to ensure there was no violence akin to that seen in 2013, during a similar moment of economic austerity.¹⁰

The rapidity and scale of the economic deterioration does, in part, illustrate the mismatch of the expectations of Sudanese in the post-sanctions era. Though it may be tempting to dismiss expectations of an immediate economic transformation as founded on unrealistic presumptions, many felt disappointed that sanctions relief has not borne fruit for the average person. While some held the United States responsible for this failing, and others conceded their expectations for change may have been too high, many pointed to the void of public information. As one person reflected, “The complexity of issues was not explained to anyone—our debt, SST. For years we were told the sanctions were the cause of all the problems, and then the US said the sanctions were over. Where are the real benefits to most Sudanese?”

The lag of an appreciable impact to sanctions relief contributes to perceptions of continuity in the US approach. Said one trader, “Say what you want, the sanctions are still there. It is difficult to do business abroad. The US hasn’t done much to encourage companies to come here. When I recently tried to order printer ink cartridges [from a major American manufacturer], they told me they couldn’t sell to Sudan.” Some, however, were more realistic about the Sudanese economy’s own limitations as the principal obstacle. “We don’t have the [hard] currency to trade,” said one interviewee. Another respondent, speaking about the lack of correspondent banking relations, noted: “We can’t tell Citibank to come here.”

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Human Rights and Religious Freedom

While the absence of an explicit human rights agenda in the five-track process has been extensively criticized by both Sudanese and Americans, Sudanese respondents offered both idealism and skepticism in thinking about the place of human rights in relations with the United States.¹¹ Said one Sudanese lawyer unfamiliar with the specifics of the five tracks, “Of course human rights is one of the five tracks. America stands for freedom!” His belief that human rights would automatically be considered in any process of normalization, coupled with an assessment that Sudan’s respect for human rights remained poor, led him to conclude the United States was “pretending” there had been progress in human rights—that it was seeing progress despite a lack of convincing evidence. Arguably, this is a perception of the United States more damaging than the reality—that the United States did not claim Sudan’s human rights record had much improved, and simply the overall situation of human rights was not considered in this process.

In response to the criticism, some US officials have claimed that human rights in fact did underpin the five tracks. Donald Booth, the former US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, argued in May 2017 that “if you want to talk about protecting human rights, the basic right is that of life. We felt that that focus of the five-track plan had very much a human rights component to it.”¹²

But for most respondents the inauguration of President Donald Trump in January 2017 raised new doubts about the US commitment to human rights. As one young Sudanese noted, “We don’t believe in US policy. President Trump told the world ‘America first,’ right? Where does that leave Sudan?” Said another, “We don’t trust the US government—they will get what they want from [the government of Sudan]. They are only a little concerned about human rights and democracy.”

Many respondents linked the Trump administration to what they saw as a limited official US response to popular protests and violent government repression. Said one activist, “They are not interested in our freedom. Trump is there.”

Yet many keenly believed that when the United States spoke, the Sudanese government would listen. As one interviewee said, “The only threat to the government is the Americans.” Respondents were also acutely sensitive to the public diplomacy (or lack thereof) of American diplomats in Khartoum. One respondent in January 2018 noted that the press releases section of the website of the US embassy in Khartoum had not been updated since Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan visited the country the previous November, despite the ongoing street protests and government crackdown. “We notice when there isn’t a statement on the US embassy website,” said one civil society worker.¹³

Diplomats always have to wrestle with the pros and cons of quiet diplomacy in the context of public protests. But juxtaposed against recent US statements of support for protests in Iran and elsewhere in the Arab world, some respondents concluded that the United States was choosing not to use its public influence in Sudan to the degree it should. One resident of Khartoum, a dual national of the United States and Sudan who had been detained by the authorities for protesting on multiple occasions in recent years, credited his release to the intervention of consular officials at the US embassy. He noted that while he had had regular contact with diplomats before his most recent arrest, he rarely saw American diplomats nowadays. “Diplomats [are] not coming [to see me] after the [lifting of] sanctions,” he said. “They don’t want to lose [good relations with] the government....The government is working hard to please the US.”

Some interviewees welcomed the Trump administration’s new focus on religious freedom, which they felt better incorporated human rights concerns than the five-track process. As

one person explained, “Yes, some people live in conflict areas. But all of us live under an intolerant government that has little respect for different views or beliefs.” That said, many respondents felt concern at the present uncertainty and ambiguity about whether human rights would truly be a priority in any future US engagement with the Sudanese government.

A few respondents questioned whether the Trump administration’s commitment to religious freedom was genuine. Others saw the mention of religious freedom as code for concern for Christian minorities only. They noted that freedom of belief for the Muslim majority of Sudanese has also been a problem, and that an approach was needed that would ensure religious freedom for all. As one middle-aged man explained, “Although I am a Muslim, [the government] can consider me an infidel if that is in their interest. And if I’m in the majority and I can still be persecuted, what hope is there for the minority?”

Although few Sudanese were aware of Deputy Secretary of State Sullivan’s visit to Khartoum in November 2017 (and no one interviewed had seen the full text of his remarks), almost every respondent agreed that religious freedom could not be achieved without respect for other fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of speech and expression.¹⁴ Many pointed out that while these freedoms are well established in Sudan’s constitution and were reiterated in the recent National Dialogue process, they have also been routinely violated—and therefore a technocratic, legislative approach would not increase religious freedom or safeguard political rights more broadly.

While most interviewees accepted that the United States is only a marginal actor in ensuring the government of Sudan’s respect for the rule of law, some respondents were concerned that the next phase of the normalization process will focus too heavily on negative measures (things the government should refrain from doing) and fail to change the underlying mentality of the regime. For example, while many agreed that the government should not direct, be complicit in, or condone the demolition of church buildings, as referenced in Sullivan’s Khartoum speech, it was also argued that such restraint should not be mistaken for a genuine demonstration of tolerance.

Some interviewees argued that demanding changes to the public order law or the repeal of legislative provisions on apostasy would have a similarly limited effect on the government’s mentality. In addition to such measures, some respondents argued for more direct and practical action to engage powerful institutions. Suggestions included the government reducing its authority in determining who could hold the office of imam in mosques in the Khartoum area, or advocating for robust limits on the operational mandate of the National Intelligence and Security Service, which plays a role in almost every sphere of public life.

Two respondents pointed out that while reform of the Voluntary and Humanitarian Work Act, which regulates the work of national and international nongovernmental organizations, was indeed necessary to broaden political freedom and the right of association, little would change without also considering the operations and procedures of the notorious Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), which is responsible for the implementation of technical agreements and license renewals of both national and international nongovernmental organizations. The Humanitarian Aid Commission has a long record of obstructing humanitarian and civil society organizations (although it eased some restrictions in July 2017).¹⁵

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Democracy and Elections

Sudan’s next elections are scheduled for 2020. The constitution limits President Omar al-Bashir, who in 2020 will have been in office for more than thirty years, from standing for another term. However, most respondents fully expect Bashir to run again, believing the constitution is only a “technical” impediment to his candidacy.

Despite these concerns, only a handful of respondents explicitly hoped that the United States would prioritize democracy in its future engagement with Sudan. One interviewee argued that US support for civic and voter education, domestic election observation, and capacity building for political parties would help make the 2020 elections a more inclusive and credible exercise. Most interviewees, however, were skeptical of the electoral process, noting that the 2010 and 2015 elections had produced only marginal and temporary change. One respondent noted that the “government doesn’t want democracy. The people are lost in the middle.”

But some did see an opportunity for the United States to take a principled stand on the elections and on the prospect of constitutional changes. As one person suggested, “If the United States is interested in irreversible steps by the Sudanese authorities, a democratic election is irreversible. We have done it before [in 1986].” Said another, “There is still a big hope in the USA, the leading democracy in the world.”

Others felt that the focus should be on subnational elections—races for state governorships and assemblies—rather than on the presidential election. “We can make a difference at the local level, if we have effective governance there,” said one woman. “It doesn’t have to be about the palace [in Khartoum] or the parliament. We don’t have to think about the president.”

Sudan may be no exception to the broader regional trend of amending constitutions and abandoning term limits. But some respondents felt it was a self-fulfilling prophecy to conclude that the 2020 elections will be of no value. They expressed a hope that any roadmap for future US engagement would take into account the Sudanese electoral calendar and make the credibility of upcoming elections a priority.

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Counterterrorism

Although terrorism and counterterrorism were not originally a central focus of this research, the thoughts offered by some respondents on these subjects were revealing. One interviewee who had recently spent time in detention noted that “this government is doing everything it can to fight terrorism. Every time they take us to prison we meet smugglers.” He went on to recount a story he had been told in prison by a cellmate who worked as a human trafficker: “Said the trafficker, ‘we are allowed to take this trash [referring to Ethiopian and Syrian migrants] outside the country...but [we] are told don’t take terrorism outside.’”

At the same time, others pointed out that Sudan had exaggerated its knowledge of terrorist networks and activities in order to impress the Americans. As one person put it, “The United States government doesn’t care as long as Khartoum says it is fighting terrorism.” Some respondents pointed to the government’s apparent ignorance of some of the university campus-based activities of sympathizers of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and alleged that the government was in the dark when it came to the operation of some cells, only discovering their existence after media publicity.¹⁶

Others pointed to the government allowing some supporters of the Islamic State—notably Dr. Mohamed Ali Abdalla al-Gizouli—to continue to work freely in Khartoum.¹⁷ Although al-Gizouli had been detained by the government in the past, one observer noted that the arrests had little or no effect. “You can’t change his [al-Gizouli’s] mind by detaining him every once in a while,” he said. Others noted that while Sudan may be cooperating with the United States in some aspects of counterterrorism, in other dimensions—namely in taking sides in Libya and with Hamas—Sudan’s support for radical groups has continued.

Next Steps

Given the long history of mistrust and conflict between the United States and Sudan, many respondents attributed interests to the United States that diverge significantly from the publicly stated interests of the current and recent US administrations. “The Americans only care about South Sudan,” said one respondent. “They support President al-Bashir,” said another. While the truth may differ, these perspectives—together with those concerning the US response to the aforementioned protests and government crackdown—indicate a significant communications and public diplomacy deficit. Regardless of the cause, this gap reinforces a narrative unhelpful to US interests and values and does not serve US objectives.

The limitations of Sudan’s mass media also contribute to this deficit, but among young people—who are more likely to get their news from the internet or social media than from state television and radio broadcasts—the Sudanese media is not the culprit. Many respondents hoped that future US engagement with Sudan would be more public and wide-ranging. As one woman argued, it is “not enough to bargain with the regime on [a] few issues.”

For those respondents who had followed the five-track process, there was some concern that the US government would again establish a process that was primarily government-to-government, limiting the potential for Sudanese to be involved. There were also concerns that the process would not have clear indicators and benchmarks for measuring progress. As one person explained, “It’s difficult to agree whether there has been progress when there is no minimum definition, no indicators. Take humanitarian access. Is access only defined for international organizations? Is it just giving visas to American NGOs or USAID? Humanitarian access means lots of things, and it shouldn’t be only externally driven.”

“I am against sanctions,” argued another respondent. “Sudan should not be on the sponsors-of-terrorism list. But how can there be no indicators, no criteria, no clear time frame, no involvement of Sudanese NGOs? It doesn’t make sense.”

Conclusion and Recommendations

The United States has continuing national, regional, and international interests in Sudan, which for both the government and people of Sudan are viewed through the lens of an acrimonious historical relationship. Yet the majority of the Sudanese people share a common interest with the United States: for Sudan to be more peaceful and better governed. An historic opening to the broader normalization of relations with the United States has coincided with economic and political turbulence in Sudan, and while economic concerns remain preeminent many Sudanese are conscious of the significance of the US overture.

Overcoming years of mistrust between the United States and Sudan, however, will require more meaningful interaction with ordinary Sudanese beyond the political elites. Divergent perceptions, and some misunderstandings, exist among Sudanese about the goals of the US engagement process with the government of Sudan, whether US values will be promoted in the contemporary Sudanese context, and how the prospects of a normalization process can best address the concerns and challenges of the majority of Sudanese citizens.

These misunderstandings and misperceptions matter. They lead to Sudanese ascribing motives to US policy that may be unfounded. Some will continue to see US policy as anti-theoretical to their interests. Others will be unconvinced that US interests are motivated by the promotion of a peaceful and democratic Sudan. If the process of reform desired by the United States in Sudan is not understood by the people it is meant to serve, the ability of Sudan’s citizens to hold their government to account will remain limited—and the prospects of successfully changing the country for the better will be diminished.

The following recommendations are derived from the responses of those interviewed. They are offered to US policymakers with the goal of addressing the gaps and misapprehensions identified.

- As part of any second phase of engagement, and irrespective of the issues prioritized, the United States should work with both the government and nongovernmental actors in Sudan to develop a clear set of short-term and long-term indicators that are measurable, achievable, practical, and meaningful. For example, on religious freedom, a short-term step could be halting the destruction of religious premises. Longer-term indicators could include reforming the government's role in overseeing the selection of imams in the capital and restoring land and property confiscated from individual religious communities over the past three decades. Rather than limit any new roadmap for engagement to a six- or twelve-month period, a future plan should take into account the 2020 electoral cycle and the credibility of those elections.
- For the duration of the normalization period, the US and Sudanese governments should support the establishment of an independent panel of subject-matter experts—beyond the joint review committee of American and Sudanese government officials that oversaw the five-track process—to determine compliance with the established indicators. The panel should be able to conduct unfettered consultations with Sudanese citizens.
- The United States should undertake more extensive public diplomacy about its engagement process in Sudan, including but not limited to the official embassy and State Department websites. Communication should be targeted to Sudanese citizens beyond the political elite and should creatively use social media. Such efforts necessarily require the availability of more content in Sudanese languages, principally, but not only, in Arabic.

Notes

1. William J. Clinton, "Executive Order 13067—Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan," November 3, 1997, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=53505.
2. Barack Obama, "Executive Order 13761—Recognizing Positive Actions by the Government of Sudan and Providing for the Revocation of Certain Sudan-Related Sanctions," January 13, 2017, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=121363.
3. Donald J. Trump, "Executive Order 13804—Allowing Additional Time for Recognizing Positive Actions by the Government of Sudan and Amending Executive Order 13761," July 11, 2017, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=126650.
4. See Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, "Notice Regarding Positive Actions by the Government of Sudan," October 11, 2017, www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/11/2017-21927/notice-regarding-positive-actions-by-the-government-of-sudan. The five tracks included two domestic priorities: a cessation of government military offensives in the conflict areas of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, and improved humanitarian access to these conflict zones; and three regional priorities: noninterference in South Sudan's civil war, cooperation on counterterrorism, and cooperation on countering the Lord's Resistance Army.
5. "Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, certain controls over exports of dual use items, and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are four countries designated under these authorities: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, Sudan, and Syria." State Sponsors of Terrorism, Department of State, www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.
6. See, for example, International Crisis Group, "Time to Repeal U.S. Sanctions on Sudan?" June 22, 2017, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b127time-repeal-us-sanctions-sudan; Mary C. Yates and Kelsey Lilley, "Sudan: A Strategy for Re-Engagement," Atlantic Council, July 2017, www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/sudan-a-strategy-for-re-engagement; Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations Sub Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, United States House of Representatives, "The Questionable Case for Easing Sudan Sanctions," April 26, 2017, <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-questionable-case-easing-sudan-sanctions/>.
7. The IMF argued in December 2017 that "subsidies are an inefficient policy instrument to protect lower income groups... [However,] to date, no assessment has been made of the distributional impact of wheat subsidies, but anecdotal evidence suggests that they are regressive." It also warned that "phasing out the subsidies currently provided through access to overvalued foreign exchange will result in an increase in retail prices of at least 216

percent in fuel product prices, subsidized bread prices, and electricity tariffs, and will therefore significantly impact the income of especially those in the lowest income groups." See International Monetary Fund, "Sudan: Selected Issues," IMF Country Report No. 17/365, December 11, 2017, 3–5, www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/12/11/Sudan-Selected-Issues-45457.

8. Steve Hanke (@steve_hanke), "Sudan's inflation rate has skyrocketed to a record high of 122%. #Sudan has surpassed South Sudan and now has second highest inflation rate in the world after Venezuela," Twitter, January 28, 2018, 2:34 p.m., https://twitter.com/steve_hanke/status/957743771126501376.
9. Human Rights Watch, "Sudan: Prisoner Release Left Many Activists Behind," February 22, 2018, www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/22/sudan-prisoner-release-left-many-activists-behind.
10. "Sudan fuel unrest: Many die in Khartoum as riots continue," *BBC News*, September 25, 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24272835.
11. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Benchmarks for Sudan," May 3, 2017, www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/03/human-rights-benchmarks-sudan; The Enough Project, "The Missing Track: the case for a new policy framework between the United States and Sudan," June 2017, <https://enoughproject.org/policy-briefs/the-missing-track>.
12. "Donald Booth: 'Sanctions relief is a start to address Sudan's human rights issues,'" May 15, 2017, *Radio Dabanga*, www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/donald-booth-sanctions-relief-is-a-start-to-address-sudan-s-human-rights-issues.
13. In early 2018, the embassy posted a short statement on the protests in Sudan. See US Embassy in Sudan, "U.S. Embassy Statement on Protests in Sudan," press release, February 19, 2018, <https://sd.usembassy.gov/category/press-releases/>.
14. Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan, "Remarks on Human Rights/Religious Freedom in Sudan," speech at Al-Neelain Mosque, Khartoum, November 17, 2017, www.state.gov/s/d/17/275752.htm.
15. Al Khatim Adlan Centre for Enlightenment and the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, "A Study of the Sudanese Voluntary and Humanitarian Work Act (2006)," 2015, www.kacesudan.org/en/study-sudanese-voluntary-humanitarian-work-act/. As Human Rights Watch noted in 2006, "The HAC has played an obstructive role in administering and coordinating international relief in Sudan since its inception. It and its predecessor agency constricted relief deliveries during the north-south war and in Khartoum, where many southerners fled during that war. Many HAC personnel have a security, not a relief, background." Human Rights Watch, "Darfur: Humanitarian Aid under Siege," May 2006, www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/sudan0506/. HAC eased restrictions on the hiring of NGO staff in July 2017. USAID, "Sudan – Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #5," July 27, 2017, www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/sudan_ce_fs05_07-27-2017.pdf.
16. Khalid Abdelaziz, "In Sudan, an unlikely path to jihad for students, Khalid Abdelaziz," *Reuters*, March 27, 2015, www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-sudan-students-insight/in-sudan-an-unlikely-path-to-jihad-for-students-idUSKBNOMN1C920150327.
17. To read more about al-Gizouli, see Suliman Baldo, "Radical Intolerance: Sudan's Religious Oppression and Embrace of Extremist Groups," The Enough Project, December 2017, https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/SudanReligiousFreedom_Enough_Dec2017_final.pdf.

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- *South Sudan's Renewable Energy Potential: A Building Block for Peace* by David Mozersky and Daniel M. Kammen (Special Report, January 2018)
- *Conflict Management Training for Peacekeepers: Assessment and Recommendations* by Alison Milofsky, Joseph Sany, Illana M. Lancaster, and Jeff Krentel (Special Report, August 2017)



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